Apr 11, 2019 08:34
I've read some McTaggart, but my knowledge of the 19th century Brithsh Hegelians isn't enough to comment on whether they called themselves personalists or what they meant by the term if they used it.
Apr 11, 2019 08:34
My sense is that personalism is primarily a term for a Catholic version of existentialism, so I wonder whether those who are being placed under the banner who aren't at least some stripe of Christian are being placed their against their will (like Sartre's categorization of Heidegger as an existentialist).
 
Feb 26, 2019 11:13
Not completely following the example you raise, but If A, then B. Therefore, if not-B, then not-A is not a fallacy. This is contraposition( en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contraposition) and it's always valid...
 
Feb 13, 2019 15:11
I’m having a tough time explaining why the pencil ceases to exist once you close the box. Are you saying that a pencil does not exist if it is in an opaque box?
 
Feb 5, 2019 18:09
process of what? process of eating? sure, anything you eat is "food to you".
Feb 5, 2019 18:09
Similar != equivalent. Even steak and chicken aren't the same.
 
Dec 11, 2018 00:23
@JoWehler You are right that philosophy is arguments for opinions under a certain light, but two factors still intervene to make it not work as an SE question. First, we're not doing philosophy here but rather answering questions about philosophy. Second, the size of a question impacts the number of necessary things to talk about to answer it. In the case of your question, there are (just counting the ones you mention) 4 different opinions as the usefulness and definition of "essence"
 
Nov 21, 2018 13:08
The very paper you're reading is about the argument that people are talking about the same thing and the nature of definitions.
Nov 21, 2018 13:08
@confused providing definitions does great good because one of the very problems is that different people are using different definitions. Without your definitions, this makes it impossible to know what you mean.
Nov 21, 2018 13:08
"care" as used in the care ethics literature does not generally mean concern for someone else and their interests. At a minimum, care as Gillingham and more thoroughly Noddings used it also greatly involves acting from emotions in response to others. Caring may not be relational in the sense used by Confucians, because relational for many Confucians does not mean "other-directed" but rather that there are not metaphysically independent humans.
Nov 21, 2018 13:08
@confused adding links to the bbc doesn't equate to providing definitions of how you use terms. If the definitions of terms in philosophy were intuitive, there would be much less need to do philosophy. / that Geoffrey Thomas (according to you) didn't understand your follow seems to indicate something was unclear in the exchange.
Nov 21, 2018 13:08
Define the word "virtue" for the purposes of your question. Also define the word "caring".
Nov 21, 2018 13:08
@confused can you make your question much clearer? I'm published in both virtue ethics and Confucianism and don't understand what you're asking that we can answer on an SE.
 
Oct 7, 2018 21:57
Can you (1) edit this down? it was a chore to read. (2) specify what country...
 
Jul 28, 2018 22:23
Er, maybe you should read up on how this SE is supposed to work? (not all statements end in a period). It's not really well-suited to helping with philosophical works in progress. It's meant to help people who have questions about philosophy. See philosophy.meta.stackexchange.com/questions/474/… ...
Jul 28, 2018 22:23
Regardless of the merits of your theory or your credentials or training, where is your question about philosophy? This seems baldly to be a non-formal proof provoking responses to both its structure and the truth of its conclusion rather than a question....
 
Apr 28, 2018 12:04
A is of a different kind than B and C. B and C are unverifiable by nature but A is potentially nonsense pure and simple. Is it relevant to your question?
 
Jan 3, 2018 17:25
As worded, this seems to be soliciting our opinions on the question... There are several different theories of value. Pe de Leao is giving you one of the most common: God. You're suggesting society and highlighting some problems with a naive version of this approach in your question.
 
