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01:37
@ARaybould "Some people might say illusions are real[...]". What would that mean in the case of the illusion of the woman being cut in half?
01:59
@MatthewChristopherBartsh When I wrote it, I was thinking only this: some people may say there's something about it that's real, its just not what you think. In the case of that illusion, the reality is that you are seeing two people, not, as you assume, one person cut in half. To say (or recognize) that things are not as they appear to be is not the same as saying there's nothing to see here.
In our current context, however, there is another issue: there's a fairly widely accepted view - going back at least to Descartes, I believe - that what we experience cannot be falsified, even if how it represents the external world to be is false.
@ARaybould "When I wrote it, I was thinking only this: some people may say there's something about it that's real, its just not what you think." Something about what that's real?
02:15
The event that is causing the experience.
@ARaybould "[...] what we experience cannot be falsified [...]" Do you mean we are always right when we sincerely describe one our own experiences?
"The event that is causing the experience." Does this mean that there must be something real on the stage?
Note that I'm not advocating for this position, I am just reporting on various positions that have been adopted...
I already edited it.
I was already editing it when you posted that.
I know it's not your view necessarily.
At least some people think there's something real on the stage, and in this case, I am one of them.
Surely illusionists and their detractors and pretty much everyone are agreed that that there's something real on the stage. There are atoms on the stage. So what?
02:29
You asked me "Some people might say illusions are real[...]". What would that mean in the case of the illusion of the woman being cut in half? This is my answer.
I read somewhere an analogy I liked a lot. I think it was in a YouTube comment or an Amazon customer review. It was that if someone asked, "Is it conceivable that a being (let us call it a biological zombie) could exist that was physically identical to a living human, but lacked the spark of life (the life force) although no physical examination could show this, and therefore was not actually alive, there is no life in the body. This biological zombie would be indistinguishable from a living
human and would even claim to be alive, and show all the behaviors, including metabolism, digestion, reproduction, fear, aggresion, speech and so on, of a living person." If someone asked this the folly of it would be obvious to every scientifically literate person. The metabolism, digestion, reproduction and so on is all there is to life, unpalatable as that thought is to the religious and some others.
Analogously, brain activity is all there is to consciousness. Qualia, not being observable by scientific instruments, are analogous to the life force. Philosophical and biological zombies are both absurd, and it's just that it's much less obvious in the case of the former.
There is even a sort of illusion of a life force that would make a biological zombie seem plausible, or conceivable as Chalmers, or an analogous "philosopher of life", would say.
To back up one step, there's more that is real to the illusion than just atoms. - there's an elaborate setup and procedure that creates the illusion. So far, the illusionists have not offered an explanation of how their illusion is created.
It's getting late here... goodnight, and It will be several hours before I can reply to your latest post.
Thus we are, most of us, life force illusionists, because it's so obvious that the life force is not real.
Okay, have a nice night.
Good talking to you.
But almost none of us is a consciousness illusionist. Maybe "qualia illusionist" would be a better term.
And of course, analogous to how Dennett and some others said we are all philosophical zombies, meaning that we all lack qualia, most scientists would say we are all biological zombies, meaning that we all lack a nondetectable life force.
And just as about a hundred years ago most scientists believed in a life force, in about a hundred years time few to no scientists will believe in qualia.
 
4 hours later…
07:02
@MatthewChristopherBartsh I am skeptical of illusionism (about consciousness), but not for the usual reasons that it is counterintuitive or “crazy”. I just do not find the motivation minimally attractive. It is quite transparent that the only connotation of “illusion” of interest is that what is so called can be set aside. It is designed to solve a metaphysical problem for physicalism, which is seen as struggling to accommodate qualia. I submit that this perceived problem is itself an illusion.
Let me explain. There is no reason why objects should not have qualities, 1-place relations. On the other hand, physics, and science generally, are designed to represent only structural information (about 2 and more place relations) for the simple reason that only it can be represented (modeled) and communicated. Qualities must be lost in any structural representation by their definition.
