@RoryAlsop that's one thing I never get used to when I travel. Here, seasons are seasons - it's either raining, or it's sunny. How could it be both at the same time?
@lynks Just as an addendum, generally on modern OSes segments actually cover the whole address space. Usually there are four - one data and one code segment for each of ring 0 and ring 3. When you make a system call, part of the magic involved is switching the cs/ds (ss) which magically switches your privilege level. Sort of. Disclaimer: that's quite high level (and again not the whole story... there's a whole load more complexity in it).
Most of the time, when some data must be encrypted, it must also be protected with a MAC, because encryption protects only against passive attackers. There are some nifty encryption modes which include a MAC (EAX, GCM...) but let's assume that we are doing old-style crypto, so we have a standalon...
@Polynomial Actually not really BEAST, more like the "padding oracle attack" from Vaudenay in 2002. The interesting point is that they found a leak which is under 1µs and could still pull off measurements.
It works in "lab conditions" (100baseT ethernet between attacker and target server)
Does using a smart phone (SMS) as the 2nd factor in a two-factor authentication kind of breaks the "principle"? Since the mobile itself used for logging in
I'm starting to think I need to stop asking Science Fiction and Fantasy or Arqade questions. It seems a lot of mine are getting closed or heavily down-voted, though they otherwise appear (in my totally unbiased opinion) to be good SE questions.
If they're saving their passwords in the browser then they're voluntarily accepting the risk of transferring their "Something You Know" factor to a "Something You Have" which is their computer.
@RoryMcCune Maybe. Most of the SMS based systems I've seen only allow the code to be good for a relatively short period of time, minutes, much like the SecurID or Google Authenticator code.
The Cryogenics Pods seem like a big ol' Chekov's Gun on both the SSV Normandy and the Normandy SR-2. However, I did not see them being used in any of the Trilogy games nor did I notice any entries in the Codex.
In fact, there's little to no mention of them even in the Mass Effect Wiki - they're...
@Iszi I'm still processing that, I can't imagine that being told to me in the same situation. I mean I'm a grown* man, but still it would make me uncomfortable.
@ThomasPornin You're familiar with TLS. D'you think it's possible for them to implement encrypt-then-MAC in TLS 1.3, or is the protocol entirely dependant on MAC-then-encrypt in a way that would break things?
@Polynomial It is possible to implement encrypt-then-MAC in TLS 1.3. But it is equally possible to implement the proper thing, i.e. "authenticated encryption" (aka GCM) and it is done in TLS 1.2.
@Polynomial If you implement encrypt-then-MAC then you implement something which is not supported yet, so you are ready to implement new algorithms -- therefore you might as well implement correct ones, which don't have padding oracles attack because they don't have padding at all.
IF SSL/TLS had used encrypt-then-MAC in the first place, then we could procrastinate and claim that there is no urgency to switch to GCM or EAX. But SSL/TLS did not use encrypt-then-MAC, making the problem urgent.
(In fact, internally, GCM is an encrypt-then-MAC system. With CTR instead of CBC in the "encrypt" part.)
