@MrHen — You already have enough prerequisite knowledge so that some inferential distances are shorter for you. When an inferential distance is short, you'd naturally think that the amount of information is small.
Oh, and I wish they didn't use obscure terminology so much—only when a short explanation was impossible. This is a general tendency that I see in philosophy all the time.
Consider "Bayesian". That probably isn't an obscure term at all: I just keep forgetting what it means, because I learnt what it was under different labels. But my labels would be like "subjective probability" or something: a good label is descriptive.
@MrHen Err, I mean, some people consider clear writing that way, but they are wrong, because it is probably not the case. Hence it will be clear that bad writing can be clear writing as long as it isn't good.
@Cerberus — Eliezer Yudkowsky's attempt to cover the core material of the Sequences in the form of Harry Potter fan-fiction, intended for a wide and inexperienced audience, I believe. I wanted to inquire MrHen about his opinion as to how well EY's doing that.
> Depending on how your childhood went, you may remember a time period when you first began to doubt Santa Claus's existence, but you still believed that you were supposed to believe in Santa Claus, so you tried to deny the doubts. As Daniel Dennett observes, where it is difficult to believe a thing, it is often much easier to believe that you ought to believe it.
> What does it mean to believe that the Ultimate Cosmic Sky is both perfectly blue and perfectly green? The statement is confusing; it's not even clear what it would mean to believe it - what exactly would be believed, if you believed. You can much more easily believe that it is proper, that it is good and virtuous and beneficial, to believe that the Ultimate Cosmic Sky is both perfectly blue and perfectly green. Dennett calls this "belief in belief".
Then A.) I find "belief" for 1 a misleading term, because 1 and 2 are rather different things, and B.) 1's property of being a belief is trivial: you could say that you have a subconscious belief about anything and everything that goes on in your mind.
Yeah, but I find the word "belief" confusing. I think Occam's Razor would cut it off: why not just say you have the desire to act as if you believed the stove was hot, to some degree?
No: I want to believe that it is cool, and I tell other people that it is cool; and yet I won't touch it, because, somewhere deep inside, I believe it is still hot.
That is cognitive dissonance; but Dennet's terminology seems to imply some sort of meta-belief that I don't think is appropriate. Or perhaps I just find it unclear. I don't know.
Why do you want to believe that it's cool? Isn't it because it's virtuous to believe that it's cool? And if it is, don't you believe that it's virtuous to believe that it's cool?
Suppose the extremely simple situation where I believe the world exists. I also believe that I believe that. I also believe that I believe that I believe... that is pretty useless.
@MrHen I actually don't think that is the best way to say it: you want the stove to be cool, because you want God to exist, which would be incompatible with its being hot.
@Cerberus > For one thing, if you believe in belief, you cannot admit to yourself that you only believe in belief, because it is virtuous to believe, not to believe in belief, and so if you only believe in belief, instead of believing, you are not virtuous. Nobody will admit to themselves,
> "I don't believe the Ultimate Cosmic Sky is blue and green, but I believe I ought to believe it" - not unless they are unusually capable of acknowledging their own lack of virtue. People don't believe in belief in belief, they just believe in belief.
For one thing, I find the use of "belief" for something subconscious misleading when combined with conscious belief in the same sentence, suggesting that they are similar.