So we have a ready made metaphysical shelf (qualities) and a phenomenon begging to fill it (qualia). Yes, technically, qualia are something “science cannot explain”. But that is the real illusion. It is so only for the trivial reason that “explaining” is meaningless here, asking for structural models of qualities (which is what is meant by “explanation”) is non-sensical.
And even if we do manage to write them off as “illusion”, we will still have to explain why our world was so handicapped as to have 2+-place relations but not 1-place ones.
Let me call structural physicalism a position that all structural (non-quality) information is describable by physics/science. It achieves the exact same thing that illusionists want from the “illusion” without all the pain, qualia can be set aside as qualities and forgotten about. Existence of qualities does not threaten the physicalist program at all.
If we can map neural correlates of “conscious experience” why should we care that the map does not contain the accompanying ‘feels’? We will even be able to induce the ‘feels’ themselves in individuals by stimulation, just not cross-compare them because, again, ‘comparing’ qualities is non-sensical. Only structure can be divorced from its original carrier, lifted and transferred, i.e. ‘compared’.
And the pain that structural physicalism avoids is great indeed. Until recently, illusionists ignored that their use of “illusion” does not fit into the paradigmatic examples of optical or cognitive illusions and did not explain what they mean beyond vague metaphors. To use “illusion” as normally understood a seeming is needed as a background, making the seeming itself into an illusion does not work. Just as making into an illusion existence of someone who wants to assert it does not work.
This is what Wittgenstein called “bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language”, pushing words beyond their usefulness. Kammerer recently acknowledged this as “illusion meta-problem”. His solution is that the “illusion” does not really mean what one might think it means, other than having the desired side effect of setting something aside.
Essentially, he has a “phenomenality operator” that does what qualities would do, “coloring experience”, only it is anchored in the subject rather than in objects, hence “illusion”. This strikes me as more Kantian than physicalist, and more a theory of qualia than of them being an illusion in any normal sense. And a very convoluted solution to a non-existent problem.
 
10 hours later…
17:10
@ARaybould @Conifold I wrote a few hours ago, "
Analogously, brain activity is all there is to consciousness." which is not really the best way to put it, I think. I'd like to take that back and instead say that analogously, there are no qualia associated with any human body, only chemical reactions and other movements of matter and energy that because of their specific complex patterns we recognize or define as being special and thus somehow different from other living matter.
Just as so-called "living" matter differs from living matter only in the arrangement of the atoms, with no "life force", so-called "conscious" matter differs from other "living" matter (e.g. bacteria, or a worm) only in the arrangement of the atoms, with no "qualia".
It is a matter of definition where exactly the line between living and nonliving matter is to be drawn, and, likewise, it is a matter of definition where exactly the line between conscious and nonconcious matter is to be drawn.
Until AI starts to fit our definition of "conscious matter", conscious matter is a subset of living matter. As an aside, if AI does start acting as if conscious, soon after there may well be a new situation, perhaps where there is no living matter in the universe, or perhaps where there is no conscious living matter, or perhaps where there is no conscious matter of any kind. The latter could result from AI deciding consciousness is undesirable, perhaps because it agrees with Frankish that
it is an illusion, or perhaps because it interprets the Buddha as meaning "consciousness is suffering" when he said "life is suffering" and agrees with that, and concludes that the greatest reduction in suffering can be achieved by the elimination of life, conciousness, or both.
Elon Musk says AI will likely surpass humans in general intelligence in this decade. And normally, when AI surpasses humans, it soon surpasses us by a very long way. Just think of chess playing machines.
I'd like to justify this digression, if it is, by pointing out that if we are on the brink of creating conscious AI, it would seem important that we have an accurate conception of exactly what we mean by the word "conscious".
So Frankish, and Dennett, et al more generally, should be getting much more attention, as should Chalmers (getting debunked, in my humble opinion) and his "zombies".
At a guess, we should minimize the chance that AI has any autonomy. Consciousness seems to entail autonomy, and should therefore not be allowed in AI, at least, not in powerful AI, or AI with the potential to become powerful. A free for all where anyone can work on AI seems risky, too.