Dec 22, 2017 05:56
笑笑
 
Nov 1, 2017 07:36
That #1c cannot be settled might be an argument against functions or more narrowly against distinguishing forms of other-use, but settling what is "other" vs. "mis" for everything is not the task of establishing the metaphysics, so it's important not to get stuck quibbling about that (and only to focus on it when its material for the truth of #1a, #1b, #1c)
Nov 1, 2017 07:35
well, my point is that there's two questions. The first question is about the metaphysics of (a) having functions and (b) having misuse and/or other use in relation to these functions and (c) how the other/mis distinction works. The second question is the application of this metaphysics to real world cases, which can depend on differences on judgment and produce lots of edge cases.
Nov 1, 2017 05:06
Again, this "contrary to" and "other than" are a toolkit that seems to follow naturally from accepting things have functions.
Nov 1, 2017 05:06
Consider for instance "medicine", the point is to heal (presumably), but it could also be used to keep someone alive to torture them continuously. Such a usage would be contrary to function. Whereas liposuctioning someone who doesn't want to change their diet might just be "other than."
Nov 1, 2017 05:04
Decadent is a good example in a sense because "decadence" is a relative judgment -- a judgment relative to an idea of what is necessary and appropriate. So in a sense it doesn't need a solid definition, because it's the extreme that opposes the mean. / Similarly, contrary to is going to be an extreme misuse or one to the opposite effect.
Nov 1, 2017 05:03
Part of my point which I don't think you're following me on is that merely because we have difficulty applying something does not make that thing vague. It merely makes that thing difficult to apply. Join that with a clarity about the function of at least some things, and I'm not really seeing why we must throw "contrary to" vs. "other than" out of the window.
Nov 1, 2017 03:18
For me, I take smashing down on top of a screw with a screwdriver to be contrary to its point (minute edge case with caked paint notwithstanding). If we can't at least get that far, I'm a bit incredulous as to whether or not you're doing this in good faith.
Nov 1, 2017 03:17
Maybe in part this just expresses that you don't have Aristotelian sentiments about the nature of the good -- i.e. that you believe it should be patently obvious to everyone.
Nov 1, 2017 03:16
If things have functions, then it seems to follow that uses that depart from those functions can depart to varying degrees (where the degree to which we believe it departs depends both on what we judge the function to be and the degree to which we think the usage deviates from that). It's going to be hard to reach agreement on that, but that's not the same thing as saying the concepts of "function", "other than", and "contrary to" are vague themselves
Nov 1, 2017 03:15
I don't think capitalizing "super" makes it so nor does stringing together synonyms...
Nov 1, 2017 03:04
It's conceivable that your objection is "there's so many edge cases that this proves there's no functions to be identified" (which would relate the two layers coherently), but then that's the only point of arguing about the functions. If so, then your position is really "I don't believe there are functions, so Feser makes no sense." If you want to argue about what the function is (rather than deny the function), then I think you're committed to believing there are functional, edge-case, and anti-functional uses of things -- at which point what goes where is empirical science + judgments...
Nov 1, 2017 03:04
Second, I think you're confusing two layers with part of your chewing gum / masturbation analogy. One layer is what anyone takes to be the function of something and how these acts differ from the central functional acts. A second layer is the idea that things have functions. You seem to be conflating the two attacks or at least being careless in explaining how they relate.
Nov 1, 2017 03:04
I feel like you're being pedantic here on two fronts. First, even with what you're saying you are demonstrating you recognize the screwdriver has a function and asking me to navigate you through every hard case. That's pretty much absurd. I don't think it goes to the point of specifying a concept precisely so much as it points out that if we want to argue ad infinitum, we can.
Nov 1, 2017 03:04
To reword that, you understand the tools he's using, but you think the moral universe Feser is painting is wrong and doesn't match up to the world we live in (either on a physical or social level). Or at least I think you understand the tool, if not, here's an example, using a screwdriver to put in / take out a screw is its function F (stipulating), using a flathead to pry something open is other than its function. Smashing down on a screw repeatedly with a screwdriver is contrary to its function.
Nov 1, 2017 03:04
I'm a little bit lost in following your position here. The way I read what you're writing: (1) You seem to grasp the difference between contrary to and other than. (2) You merely deny the way he's categorizing things with respect to that. These are two completely separate issues.
 
Aug 14, 2017 13:00
A third possibility is to quote but instead of [sic] to bracket-replace the incorrect segment.
 
