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00:39
@user21820 @MatheinBoulomenos does the model of constructible points have the same first-order consequences with the usual model of Euclidean geometry?
@LeakyNun I know basically nothing about this stuff, but isn't Euclidean geometry complete by a theorem due to Tarski?
@MatheinBoulomenos the theory of algebraic closed fields is also complete, yet it admits many models
cf Lowenheim-Skolem theorem
so Tarski's axioms should have a countable model
@MatheinBoulomenos the theory of dense order (with language signature {<}) is surprisingly complete...
alright, not very surprising
00:56
But what does completeness mean? I thought it means that the first-order statements which are true in one modeal are true in all models
1. $(\forall x)(\neg(x<x))$
2. $(\forall x)(\forall y)(\forall z)(x<y \implies y<z \implies x<z)$
3. $(\forall x)(\forall y)(x<y \implies \neg(y<x))$
4. $(\forall x)(\forall y)(x<y \lor y<x)$
5. $(\forall x)(\forall y)(x<y \implies (\exists z)(x<z \land z<y))$
@MatheinBoulomenos good question:
let's define a model from the basics
a language is a set of symbols, which include the standard logical symbols (and sometimes the equality symbol) and variables. the other symbols is called the signature
a (well-formed) formula is a string of symbols from the language satisfying certain property (to ensure that the string makes sense)
a sentence is a formula in which every variable is bound (i.e. have $\forall x$ or $\exists x$ in front of it)
a theory is a set of sentences (that may be infinite) (that we want to be true)
a model is an interpretation of the constants, functions, and relations, in the language, with the domain being the set of objects
the size of a theory is the cardinality of the set of sentences, and the size of a model is the cardinality of the domain (which is a set)
wait, what do you mean by "interpretation"?
@MatheinBoulomenos recall that the symbols are formal symbols with no meaning. a model interprets those symbols
if we have a constant symbol in the language, the model maps it to a constant term in the domain
now, for L a language, T an L-theory, M an L-model, phi an L-sentence
M |= T, which reads "M is a model of T", means that every sentence in T is true in M
M |= phi, which reads "M is a model of phi", means that phi is true in M
T |= phi, which reads "phi is a logical consequence of T", means that phi is true in every model of T
note that we have overloading of |= aka abuse of notation
note that either M |= phi or M |= neg phi, by requirement of model (which I did not include)
but we do not have "either T |= phi or T |= neg phi" (think about L = language of groups, T = theory of groups, phi = group is abelian)
01:02
okay that makes sense
now, Godel's completeness theorem, which is "semantic-completeness", states that "T |= phi iff T |- phi"
what does the latter notation mean?
it means that phi is provable from T (under classical logic)
note that Godel's completeness theorem applies for any theory T
now, this is not to be confused with syntactic completeness of a theory, which states that for every phi, T |- phi or T |- neg phi
this is not true in general
okay, so these are the theories we call complete?
in fact, Godel's incompleteness theorem (syntactic-incompleteness) gives a criterion for the incompleteness of theories
@MatheinBoulomenos yes
when we say that a theory is (in)complete, we really mean syntactic-completeness
particularly so for incomplete (because semantic-completeness is an axiom)
@MatheinBoulomenos is there any point/concept that you would like me to expand on?
this is helpful for me also to consolidate my knowledge
01:10
@LeakyNun So are there situations where we can prove something in one model and conclude that it must hold in other models?
@MatheinBoulomenos you mean model of a theory?
note that models are L-models, and are not contingent on any theories
models are not based on theories
should I take your sentence to mean "where we can show that a sentence phi is true in a model M of a theory T and conclude that phi is true in other models of T"?
yes, that's what I meant
sorry for being pedantic, but it is quite needed in this case for my clarity
because "provable" |- and "true" |= are very different concepts
01:12
no, it's good that you're correcting me, if I want to learn this
the situation is exactly when T is complete
no
if you can actually prove phi from T, then you also have that situation
but "completeness" is definitely a strong criterion
@MatheinBoulomenos do you follow?
