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03:40
hmm, so there are sequences whose status of convergence is likely to be null
https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/1783680/examples-of-provablyn-unprovable-statements
and back here we have explored n-fold provably null statements
To be think about later: Find an example of P such that "P is provably provable" (call this Q), but the proof of P (which is demonstrated to exist by Q) cannot be demonstrated in strings of symbols of the formal system S
(which is basically a long winded way of saying: Yes, the proof exist, but it is also proved that you cannot write it down, ever)
One hilarious consequence if the above is possible is that you can have a theorem that is the proof of P, and you can imagine a paper using that theorem everywhere, but the theorem is practically speaking lack a proof because it is proved that the proof cannot be wrote down
A rough geometric analogy of this is a smooth function with a removable singularity. Then while the limit said that the limit of the value of the function as it approach the singularity a is $\lim_{x\to a}f(x)$, but f(a) itself is undefined
 
4 hours later…
07:48
@Secret No? Provability is a separate matter from predicativity. Many predicative viewpoints (including mine) accept natural numbers as a fixed collection, so anything about provability would have definite truth-value as well.
@Secret It exists. You need to learn enough logic first, but it's a trivial consequence of the incompleteness theorems. PA+¬Con(PA) proves the existence of a proof of contradiction over itself, but if we believe that PA is consistent then we must also believe that PA+¬Con(PA) is consistent, and hence no such proof of contradiction actually exists.
@Secret Completely unrelated.
7 messages moved to Rambles
I have a particular way to make analogies, which roughly speaking A is analogous to B if there is even a tiny way they are similar. The issue is that I have not figure out what exactly is that similarity that I used, which is why to others, it seems I am putting two unrelated things together

For this particular comment, I felt "the value of something as it approaches a, except it is not defined right at a" has a similar "structure" to "that you can go as close to prove a proof exists, except the proof itself cannot be written, thus as if it does not exist"
Currently, I think the best way I can describe that, is I can doodle the same diagram for these two different things, except replacing the labels
@Secret As I said, they are completely unrelated. There's nothing more to say.
So I guess it's just a me thing then...
It's actually a not-enough-grasp-of-logic thing, and perhaps a want-to-find-pattern thing. Remember that it is better to attempt to first find the simplest explanation for phenomena, than to attempt to find connection between phenomena. Only after you find the simplest explanation, then you can see whether the explanations have common structure/content to them.
2 messages moved to Rambles
I see, I will keep this in mind to better understand about both logic and myself
 
6 hours later…
13:45
@user21820 is there a two-param sentence phi(m,n) over PA such that (N,phi) is a model of ZFC?
14:19
@LeakyNun You mean when you ask this question in ZFC, right?
@user21820 sure
(i thought sentences are absolute)
Then you can't prove it, because ZFC can't prove existence of a model of itself.
That's why I asked; you definitely need some assumption outside ZFC.
@LeakyNun Sentences (and provability) can be considered absolute, but if you ask for a "model" then you're more or less asking for consistency.
ya, but...
I'm sure that ZFC+Con(ZFC) does prove the existence of an arithmetically definable term model of ZF, because the existential axioms of ZF are all equivalent to unique existentials because of the extensionality axiom.
sentences are those that you can write
14:34
The point is that if ZFC is inconsistent then there is no model of it at all, much less an arithmetically definable one.
Do you get my point?
sure
but you can't just say that such a sentence exists when sentences are absolute...
Um then I don't understand what you mean by "absolute". Are you asking a philosophical question?
yes
kind of
@user21820 what happened to choice
If you believe ACA is meaningful, then we can use ACA to express the question of whether ZFC has a model (but note that this is not what a set theorist would consider to be the same, since "model" in ACA is necessarily countable from the viewpoint of any 'stronger' set/type theory).
If we ignore the "countable" issue, since even ZFC proves that a countable theory that is consistent has a countable model, then we can state your question in ACA.
So far so good.
But what is its truth-value? If we believe ACA is meaningful, then we have to believe that your question has a definite truth-value.
The problem is that we can't prove it without at least proving Con(ZFC).
And ACA itself can easily prove that Con(ZFC) is stronger than Con of a lot of other things.
In particular, we have ACA |− Con(ZFC) ⇒ Con(ACA).
So by incompleteness theorem ACA cannot prove "ZFC has a model".
Yours is even stronger; you want "ZFC has an arithmetically definable model (namely its domain and membership relation are definable by arithmetical formulae)".
By the above argument ACA cannot prove that either.
So what extra do we need?
Well... I'm pretty sure ACA+Con(ZF) proves "ZF has an arithmetically definable model".
@LeakyNun AC disappeared in my claim because it is an existential axiom that is not equivalent to a unique existential.
So there's some trouble.
@LeakyNun: Wait I realize that I'm being silly; if we're just interested in an arithmetically definable model, not a 'nice looking' model, then it suffices to use what I described here:
Nov 18 '17 at 4:57, by user21820
@LeakyNun: I'll elaborate on my point that we can in fact perform that process using the first Turing jump H(1), also known as the halting oracle. There are many programs using H(1) that are proof verifiers for a complete consistent extension of any consistent formal system. You just use any computable enumeration of all sentences, and at each step you use H(1) to find out whether that current sentence is consistent with the previous ones and if so then add it but otherwise add its negation.
Take any consistent first-order theory S. Build a program that uses H(1) to decide a complete theory S' extending S. Then you can Skolemize S' using H(2), to obtain a complete theory S* with only universal axioms. Then you can obtain the term model of S* modulo provable equality using H(3). So you get an arithmetically definable model of S.
Does this make sense, or do you want me to elaborate? H(k) can be encoded as a Σ[k]-formula over PA, as sketched here:
2
A: Computable extension to $Σ_1$-sound system that is $Σ_2$-unsound?

