So, I've been reflecting on our discussion sparked by Huemer's paper. I suppose the main thing I wanted to say is that I find it somewhat difficult to figure out what you actually believe about morality.

You pointed out a lot of difficulties people face in finding out the right or wrong action in any given circumstance (difficulty in pinning down an exact definition of "good", varying desires of people depending on their state of mind, conflicting interests), but I don't think any moral philosopher who affirms objective right and wrong would deny any of the things you pointed out. Ethical philosophers know that things aren't clear-cut, which is why there's a whole field of study dedicated to

asking, "What is the (moral) good?"

They (and I) also recognize that "good", in a moral sense, can't be synonymous with "desirable", because there are many desires people have for things that are morally wrong, for example, the kid who wants to take a piece of bubble gum from the store without paying for it, or the man who wants to cheat on his spouse. There are also things people can enjoy that are morally wrong (see above examples again)...otherwise those things wouldn't be desired

I do recognize, however, that you weren't necessarily arguing in favor of defining moral good as "desirable"...you got your examples from Huemer's example of a "basic" moral statement (I think it was...) "Enjoyment is desirable"

I think if he were to actually engage in discussion over that phrase, he would modify it to make it more nuanced.

I would like to point out, however, that to attempt to define some words with just a synonym (good=desirable, for example), can't be done, because these different words have different connotations, and no synonym can capture every connotation contained in the idea of a "moral good".

Terms in moral language are frequently vague and undefined and in practice carry numerous distinct meanings, so while moral claims can have objective truth values with respect to any chosen meaning for terms, they can have different truth values with respect to different meanings, and moreover the only reason moral claims are relevant or compelling to people is when they reflect our feelings about possible states of affairs, which are not universal among all people both actual and hypothetical.

I don't know whether to keep going now or to stop and pick it up later, because I'm leaving for church in 15 minutes, and you caught me before I was finished O_O

Hi ^_^/

Hi

The claim of an objectivist about morality is that a universal "ought" exists regardless of whether people feel compelled by it

What does "you ought to [action]" mean, then?

What does "orange" mean

?

I'm sorry, lol

I have to take some time to think about how to answer that.

It just seems so self-apparent, that I'm not sure how to put it into different words.

In my experience, the word seems to work like one of those context-dependent things. When I say "you need to do [X]," what I really mean is "you need to do [X] in order for [Y], [Z]" where [Y] and [Z] are clear from context and are of interest to the person I am talking to (or at least to me if I am persuading them to do [X])

When a person disagrees with me that s/he "needs to do [X]," then maybe they disagree that [X] is necessary for [Y] and [Z], or maybe they disagree [Y] and [Z] are of interest, or maybe they misunderstand what I am implying [Y] and [Z] are in the given context.

Ooh, well-stated

Please let me come back to it later...I have to go now

I could, of course, work to convince them that [Y] and [Z] really are of interest, or more specifically of greater interest than alternatives, or that they ultimately do recognize [Y] and [Z] are of interest but are avoiding the thought or in denial, etc.

Alright, goodbye!

Sorry for running out suddenly on such a conversation.

So, I don't think you're to this part in the notebook yet, but how does what you've said there compare to how I attempted to define "should" (in a broad, not necessarily moral, sense)? Since you've given me some spoilers, I think it's okay for me to do the same...

@arctictern " At its most basic, “should” is a word that indicates a state of affairs in which a choice is involved, and things would be in some way better if one choice were taken over another. It doesn’t express possibility (“I can do x”), or what actually happens (“I will/did do x”)...

...Rather, it takes into account at least two counterfactuals and applies a preference of some kind to one of them. “If I did x, then y would happen. If I did p then q would happen. y is (in some way) better or preferable to q. Therefore, I should do x.” "

What I wrote there sounds similar to what you just said

Expressing preference between outcomes strikes me as a sensible way to interpret "ought" statements. This doesn't quite comport with the "a universal ought exists regardless of whether people feel compelled by it" perspective, since people can prefer different outcomes (and it's tied to what is compelling).

There are different ways in which things can be better or preferable. A non-moral "should" might indicate mere personal preference, but a moral "should" might refer to an outcome which is objectively better than another outcome.

I'm not satisfied with that definition anymore, thought, because Professor Alex pointed out that it only covers Consequentialist moral theories, and so "defines away" an entire subset of moral theories.

Also I'd ask what "objectively better" means - once again, I see the word "better" being used by everyone in a very context-dependent way (just like "ought" or "need" or "should"), often with multiple distinct interpretations depending on what objective is implied (objectives like maximize happiness, minimize suffering, obey an authority, avoid punishment, etc).

That's been going through my head all day

Gotta go again...Gonna bake a cake and rescue a baby bird.