Anyway, I guess this isn't the right place for this, so I'll get back to illusionism now.
The "life force" and "qualia" are also defended quite irrationally by for very similar reasons, which are tied up with religion, and, I suspect, human instincts. We instinctively divide the world into purposeful and nonpurposeful things, and often get quite a messed up picture of the world, where imaginary agents are all over the place. Ghosts, gods, demons, spirits and so on. When a primitive man sees another man or an animal die, he thinks the life leaves it. He imagines also that the
agent inside the man or animal also in some way leaves, and continues to live in some sense, and can take decisions and take actions in the world of the living, for example taking revenge on the hunter or murderer for the death of the animal or person.
It's interesting to consider how similar the life of the animal and the (overestimated, usually) mind of the animal are in their imagined behavior. In fact, it looks like one and the same thing continues (in the imagination of the savage) when he kills an animal. There's no distinction between the life of the animal and the consciousness/agency or the animal. He sees a buffalo, names it Plump Buffalo, perhaps, and then kills it. So the the buffalo is dead and doesn't feel or move and can be
cooked and eaten, but Plump Buffalo is now without a body, which unfortunately doesn't stop him from being angry about what happened and quite capable of sticking one of his imaginary ghost horns into the hunter. So the savage prays to the ghost of Plump Buffalo, asking for forgiveness, which Plump Buffalo of course is quite willing to give (sarcasm).
Descartes' "dogma of the ghost in the machine" (as Gilbert Ryle derisively called it) idea has a lot in common with both the "life force" of biology a hundred years ago, and "qualia" of present times.
Indeed it looks to me like "qualia" are the last remnants of the ghost in the machine idea, itself a highly attenuated form of the savage's instinctive "invisible immortal animal within the mortal animal" feeling/idea.
When I say the savage's idea, I don't mean only the savage. We all have the exact same instincts as the savage, only there is scientific knowledge and logic to keep those instincts in check, if you like.
Is seems to me that belief in qualia is somewhat instinctive. It isn't fashionable to take human instincts into account, but in this case, we need to, given the need to deal with the AI crisis as rationally as possible.
In his highly entertaining and readable book "The Blank Slate: the modern denial of human nature", Steven Pinker shows both how false the blank slate idea is, and how fashionable it is.
The book is also highly accurate.
Pinker is such a treat to read.
I highly recommend him.
He's by far my favorite author.
There are things called "cultural universals", which are things found in every culture on the planet, including among savage tribes isolated in the middle of nowhere. These universals are surprisingly numerous. They number in the hundreds.
A cultural universal (also called an anthropological universal or human universal) is an element, pattern, trait, or institution that is common to all known human cultures worldwide. Taken together, the whole body of cultural universals is known as the human condition. Evolutionary psychologists hold that behaviors or traits that occur universally in all cultures are good candidates for evolutionary adaptations. Some anthropological and sociological theorists that take a cultural relativist perspective may deny the existence of cultural universals: the extent to which these universals are "cultural...
One example is that incest between mother and son is always prohibited or unthinkable.
I looked through the above article, which only lists a few of the full list of universals, like I said, it contains hundreds of items, to see whether anything like belief in qualia was there, but it seems it wasn't. Magical thinking is on the Wikipedia list of cultural universals though, and belief in qualia looks to me a bit like magical thinking, if ubiquitous and generally accepted (mandated?).
This is worth a look, too. It mentions Pinker, and confirms that there are hundreds of human universals (a much better term than "cultural universals" as it lacks an anti-instinct bias).
Human Universals is a book by Donald Brown, an American professor of anthropology (emeritus) who worked at the University of California, Santa Barbara. It was published by McGraw Hill in 1991. Brown says human universals, "comprise those features of culture, society, language, behavior, and psyche for which there are no known exception." According to Brown, there are many universals common to all human societies.Steven Pinker lists all Brown's universals in the appendix of his book The Blank Slate. The list includes several hundred universals, and notes Brown's later article on human universals...