user21820Based on Gro-Tsen's answer, I believe that my proposed extension in my question should work in general, but needs $S$ to uniformly interpret PA. In contrast, I believe I have a way that only needs $S$ to interpret PA$^-$! (Note that PA$^-$ interprets TC, and the same holds for even weaker systems...

(the last part)
The reason I had omitted AC earlier is that I had been thinking of a nice presentation of ZF where we do not just have the "∈" relation but also have a set-union symbol and set-builder notation that would essentially act as Skolem functions for the pairing axiom and the specification and replacement schemas, and also a constant-symbol "ω" to witness the axiom of infinity. Then we would have a much nicer model, because we just need to take the term model.
AC does not fit simply because we don't have a Skolem function for it. If we add such, we effectively would have ZF + GC (global choice). All the other Skolem functions are conservative, for the reason I gave, namely all those axioms are equivalent to unique existentials by extensionality. AC is different, because it is not equivalent to a unique existential over ZF.
@LeakyNun: Do you get what I'm saying?
15:20
maybe
user131753
15:43
@user21820: Would you mind to come to the General Topology chat room? I have some logical issues that I need to clarify from you. (Although it's fine by me if you wish to continue the discussion in this room if the discussion between you and @LeakyNun is complete.)
@user170039 No, until you agree to stop supporting cranks.
:43074638 You still have not agreed that I was correct in identifying George Chen as a crank.
user131753
@user21820 I see. Thanks for being so nice with me, though.
@user170039 While you do not appear to be a crank, I still believe you've chosen to misguide yourself. When you're ready to allow me to freely criticize clear-cut cranks, I will be more than happy to help you as before. Note that I do not expect you to accept my criticism of philosophers, but cranks are a no-go with me.
user131753
@user21820 We have discussed this issue before. In the following room,
15:58
@user170039 And you know full well that you did not accept my proposal, so I left it at that. I'm not here to convince you to follow me, but don't expect my help if you censor any of my comments.
I already gave you more help than I promised you since that time, by answering your recent query about the topology question.
user131753
@user21820 Sorry, but I don't see any point in continuing this discussion anymore (not in this room, at least). It's after all your decision whether you chose to help me.
@user170039 Of course. But let me just say that you censoring me is like you telling your teacher to shut up. If you don't understand how I feel, maybe this will tell you.
 
6 hours later…
22:03
Hi @LeakyNun
22:18
@MatheinBoulomenos hi
I'm finally actually learning some logic
@LeakyNun Can you help me with an exercise?
@MatheinBoulomenos sure, provided that I know how to do it
It's really basic
go ahead
It's about syntax. So we have these syntax rules: 1) prime formulas which just have a variable $p_i$ are formulas 2) if $f$ and $g$ are formulas, then so are $(f \land g)$ and $(f \lor g)$ and $\lnot f$ are formulas
the exercise is to prove that if $f$ is a formula, then if we cut off some symbols from the right, the result is never a formula
I think I have a solution based on paranthesis counting and the lemma that if $\lnot f$ is a formula, then so is $f$
but in the hint for the solution the author says "Prove by induction that if $f$ is $g$ by with some symbols from right cut off, or $g$ is $f$ with some symbols from the right cut off, then $f$ is not a formula"
I'm not sure how that induction argument should work

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