I don't really understand why the completeness of Euclidean geometry does imply that all models have the same first-order consequences
let T denote the theory of Euclidean geometry
let M and M' be models of T in which phi and neg phi are true respectively
since phi is true in M a model of T, neg phi is false in M, so we have T ⊭ neg phi (notice it is neg phi here)
since neg phi is true in M' a model of T, phi is false in M', so we have T ⊭ phi
which contradicts the completness of T
@MatheinBoulomenos do you have any questions?
3 mins ago, by Leaky Nun
let T denote the theory of Euclidean geometry
note that T is for Tarski :P
"Euclidean geometry" is really a model, not a theory
01:20
But when you asked "does the model of constructible points have the same first-order consequences with the usual model of Euclidean geometry?" and I replied "I know basically nothing about this stuff, but isn't Euclidean geometry complete by a theorem due to Tarski?", you said something about Löwenheim-Skolem
Ah okay, that explains it
I thought Euclidean geometry is a theory
recall that a theory is a set of sentences
Euclidean geometry has all the (real) objects, (real) constants, (real) functions, and (real) relations, so it is a model
Oh yeah, I need to work on the basics
do you have any particular "basic" in mind?
I think I just need to digest the information
So if we have a theory, how can we know if there even exists a model? If we can conclude a contradiction from the theory, then there can't be a model, right?
@MatheinBoulomenos correct
01:25
But to contruct models, we need a meta-theory (e.g. set theory)?
yes, we usually use ZFC and classical logic as the meta-theory, but I wouldn't really bother
yes, ZFC, with choice
Is "field with characteristic 0" expressible in first-order logic?
I think not
in which theory?
If we just take $0,1,+,\cdot,=$ as a language
the language of rings
01:30
anyway, this was very helpful, thank you @Leaky
summary:
1. A language is a set of symbols which include standard logical symbols, optionally the equality symbol, the variables, constants, functions, and relations.
2. The set of constants, functions, and relations of a language is called the "signature" of the language.
3. A well-formed formula is a string of symbols in the language that makes sense, so $x=x$ is a well-formed formula while $\lor \land y \neg x$ is not.
4. A sentence is a formula that is bound, i.e. without free variables. So $(\forall x)(x=x)$ is a sentence while $x=x$ is not.
@MatheinBoulomenos ACF0 is an infinite theory
I don't think it is finitely axiomatizable
and by the way, axiom of theory means a set of sentences that have the same first-order consequence of the theory
@MatheinBoulomenos glad to have helped you
01:33
So the compactness theorem implies the existence of a non-archimedean real closed field?
yes, the hyperreals
note that you have to expand the language
01:52
in Mathematics, 32 secs ago, by MatheinBoulomenos
@LeakyNun can we express algebraicity in first-order?
@MatheinBoulomenos could you clarify what you mean using the terminology of language/sentence/theory/model?
Okay, suppose we have the language L which consists of $\{0,1,+,=\}$ and the logical symbols
you should have $\times$ also, but move on
Suppose for simplicity we want to express algebraicity over a fixed prime field, else we would need a larger language
is there a L-theory in ZFC such that the models are precisely algebraic extension fields of the fixed prime field?
and is this possible in first-order?
@MatheinBoulomenos yes
you're really helping me lol
this is actually what I'm going to talk about
now the language of rings has signature $\{0,1,+,\times,=\}$
the theory of fields is the set of field axioms
now, the theory of algebraic closed fields, ACF, is a countably infinite theory
okay, but what a about if we don't require algebraic closed, but just algebraic?
is this still first-order?
01:59
hmm, no, because of compactness theorem
good question
so the compactness axiom also implies the existence of algebraic closures, right?
for a finite subset, we can just construct a field containing the roots using quotients of polynomials
how do you imagine the set to be?
well, for every non-constant polynomial we have a sentence that says that the polynomial has a root
and the field axioms, of course
how are you going to state that $x^2 - \sqrt2$ has a root?
