(one of the ones I was part of said something like "these are all of them except in these few cases where there are some more. We don't know how many")
Well, my thought is this: Suppose that, for every statement, there is a set of axioms which can decide that statement. Then could you collect together a list of all these axioms such that every statement is decidable? It might be an infinite list of axioms, but supposedly it would be complete. This seems to imply that there exist statements that no set of axioms could ever decide.
@Rithaniel I can prove that there's a structure $(M,S,0,+,\cdot)$ that's not isomorphic to $(\Bbb N,S,0,+,\cdot)$ but such that any statement true about one is true about the other
Make the symbol $S$ mean the successor function, make the symbols $0$, $+$, and $\cdot$ mean the integer zero and the operations addition and multiplication, and make $c$ any integer bigger than 0
(Be careful to distinguish between the symbol $0$ in our language and the number $0$ in our model)
@Rithaniel Make sense so far?
And because these axioms have a model, they're consistent
Yeah. Whatever $\phi$ is, if you prove $\phi(0)$, and you prove $\forall x(\phi(x)\implies\phi(S(x))$, then you can invoke the axiom of induction and conclude $\forall x\phi(x)$
We've only invoked finitely many axioms: whatever it took to prove $\phi(0)$, plus whatever it took to prove $\forall x(\phi(x)\Rightarrow\phi(S(x))$, plus one (the induction axiom)
and our proof is of finite length as well because its length is just the length of the first two things plus one, also
So in the end we have a model (let's call it $M$) such that
any statement you can write in $(S,0,+,\cdot)$ that's true in $\Bbb N$ is true in $M$
but also we can view $\Bbb N$ as a proper subset of $M$
and there's an element of $M$ which is larger than any element of $\Bbb N$.
Well, I'm currently hung up on the notion that a proof has to necessarily have finite length. What is stopping us from using finite symbols to represent an infinite number of steps?
As an analogy: Suppose I write a complicated program, and then realize that I want to reuse a certain part of that code. Ok, I build a separate function that’ll perform that operation, and I just have the original program call said function.
Keep in mind that I am quite tired at the moment, but I'm still not 100% convinced. You've allowed that you can define a structure with infinitely many statements but that a proof directed towards a statement about that structure cannot use infinitely many statements.
Have I simplified the program? Well, at one level the answer is clearly yes: my program includes fewer lines and is easier for me to understand what’s going on
But nevertheless the actual amount of work for the computer must do has certainly not decreased. The computer still has to execute the function after all
So as convenient as it is to black-box that part of the program when understanding its purpose, I clearly can’t neglect that if I want to know whether said program will ever finish computing!
You presumably could consider theories of logic (not sure that’s the best word) in which certain hard algorithms (e.g., those which require infinite steps) are taken to require finite resources, and explore the consequences of that
Well, I'm still caught on the fact that infinite axioms are used to define an object but you aren't allowed to use infinite statements to talk about the object. Also, just because something is true about all finite subsets of an infinite set doesn't mean that it's true about the entire set. Just because they're all consistent doesn't mean the full collection is consistent.
That rule, that no single proof can be infinitely long, seems arbitrary. It is a logical thing that we can't reference every axiom by name, but I also didn't write out infinitely many axioms when defining my object.
With accepting that $\forall n:n=0\lor n=1\lor n=2\lor\dotsb$ can be false?
I said that all statements in our language that are true in $\Bbb N$ will be in our set of axioms. I guess I should've specified, only statements of finite length
I really should've distinguished between the symbol $\forall$ and the logical quantifier $\forall$
The former is just a symbol, and it can be manipulated by rules, and a computer can learn those rules and perform those manipulations
Any possible first-order definition of the natural numbers ("first-order" meaning it's made out of symbols like this) will describe things that are not the natural numbers
Even if the computer had access to a magic oracle that told it if any random statement was true or false in $\Bbb N$, there could be a mathematician standing next to you who says, those symbols on the screen don't really refer to natural numbers, they refer to elements of a completely different, larger, set
Now Gödel's incompleteness theorem tells us something slightly different
I'm okay with accepting that comparing infinitely many statements with infinitely many statements can potentially fail to ever arrive at a decision, even "after" all infinite statements have been checked.
Take away the oracle: the computer now only has access to a limited number of axioms (the first eight axioms of PA plus the "axiom schema" of induction)
and it's deducing as many statements as it can from the axioms, algorithmically
Basically the least efficient proof software imaginable
Trying to see if a statement $A$ is true or false by trying all possible logical deductions to see if it eventually arrives at $A$ or $\lnot A$
Gödel tells us two things, Turing tells us another thing
One: there are statements $A$ such that the computer will never arrive at $A$ and $\lnot A$
(They're independent)
Two: there could be a mathematician next to you who says that the symbols on the computer don't refer to $\Bbb N$, they refer to some other set, $M$. Not only that, but if $A$ is independent but true in $\Bbb N$, then there's some model $M$ in which $A$ is false.
Recently we posted a question about Jayadeva's method to solve the Pell's equation of the form $X^2-DY^2=C$. In that we got a response showing the Conway method to use the integer solutions of $X^2-DY^2=1$ and a set of "seed" to find the solutions to $X^2-DY^2=C$. But the subsequent question woul...
We = Me..The issue is that I refer to the original author who lived about 1000 years ago and did not get due recognition I feel.. So I write we.. :-)..
and it feels odd to write 'I'
because all the papers I came across, I have never seen anyone use 'I'
@RyanUnger It is more of a methodology with questions embedded in bold
@AkivaWeinberger It's technically not new (see video below), but it seems this game makes that mechanic more smoothly into the puzzle solving environment. In practice, that resizing is done by some kind of portals and perspective projection, but it will be interesting to see how to use mathematics to model the underlying non euclidean space as a seamless whole