It's funny that you brought up Hume ---- The second of my two WL Craig links is titled, "Hume's Abject Failure". Not that a title proves anything, but that I was aware of Hume!

It looks like Craig's 2018 writing was in reference to a 2000 book from Oxford Univ. Press, "Hume's Abject Failure: The Argument Against Miracles" by John Earman.

Here,

I'll copy the first two paragraphs of Earman's book.

"

Section X ("Of Miracles") of Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding [1] is a failure. In philosophy, where almost all ambitious projects are failures, this may seem a mild criticism. So to be blunt, I contend that "Of Miracles" is an abject failure. It is not simply that Hume's essay does not achieve its goals, but that his goals are ambiguous and confused.

Most of Hume's considerations are unoriginal, warmed over versions of arguments that are found in the writings of predecessors and contemporaries. And the parts of "Of Miracles" that set Hume apart do not stand up to scrutiny.

[new paragraph]

An apt analogy for Hume's project is the search for a "demarcation criterion." As originally conceived by the logical positivists, such a criterion would separate genuine assertions having cognitive significance from meaningless gibberish. More recently, there has been a quest for a criterion to cleave genuine science from pseudo-science.

The history of these twin quests has been a history of failure [2]. One of the morals to be drawn from a failure to find a litmus test of the pseudo-scientific is relevant here: namely, it does not much matter what label one sticks on a particular assertion or enterprise; [3]

the interesting questions are whether the assertion merits belief and whether the enterprise is conducive to producing well-founded belief. [4] The answers cannot be supplied by a simple litmus test, but can only be reached by detailed, case-by-case investigations.

/"

I think that the sentence, "the Sagan standard is either false or it is trivially true" is very helpful, as Dr. Craig asserts. I think that your understanding of the Sagan standard makes the Sagan standard out to be trivially true.

Here's my criterion: in how many times when you have thought or said or written "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence" would you have said that it would be just as well if the extraordinary claim was supported by "evidence"?