I meant for every non-constant polynomial with coefficients in the ground field
02:04
hmm
from the compactness theorem, we get an extension that contains an algebraic closure
but not necessarily the algebraic closure
we can just restrict us to the algebraic elements of that extension
that part is not mode-theoretic
not even necessarily algebraic closed
are you trying to construct a theory such that the only models of T is exactly the algebraic closures of the base field?
no I'm asking several unrelated questions about fields
02:07
I'm lost
it isn't your fault
and fwiw, ACF is a first-order theory, and so are ACF_p for every prime p and ACF_0
for every prime p, ACF_p is complete; ACF_0 is complete
I was just wondering if you can somehow use the compactness theorem to show the existence of algebraic closures
but you can't require the model to not have transcendental elements
yeah, but using field theory it's enough to show the existence of a field that contains an algebraic closure
02:11
why?
If $L/K$ is a field extension. $\{\alpha \in L \mid \alpha \text{ is algebraic over } K\}$ is a field
hmm, interesting
so I think it works then
02:26
I'll try to generalize this, this is going to be a huge language and theory, but whatever. Let F be a field. We construct a language L that has signature $\{+,\times,=\}$ and also one constant for every element of F. We then construct a L-theory that has all the field axioms, one sentence for every relation of elements in L and one sentence for every non-constant polynomial with coeffcients in F stating that there exists a root
every finite subset of the theory has a model, we can just construct finite extensions of F by using quotients of polynomial rings
so we get a model of the whole theory by the compactness theorem
then when we restrict to the elements that are algebraic over F, we get an algebraic closure of F
is this correct? @LeakyNun
@MatheinBoulomenos magnificent
have you read about Lowenheim-Skolem's proof?
interesting
because "one constant for every element" and "one sentence for every relation" are basically how you use compactness to prove upward Lowenheim-Skolem...
I see
I just don't understand why we need countability in Löwenheim-Skolem
well, an uncountable theory may not have a countable model, I think
02:42
Makes sense
@MatheinBoulomenos thanks for your questions, see you
@LeakyNun thanks for your explanations, see you!
 
7 hours later…
10:07
@MatheinBoulomenos I do not think LeakyNun has answered your question, even though he has shown you how the von Neumann ordinals behave. When you do transfinite induction, you do not take union just because the ordinal stage is a limit ordinal. You will have to look at the actual rigorous use of transfinite induction. If I am not mistaken the way you have been shown is very clumsy.
We can take the simplest example of the existence of a basis of any given vector space V. By transfinite induction V can be well-ordered. Initialize S = {}, then enumerate the vectors in V in that order and at each stage add the current vector v to S iff S⋃{v} is linearly independent. At the end, clearly every vector in V is in span(S), and we just have to check that S is linearly independent, which you should be able to prove.
I didn't need to split cases according to whether the stage was a successor or limit stage!
All the hard work is done by the transfinite recursion used to construct S, which I have detailed in my post.
I recall some set-theoretic constructions that need to handle the successor and ordinal cases differently, but I think outside of set theory not many applications of transfinite induction will actually have to do that.
@LeakyNun Constructible meaning? Euclidean geometry meaning? If both are using the same tools (say compass and straightedge), then yes almost by definition because 'constructible' just means 'can be obtained by the tools' and 'euclidean geometry' proves only what 'can be obtained by the tools'. Of course, I'm skipping all the tedious technical details.
@MatheinBoulomenos That's why it's better to distinguish semantic-completeness from syntactic-completeness.
@LeakyNun It's dense linear orders without endpoints. Their theory is syntactically-complete.
It is the first-order logic that is semantically-complete.
@LeakyNun Yes the set of axioms { c[i] ≠ c[j] : i,j∈S ∧ i≠j } where the c's are constant-symbols can only have models of size #(S), of course.
10:40
@user21820 thank you
@user21820 how do you prove transfinite induction?
11:13
@LeakyNun Read the post. It's all there! I didn't explicitly mention where I used the axiom of replacement, but it should be clear to you if you go over it. Note that the only use of transfinite induction is to produce a well-ordering of the set you are interested in (here V). If you already have a well-ordering then you do not need transfinite induction, nor replacement.
3
A: Definition of Ordinals in Set Theory in Layman Terms

user21820Counting has two purposes, namely for specifying sizes and indices. These are directly related for finite quantities, because the number of natural numbers (including $0$) less than $n$ (before the position $n$) is $n$. But in set theory, when generalizing to infinite sets these two notions becom...