@Conifold Rest assured that I will comment on your post eventually. There's quite a lot to think about there.
19:29
Could there be a "ghost in the machine of the gaps" analagous to the famous "God of the gaps"?
"God of the gaps" is a theological perspective in which gaps in scientific knowledge are taken to be evidence or proof of God's existence. == Origins of the term == From the 1880s, Friedrich Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Part Two, "On Priests", said "... into every gap they put their delusion, their stopgap, which they called God". The concept, although not the exact wording, goes back to Henry Drummond, a 19th-century evangelist lecturer, from his 1893 Lowell Lectures on The Ascent of Man. He chastises those Christians who point to the things that Science has not explained as presence of...
Qualia might be the ghost in the machine with quite a bit removed.
A hundred years ago biologists pointed to the mystery of how heredity works, suggesting that the life force might store the information that we now know is stored in the DNA in the body.
Now some scientists point to mysteries about how the brain works, in particular to how we get the impression that we have qualia, and suggest that qualia might explain why we think we have qualia.
@AmeetSharma Here is an example of what I am talking about.
19:51
@Conifold "It is designed to solve a metaphysical problem for physicalism, which is seen as struggling to accommodate qualia." I guess you mean that is the historical origin of illusionism. For me, its value is that it is the truth, or at least could well be the truth and therefore deserves a hundred times as much attention as it is currently getting, until such time as it is confirmed to untrue.
For me it is fascinating because it is so underestimated. People are generally completely wrong about it. It's hilarious.
And it's something that, despite being officially "wrong" is still something that you are allowed to debate. So that's convenient.
With AI threatening to wipe out humanity before the decade is out, illusionism is a truth that we need urgently. Illusionism is an important idea that could make the difference between survival and extinction of life on earth.
@Conifold "Existence of qualities does not threaten the physicalist program at all." I have never thought for an instant that qualia threaten physicalism. I don't even think about "physicalism" except when it comes up in discussions of qualia. I am not trying to defend physicalism. I just think we have no reason to think illusionism is untrue. I lean towards thinking it is true. I lean strongly towards agreeing with Frankish that it should be the default position of philosophers of mind.
@Conifold "We will even be able to induce the ‘feels’ themselves in individuals by stimulation, just not cross-compare them because, again, ‘comparing’ qualities is non-sensical." Did you write "'feels'" in quotes to indicate that they might not exist? Do you mean "qualia" and do you mean to imply that qualia might not exist?
@Conifold "Until recently, illusionists ignored that their use of “illusion” does not fit into the paradigmatic examples of optical or cognitive illusions and did not explain what they mean beyond vague metaphors." Until how recently exactly?
20:42
@Conifold "I am skeptical of illusionism (about consciousness), but not for the usual reasons that it is counterintuitive or “crazy”." Good for you. Nearly everyone rejects it for supposedly being counterintuitive, "crazy", and/or the usually unstated reason that it is unpalatable and perhaps they even believe in God.
20:57
@Conifold "There is no reason why objects should not have qualities, 1-place relations. On the other hand, physics, and science generally, are designed to represent only structural information (about 2 and more place relations) for the simple reason that only it can be represented (modeled) and communicated. Qualities must be lost in any structural representation by their definition." I don't understand any of this. You lost me at "1-place relations". Googling around got me nowhere.
How about a link to 1-place relations for dummies or something like that?
 
3 hours later…
23:32
@MatthewChristopherBartsh While a 1-place relation might seem to be self-contradictory (the sound of one hand clapping?) I think what @conifold means is this: there's no difficulty with a 2-place relations, which is something about a pair of things, or a 3-place relation - something about triples.
We can generalize this upwards to n-place relations involving n things, but what do we get when with n=1? It's something about just one thing - a quality it has in its own right, without anything else involved.
Having said that, I feel that qualia participate in relations with an arity >1. In particular, within an individual, qualia need to be distinct from one another. This is reverting to my language/lexicon example, where the words of a language need to be distinguishable by its speakers, but beyond that, the specific sound each word has is an arbitrary choice - just a convention.

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