A Diceware passphrase is constructed from a set of words chosen from a 7776-word database, using five dice throws to choose each word. The argument is that each word in the phrase adds about 12.92 bits of entropy since $\log_2(7776)≈12.92$. As Arnold Reinhold, the creator of Diceware, explains, t...
@Patriot Sorry, but it's fundamentally impossible to determine the quality of the output. You have to have knowledge of the physical properties underlying the randomness and the ability to reduce it to a known stochastic or highly chaotic process (e.g. thermal noise, quantum tunneling, etc.). There's no way to look at the output and conclude that it is good.
@Patriot :For what, transmitting data, or a TRNG? For the former, I really don't get what you mean unless you're talking about new hardware that you need to write a driver for. Also, "break the trail of electrons" has no scientific meaning, as literally any EM involves photons and not electrons. In general though, I'd say don't get your hopes up about "inventing" a TRNG. That kind of thing just isn't done. You can implement an existing hardware noise source, but there's not much else to do.
Perhaps I should have posted this in Math SE, I designed/derived this Cayley table from an S-Box I made a few days ago, so thought the question was suited for Crypto but happy to repost in Math if it is voted to be closed. crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/71288/…
@ Forest I see that you are right about the TRNG output. Looking at distributions of bigraphs and trigraphs is not enough.
@ Forest Yes, learning C is for writing the driver for the TRNG and for doing PGP and purely symmetric encryption in ways that are more to my liking. "Break the trail of electrons" is an expression I learned from long hours with IC types back in the day--a phrase that stuck in my mind. You were absolutely right to call me out on that. But there is an extremely important meaning to this idea of cutting the data trail and preventing others trails to start.
The scandal of modern cryptography is that it often does not deliver its main services at all. Why is that? Because it is easy to get around the crypto or subvert. It is relatively easy to establish another trail of data, and that is often plaintext. That trail into the plaintext is what it is all about--either that or making weak ciphertext.
The way to deny access is cut the trail into the plaintext.
We don't talk much about metacontent, but that is a big deal too.
My TRNG is a new way to generate truly random numbers, and I have been sitting on it for a while. I know it is a big deal, and I know it is going to cause a shitstorm. Whitfield DIffie said that if you can create truly random numbers, then you can have a private conversation. Well, yes, basically.
And the place to start is this: how can the TRNG be subverted? What is the trail of data in or out that can be collected? Does the TRNG actually resist the common ways to collect data? How can this particular TRNG be subverted?
My purpose has been:
1) generate keys which were generated in what people call "a truly random" manner. In fact, I agree with Squeamish: there is no such thing. But what we call "a truly random" manner is good enough for my purposes: generate one-time pads on air-gapped systems; secondly, to generate "truly random" passwords that are long and use all possible values on standard keyboards.
And everything has to be understandable by Mr. and Mrs. Joe Schmoe, which most cryptography fails at miserably.
This statement is just stating that since there exists an algorithm that can factor a number in time sqrt(N), we can use what we know about this algorithm to calculate the probability that the adversary can win an indistinguishability game against a challenger using this encryption scheme.
In o...
> I know it is a big deal, and I know it is going to cause a shitstorm.
Why is it that people who have little/no background knowledge of cryptography are so certain that their designs are revolutionary and disruptive technology? This is a thing that happens all the time, and it's not possible to correctly derive this conclusion with little/no knowledge of the state of the art.
It's always interesting to see what people with no real knowledge of cryptography imagine is the current state of the art, they appear to picture a world where humanity has never generated a random number before and that the world is still holding its breath waiting for a secure symmetri…
This statement is just stating that since there exists an algorithm that can factor a number in time sqrt(N), we can use what we know about this algorithm to calculate the probability that the adversary can win an indistinguishability game against a challenger using this encryption scheme.
In o...
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