@LeakyNun: If you want to see an example where you do need the split cases, consider ordinal multiplication. Addition is simply concatenation, and no case splitting is needed there. But multiplication is not so easy.
a·(b+1) = a·b+a.
well that just depends on how you define addition
a·b = sup { a·c : c < b }.
the definition I've seen is
1. a+0=a
2. a+S(b)=S(a+b)
3. a+b=U{a+n|n<b}
alright, you don't really 2, but...
@user21820 is there a theory of ordinals without ZFC?
@LeakyNun You need both.
both?
11:19
ω+1 is not Union { ω+k : k<1 }.
I mean, you need both (2) and (3).
is it not?
right, it isn't
then in this case you clearly need case splitting
Anyway that's von Neumann ordinals. Concatenation works for the original notion of well-ordering, so as I said you don't really need case splitting for addition.
However, if you really have nothing better to do, you can define a+b = sup { a+S(c) : c<b } and it covers all 3 cases! @MatheinBoulomenos: you may also be interested in this curiosity but it has no practical purpose.
But for multiplication there is a problem I think.
@user21820 as an unrelated note, I find it quite curious that Presburger arithmetic is complete
Well even for multiplication there is another way if you really really have nothing better to do.
@user21820 multiplication is just product right
11:25
No...
I wrote the two main cases above.
The trivial case is a·0 = 0.
I mean, cartesian product
Uh yes yes.
Then it was exponentiation that had the major problem.
Lol.
But anyway there is an 'algebraic' definition of ordinal multiplication that covers all cases, just that it is very nothing-better-to-do style.
a·b = sup { a·p+q : p<b ∧ q≤a }.
I hope I didn't make a mistake, but something like that would work. It's been a long time since I did this kind of silly thing.
But exponentiation is a much more tricky business.
@LeakyNun I also found it curious, but never really thought much about it. Seems to me that addition alone is like having unary strings as compared to binary strings in the intended model of TC.
maybe
In computability there seems to be numerous instances of discrete threshold of 2 or 3 between simple and complicated, with a vast chasm in-between.
Here the threshold is 2. Consider any NP-complete problem and you will find typically threshold of 3.
For example 2-colouring is polynomial time; even linear. 3-colouring is NP-complete.
what is 2-colouring?
11:35
The problem of determining whether a given graph can be 2-coloured.
I see
2-SAT (look up boolean satisfiability) is in P. 3-SAT is in NPC.
4-colouring becomes polynomial again ;)
Nope!!
That's 4-colouring of a planar graph.
well, alright
11:36
But incidentally, I think 3-planar-colouring is also NPC.
@LeakyNun: Anyway I've to go now. See you next time! =)
see you
12:24
1 hour ago, by Leaky Nun
@user21820 is there a theory of ordinals without ZFC?
langauge has signature {0,ω,S,+,x,<}
12:50
ordering:
1. (∀m)(¬(m<m))
2. (∀a)(∀b)(∀c)(a<b⟹b<c⟹a<c)
3. (∀a)(∀b)(a<b⟹¬(b<a))
4. (∀a)(∀b)(a<b∨b<a)
constants:
1. (∀m)(¬(m<0))
2. 0<ω
3. (∀m)(∃n)(m<ω⟹m=0∨m=S(n))
successor:
1. (∀a)(¬(S(a)=0))
2. (∀a)(¬(S(a)=ω))
3. (∀m)(∀n)(S(m)=S(n)⟹m=n)
4. (∀a)(a<S(a))
addition:
1. (∀m)(m+0=m)
2. (∀m)(∀n)(m+S(n)=S(m+n))
3. (∀m)(∀n)(∀y)((∀x)(x<n⟹(m+x)<y)⟹m+n<y)
4. (∀m)(∀n)(∀x)(m<n⟹x+m<x+n)
multiplication:
1. (∀m)(m⋅0=0)
2. (∀m)(∀n)(m⋅S(n)=(m⋅n)+m)
3. (∀m)(∀n)(∀y)((∀x)(x<n⟹(m⋅x)<y)⟹m⋅n<y)
transfinite induction:
1. (∀m)((∀n)(n<m⟹φ(n))⟹φ(m))⟹(∀m)φ(m)
 
2 hours later…
14:47
@LeakyNun Well of course you can build your own theory, but probably anything you will build will come short. For instance, ω^ω with the ordinal arithmetic is a model of your above theory, assuming your axioms mean what they are labelled (too lazy to read everything).
