In RSA, the choice of e being 65537 has no security advantage over it being 3, assuming a proper padding scheme is in use. Is this provably true even though the RSA problem can't be provably reduced to integer factorization? In other words, is it a possibility that a small e might make an unknown attack unrelated to factoring N easier than it would have to be otherwise? Or is this something I should ask on the main site?
@forest most security proofs for RSA with padding schemes make no assumptions about the value of the exponent, as long as it's a valid one for RSA
@Javier I'm mildly confident you can do this with a proper LaTeX environment and I'm quite certain you could hack it together using eg something like Powerpoint or Visio
Claims are that it's easier to make 3D transistor networks, it's cheaper and faster to manufacture, and "theoretical speed ... in the terahertz range".
Of course I don't think or know that it's an inevitable or practical. If it were to make 3D chips and terrahertz clocks efficient however then the future of computing is going to be fun. (I hope it doesn't do to much damage w/ password cracking.)
It seems that a small e attack can't possibly make factoring easier; If it could, there's nothing stopping anyone from computing m^e mod N for arbitrary m, e
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