@Iszi heh "Vista not well received by business" - understatement of the decade!
@Jin - did you see the couple of bug reports I popped into meta. It looks like they are IE7 specific, but also only happen with security.SE so probably something incompatible in the CSS
i figured that was probably the case - it is no big deal - I can remember the URL's I want to go to, and it is only when at work as the client only gives me IE7
I know many big corps/gov still use IE7, or even IE6! but i figure if you're an IT Pro working in those environment, chances are you're free to install other browsers on your desktop
@Jin depends - we tend to argue that security folks should have more things locked down than others, as security people are a big risk (they're very clever and sneaky, you see:-)
I would love it if we could just mass enforce all orgs to upgrade browsers to IE9, FF5 and latest Chrome, Opera and Safari - but they can't do it so they manage risk into little pockets. The risk of everyone being on IE6 is often easier for them to cope with than some folks being on other browsers that may or may not be outside simple management processes
Ooooh - I had an interesting glitch on that post @Jin - once it got really long lots of little arrows appeared all over it until I hit Upload:-)
@RoryAlsop Can you clarify? What sorts of security risks are commonly risked due to "management" outages for more recent browsers, that would trump the many ie6 bugs like grabbing passwords out of the clipboard? Is there a good Q/A in there?
to be fair, I was glibly running two points together. I definitely don't approve of IE6/NT/anything that outdated and known vulnerable, however I also understand some of the risks around letting highly skilled individuals have versions which may not be properly supported/understood by support teams etc
I'm wondering if there have been any recent advances (say, the past 5-10 years) in human usability for cryptography and/or authentication?
By that I mean something that makes it easier for an average person to make use of the benefits of cryptography. It strikes me that although we have all the...
@nealmcb Probably need one of the crypto diamonds to do it. Can't even see that unless you're in the private beta. (Unless all site diamonds get some special uber-access rights.)
The vast majority of the National Security Agency's work on encryption is classified, but from time to time NSA participates in standards processes or otherwise publishes information about its cryptographic algorithms. The NSA has categorized encryption items into four product types, and algorithms into two suites. The following is a brief and incomplete summary of public knowledge about NSA algorithms and protocols.
Type 1 Product
:Main article: Type 1 encryption
A Type 1 Product refers to an NSA endorsed classified or controlled cryptographic item for classified or sensitive U.S. gover...
I know it's on topic, but I thought I'd ask anyway :P
I'm getting close to 40MiB/s out of AES, that's much more than adequate. The key derivation takes much longer than encrypting any data set that fits into memory
so, I suppose that means that I really have no need for a real stream cipher
A quantum computer is a device for computation that makes direct use of quantum mechanical phenomena, such as superposition and entanglement, to perform operations on data. Quantum computers are different from traditional computers based on transistors. The basic principle behind quantum computation is that quantum properties can be used to represent data and perform operations on these data. A theoretical model is the quantum Turing machine, also known as the universal quantum computer.
Although quantum computing is still in its infancy, experiments have been carried out in which quantum...
so now, I'm trying to understand it properly by implementing it using another sort of crypto - which is why I'm posting questions about Skein and so on. lots of fun
(because the current prototype uses, as far as I know, quite a lot of power -- so you put a boiler on the transfo, and voila! hot water for coffee)
@StefanoPalazzo Implementing is a good way to learn. But remember that it is very difficult to know whether you implemented something secure (because a weak system compiles and runs tests just fine).
actually now that I think about it, the NIST people should prefer an easy to understand algorithm over one with a larger security margin, shouldn't they? Must be reasonable to assume that most breaches are caused by implementation errors
@StefanoPalazzo The main job of a Spy agency in a modern state is to tell to the corporations of that state how not to get spied upon by foreign competitors.
So when NSA says that AES is good, you can trust it, because US big companies will follow that advice and NSA certainly wants US big companies not to be hacked by non-US big companies
so, there's an encryption plugin in the Pidgin instant messaging program. but, they way I see it, it's got a huge problem: It uses some type of public key crypto, which means if your private key is ever exposed, not only will that reveal your past conversation, it'll also authenticate it. So there's proof of the content and proof of the participants
but if you communicate completely without encryption, it's easy to forge. which means your participation in the conversation can't be proven
so the encryption actually makes you, in some ways, less secure
@StefanoPalazzo - Sort of, I suppose. Also, cryptography via IM client generally requires (depending on your usage, this may or may not be easily workable) the same client being used on both ends.
mh I don't understand this entirely. Let say I'm communicating with a rogue impostor
now I'm signing my messages (right?), that means that it can be proven, after my private key has been exposed, that the impostor was talking to me, no?
that is, without perfect forward secrecy (say using something like PGP)
@StefanoPalazzo It depends on the specifics, but a possible protocol is: at some point, an asymmetric key exchange takes place, and the parties authenticate to each other by signing the internal messages for that key exchange
afterwards it is just symmetric encryption and MAC
each party trusts the subsequent messages because of the MAC, but cannot prove to a third party that a given message is really from the peer
I am getting confusing, I need names
A and B run the key exchange and this results in a shared key K
and also the MAC can be verified only by knowing K, so if the police wants to verify the MAC they must learn K and be in position to fake the transcript themselves
to prevent that situation, Alice signs her key exchange half (e.g. her transient DH public key if it is DH they use for that) and Bob accepts it only after verifying the signature
@StefanoPalazzo @ThomasPornin is awesome like that.