Reason is simple; ω^ω is closed under addition and multiplication.
@user21820 I know theories are limited by Lowenheim-Skolem, but that doesn't mean I can't build it
Sorry by come short I meant come short of the theory of ordinals you get within ZFC.
That's presumably what you wanted.
No?
no, I still want to build it even though I can't control the cardinality
I know that omega^omega will be a model
14:49
Ah okay.
So what else were you looking for in your theory?
For a related fact, there are weak foundational systems that have ω^ω as proof theoretic ordinal, which roughly means it is the least ordinal for which they cannot construct and prove a well-ordering.
Reverse mathematics is a program in mathematical logic that seeks to determine which axioms are required to prove theorems of mathematics. Its defining method can briefly be described as "going backwards from the theorems to the axioms", in contrast to the ordinary mathematical practice of deriving theorems from axioms. It can be conceptualized as sculpting out necessary conditions from sufficient ones. The reverse mathematics program was foreshadowed by results in set theory such as the classical theorem that the axiom of choice and Zorn's lemma are equivalent over ZF set theory. The goal of reverse...
@user21820 well I would like to be able to prove, e.g. 3+omega = omega
So you're asking for a complete axiomatization of ω^ω with ordering and addition and multiplication and constants 0,ω?
Then looks like it's doomed by the incompleteness theorem...
=D
but surely 3+omega=omega can't be the independent sentence
Of course not.
You should be able to prove simple facts.
how should I axiomatize it then?
14:54
Isn't that up to you? Since there is no objective goal given the essential incompleteness?
I can't seem to prove 0+x=x from the axioms though
did my axioms capture all the essential properties?
Hmm..
Your last axiom for constants is weird; it only talks about finite ordinals.
it says omega is the first limit ordinal
Yes.
But what about ω+ω?
what about it?
14:56
I mean you are not capturing the basic fact that every ordinal is either zero or successor or limit.
I thought "limit" just means "non-zero non-successor"
Yes that is what I said earlier but if you do it that way then you don't have the basic fact that every limit ordinal has no nearest neighbour on the left (smaller).
what does that mean?
I edited; shouldn't have used the term "predecessor".
still what does that mean?
14:59
You can express that fact in your language.
I don't even understand it
You also don't have the basic fact that every successor ordinal has a unique nearest neighbour on the left.
"on the left" = "smaller".
that's successor is injective
Successor is injective does not imply "nearest neighbour" is unique.
It just implies you have predecessors (inverse of successor).
could you express it in the language?
15:03
You're not going to try? It's like "dense" and "discrete" in expressing the axioms for dense linear orders.
"has no nearest neighbour on the left" = "dense on the left".
15:14
@LeakyNun: Ping me when you get it. Also, in fact you can say a lot even with just the ordering symbol (not even using addition and multiplication)! See the comments by David here:
4
Q: Ordinal pair $(α,β)$ such that $α<β$ and $Th(α,<) = Th(β,<)$

user21820A number of weeks ago I was thinking of finding an example of a complete countable theory with only one binary predicate that is not $ω$-categorical. I later realized that $Th(\mathbb{Z},<)$ works, but an earlier thought was to find two non-isomorphic well-orders that have the same first-order th...

 
6 hours later…
21:16
@user21820 maybe I'm just dense, but I still don't understand it. What exactly do you mean by "at each stage"?
I understand what "at each stage" means for successor ordinals
but I don't see how this works for limit ordinals as well
22:03
@MatheinBoulomenos hi
I won't answer questions about ordinals (because of my incompetence)
but we can talk about model theory :P
@user21820 I was rushing my work at that time and didn't want to think
@user21820 (∀x)(∀y)(¬(x<y)∨¬(y<S(x)))
 
1 hour later…
23:35
@user21820 it turns out that this can be deduced from the fact that every successor ordinal has a unique nearest neighbour on the left

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