Aug 12, 2017 16:16
so I think my first comment still stands... and the goal isn't just idle preference.
Aug 12, 2017 16:16
Sure, granted that a Prauss or Allison book on "what does Kant mean by ..." is also philosophy in its own right, but answers on an SE shouldn't delve into that level of precision (at a minimum due to length). At which point the degree to which it represents the answers' personal take on things is rather minimized and we're much closer to the base SE model.
Aug 12, 2017 16:16
I'm not understanding your after At some point... As a "professional philosopher" (assuming the degree and publications are what would make one), I definitely see a difference between answering someone's question about Sartre or Descartes as distinct from anything within the professional purview of "doing philosophy". Maybe it becomes "philosophy" since it's my interpretation, but for many of the questions (logic, many Descartes, many Kant), other than subtle differences in wording, most philosophers would give the answer. I think that's the sweet spot where a philosophy.SE shines.
Aug 12, 2017 16:16
@Isaacson I can see how one can argue that this about having positions in philosophy that people want to validate and different degrees of ingenuity in supporting that... (ala power in Foucault's work) but if that's the point, then this SE should be shut down / The point of SE is to harness somehow something in human nature for productive purposes. So what we're trying to do here is harness volunteer attitudes into useful answer to questions about philosophy rather than have a war in which both questions and answers are just pushing personal philosophies.
Aug 12, 2017 16:16
(3) the example of world-building.SE highlights the problem rather than undermines it. A good answer on world-building is one that would help a person designing their own fictional world. That feature of answering and voting on answers is hopefully not arbitrary. Here, the same guiding criterion should be whether it answers the users question about philosophy. The problem here vs. there is that often people do not have a question about philosophy. They have a position in philosophy they want to validate and that makes the voting arbitrary and breaks the point of an SE.
Aug 12, 2017 16:16
(2) I agree with you on the good subjective / bad subjective thing. I've never really understood that. (one problem is that the word "subjective" has at least three distinct meanings).
Aug 12, 2017 16:16
(1) there is no difference, asking and answering philosophical questions definitely is doing philosophy. Maybe or maybe not. A lot hinges on what the adjective "philosophical" is doing here. There's a clear cut distinction between asking questions about "art" and making pieces of "art," and the same distinction is meant to apply here.
 
Aug 4, 2017 13:50
one could demonstrate to be true and coherence are really tall orders. If one could find that, everyone would follow that view. What's more likely is that there are things you find necessary or expect that would make certain views appear incoherent to you.
Aug 4, 2017 13:50
Er, I mean ask a separate question in the SE like "who are some of the leading contemporary scholars for understanding what Kant wrote?" / that seems to be separate than asking how to deal with the problems in Kant's formulation of the term maxim.
Aug 4, 2017 13:50
I'm open to any interpretation of Kant, or even dissents from it or from Kant, as long as it leads to a coherent and valid system of morality. I can't really help you there. There's not that much agreement on what is "valid" and "coherent." You'd have to flesh that out much more clearly -- and again not really answerable in a comment (and possibly not at all on an SE).
Aug 4, 2017 13:50
Finally, who should I read on Kant? There's quite a few good Kant scholars and quite a few interesting derivative Kantian -- enough so that I'm not going to answer that in a comment.
Aug 4, 2017 13:50
Would the R, be the same in all people of good character, or as I have read, of all people who share the supra-maxim of putting morality (or reason) before their desires? Could you provide an example of what it would be? Reason (for Kant) is the same for everyone and should lead everyone to the same actions. This can be seen both in GW and in Religion among other texts. This is not a maxim of choice -- instead it's a necessary maxim for rational beings to choose. (Kant makes this point very clear in defining the CI).
Aug 4, 2017 13:50
Maybe to draw a moral from the story: don't try to read Kant via the Rawlsians. First try to read Kant, then decide if you're a Rawlsian and thus amenable to their re-interpretation.
Aug 4, 2017 13:50
I'm quite lost to your example ( example of suicide (action) out of self-love (reason) as an example of a maxim including the reason as to why it was adopted). There's no place where Kant is okay with suicide in any of his works. The closest you will get is MM in the quodlibetal questions but there the point is that one can will something that includes one's death but not with that as the goal when that action is done to preserve other rational beings (= double effect). Though I guess I do recall, Korsgaard suggesting Kant could be okay with suicide.
Aug 4, 2017 13:50
To reword that, when Kant says you act on the basis of reason, he means you act on the conclusions of a maxim that can be universalized as the course of action of all rational creatures -- not that you do A because of some R. That you do A because you are R. On the standard reading A because of some R is not a hypothetical imperative. Korsgaard is a bit clearer on this in the text after Sources of Normativity (= oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/…) because she was pressed on this point by her interlocutors there and after.