3
Urgh. Maybe I'm taking this a little personally since there's a couple jabs and a down-vote aimed at me here, but I think this is getting old. Could we just close as NaRQ? I'd vote on it, but I lost that privilege about 24-ish hours ago.
I am connecting to a VPN server that has been compromised and is under the complete control of an attacker. The virtual network itself contains numerous attackers waiting for a new target. What steps should be taken to protect myself in this hostile environment?
(Yes, I have to use a VPN that ...
Again, I may be biased here, but it's comments like these that (I think) prove the case now: I fail to see how that is relevant. Its also shocking that this post got 9 up votes and its completely worthless. "Install an anti-virus hurrrr." and -1 this isn't an answer this is ridicule best suited as a comment. Both comments are to answers with 5+ up-votes.
@ScottPack Pity
And it doesn't look like we have any site diamonds on right now either.
@StefanoPalazzo - Nope. It was there before. And, frankly, I don't care. The only true measure that can be taken that offers guaranteed protection in that scenario is to not use the network at all.
The next-best measure is covered in paragraph 2 of my answer, though.
@ScottPack What perhaps irks me most is that his rep is so high, and he seems to be not going (or staying) away, nor having any intention of changing his attitude.
Well, in his little sandbox he is good. The problem is that he just refuses to accept that there's a world outside, and it seems like his mission is to pat us on the head, tell us how cute it is that we haven't figured out the truth, and build schools until we convert :)
@StefanoPalazzo At this rate, the kind that doesn't exist.
'Cause: 1.) His question apparently is lacking a lot of essential details which he doesn't seem keen to give. and 2.) For the question as written, there is no answer.
@StefanoPalazzo Again, it's hard to tell. I really get the feeling that whenever he posts a question he already knows what answer he wants, and gets really bitchy if he hears something else.
yeah. well there's nothing you can do about that. I always tell people that we do this not for the people who ask the question, but for those who land on it via a google search. always answer (and indeed vote) with that in mind
@StefanoPalazzo A typical question which fits both security.SE and crypto.SE
In security.SE I would answer: "yes; make sure it is a good one such as those from RFC whatever"
In crypto.SE I would answer: "yes, because discrete logarithm hardness does not depend upon how the group is generated, and, indeed there is no secret data in the group" (followed by a discussion on elliptic curves)
I realise it's very hard to generate suitable prime numbers and generators for the Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
What is the best way to generate them? And if I have one, can I use it twice? According to Wikipedia, they are considered "public".
but that's not so bad, it didn't fit the FAQ anyway
had they bothered to click on my name and take a look at my profile, they'd have realised it was an honest mistake. :) not that I'm bitter or anything :P
the question was a bit stupid, it was something like "where do I find viruses, I don't want to set up a honeypot, so is there a good place to get a bunch of them?"
@Iszi, i don't like this color of hat thing much. Keep in mind that publishing information which is illegal in some jurisdiction may be ethical.
things like organizing demonstrations for democracy, videos showing soldiers killing civilians from an helicopter, it's hard to draw a line.
I just have to think at some childhood memories when visiting family members ones a year.
Crossing the border to east Germany: "Do you have news papers?", "No", "Open your bag". Pulls out shoes, pulls out newspapers from inside shoes. "What is this?"
Not, nice. Especially seeing your parents being afraid.
(In the end they somehow believed us that this was just a carelessness and we did not intend to smuggle news papers.)
@HendrikBrummermann not quite the same, but: "do you have liquids?", "No", "open your bag". Pulls out toiletries, pulls out mouthwash... "Terrorist!"
cool, lotsa new faces here :)
@StefanoPalazzo problem with that "dillema", is that "security" is a vague fuzzy word.
Usually, it can be understood from context, but often that's not the case. That's why I find it best to avoid the word, unless its unambiguous by context.
The proper, full meaning of security, IMO, is really translated better into "risk management". Security is about tradeoffs, and finding the balance between conflicting elements of security (e.g. CIA, but also privacy aka confidentiality of identity), not just choosing to focus on only one.
but, I'm not a networks guy, or a cryptographologisticianistic to know if the protocol is cryptographically secure... But, my point is its a smart move, and long past time, to get the base addressing protocol to be secure.
repudiation is definitely a security issue, but its usually the other way. On the other hand, since privacy is, to some extent, a confidentiality issue - but with a different risk perspective, this is from the pov of the user, and not the system - it comes back to finding the smart tradeoff.
much like you said - it seemed to be a bad tradeoff, in some situations.
actually I think @nealmcb might have some sharper insights on this - digital voting is (one of) his forte, and for voting the key elements are integrity+privacy.
I know for instance that OTR makes it easy to forge transcripts of conversations, but you'd still have to be a bit of an engineer to do it. Is there a scheme where it's plausible that even a non-technical person could forge a transcript?
@StefanoPalazzo well then, emails are ridiculously easy to forge.
as are IM transcripts.
@StefanoPalazzo I think it would depend on the context.
might be "provably easy to forge", or "prove that someone else forged (or probably)", or even "prove that I could not have done it myself (ergo it must have been forged)"
I can also imagine a scheme where there is an incentive for random strangers to forge messages (specifically relating to your own communications), and in such a way that it's completely impossible to distinguish the fakes