@songmorning I don't think having objective morality is the problem. Toaster-oven morality (act to maximize the total number of toaster-ovens in the world) is objective in the sense that the question of whether a given act is "toaster-oven moral" has an objective yes or no answer - despite the potential usual difficulties with implementation and ambiguity of definition (which type of factory is most efficient? / do the toaster-ovens have to be functional? etc).

One could similarly have other objective moral systems - ones that maximize net total happiness, or one's personal happiness, or minimize net total suffering, or personal suffering, or maximize knowledge and understanding of the natural world, or to obey an authority, avoid punishment, etc.

The problem is having one that is compelling to every being, both actual and hypothetical (so, including sufficiently conscious animals, advanced AIs, aliens, supernatural beings like demons or gods, etc). For instance, nobody cares what toaster-oven-preacher has to say about right and wrong, even if his labeling system is internally consistent and objective.

Well, that's wonderful. Smells like progress.

How would you define "compelling", then?

@arctictern I really do like that. I'd like to explore this line of reasoning. (Also, how far HAVE you gotten in the notebook? I also came to the conclusion that toaster oven morality is a form of objective morality.)

@songmorning Relevant to people because it tracks with what they care about and their preferences for what world they'd like to see.

lol I see you found the starboard

Yep

I enjoy the fact the starboard is on the right side, consistent with the nautical term.

:D

Might there be a system of morality that would be compelling to every possible being, if they knew all the relevant facts?

Strikes me as wishful thinking. But it's not as harrowing as I think it sounds - psychopaths are a small subset of people, even many who are regarded as psychopaths probably aren't entirely, and for the rest of us there is a sense of "know all the relevant facts" that is relevant - we are capable of simulating how other people feel, and in doing so feel it ourselves (empathy, a kind of experiential or phenomenological knowledge I guess).

Arguably minimizing others' suffering or maximizing others' happiness so that we can avoid suffering or feel happy ourselves is an indirect form of selfishness. Dunno what to do with that fact.

(Reminds me of an episode of Futurama where Bender, the archetypical asshole character and robot, is configured with a microchip that makes him feel whatever Leela is feeling in an effort to get him to respect her feelings more and stop being mean to her. Everytime he hurts her feelings, he feels sad, so gets conditioned to be less selfish and jerkish. His attitude isn't fixed after the chip is removed.)

Haha, interesting

What about when someone sacrifices their own well-being for the sake of another person's well-being? That sort of act generally strikes me as especially good (sometimes supererogatory)

What about it?

Well, it seems to be different than minimizing others' suffering to avoid suffering ourselves

Although the emotional suffering of seeing someone they love suffer, might be worse than (for example) the physical suffering the person would have to go through to end their loved one's suffering.

Depends on the kind of suffering - your personal suffering (due to "sacrificing" your "well-being") or suffering when you think of the others' well-being.

Hmm

right

Plus there's other reasons people sacrifice their well-being that are contributory, like self-esteem.

In my Moral Values class in high school, we had to read a book called "I'm Okay, You're Okay." The premise was that there was a 2x2 matrix of orientations or attitudes people can take up - where one axis is if you're Okay or Not Okay, and the other axis is if others are Okay or Not Okay.

Like, a person who is sensitive to others' suffering and experiences emotional pain at it is generally regarded as more moral than someone who's callous to others' well-being.

Huh

That's kind of weird

It also had the thesis that the plurality position was "I'm Not Okay, You're Okay"

because of childhood and society and such

Plurality position?

plurality - the position with the greatest numbers (but not necessarily a majority)

So, as in, the stance the greatest number of people take (separating each of the four), when talking about morality is that the morally best action to take is the one which results in "I'm not okay, but you're okay"?

I'm not sure if I stated that well

the book wasn't about morality, actually

...but about people's moral values?

eh. about self-esteem.

Like, what does "position" mean here?

which of the four orientations / attitudes a person has

Like, most people feel as if they're not okay, but others are okay?

Oh

I mentioned self-esteem as another contributing factor to some people's decision to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of others' well-being (for instance in abusive relationships), which in turn related tangentially to this book I read in high school.

Yes, I noticed ^^

Hearing my parents say we need to start dinner. :((( I should go help (moral statement). I'm kind of annoyed with myself today because I took a 2-hour nap during the time that I could've been discussing these things with you. Hopefully, I'll get more time after dinner!

By the way, also please tell me if I'm messaging you too much...

This particular conversation is extremely interesting, though.

TTYL

No, you aren't at all. Also, napping is one of my favorite things to do, alongside math for instance.

Later. I am going to a movie with my dad in 5 min anyway.

I think you're right, though - there is much personal sacrifice that isn't sufficiently explained by people's aversion to knowing / imagining other people may be suffering (or other things like self-image).

Which isn't to say there aren't other contributing factors, like low self-esteem, desire for positive self-image in others' or even one's own eyes (as a "good" person, the kind of which is ennobled in the stories we tell), doing what you're Supposed To Be Doing, etc.