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9:43 AM
in Set theory, 3 mins ago, by Leaky Nun
Is there a model of PA in which Goodstein's theorem doesn't hold?
@user21820
Please ping me if you respond anything.
 
@LeakyNun Hello! Well since Kirby-Paris proved that PA cannot prove Goodstein's theorem G, it follows that (PA+¬G) is consistent, and hence must have a model by the completeness theorem.
 
@user21820 but is there any model?
that we have constructed?
 
Well do you count the model constructed via the completeness theorem?
 
I don't know much about the construction indicated by completeness theorem
I don't know much about completeness theorem.
 
10:07 AM
@LeakyNun Well I suppose you'd have to look in a standard reference text then. I'm not sure where you can find a very illuminating explanation, though.
 
@user21820 alright, thanks
 
There are a few basic ideas that I can explain if you want.
 
are there any constructed models then?
 
There is a theorem that there are no computable non-standard models of PA. This means that there is no computer implementations of the domain and arithmetic operations that obeys PA but is not isomorphic to the standard natural numbers.
 
:O
 
10:10 AM
Tennenbaum's theorem, named for Stanley Tennenbaum who presented the theorem in 1959, is a result in mathematical logic that states that no countable nonstandard model of Peano arithmetic (PA) can be recursive. == Recursive structures for PA == A structure M {\displaystyle \scriptstyle M} in the language of PA is recursive if there are recursive functions + and × from N × N {\displaystyle \scriptstyle N\times N} to N...
 
can you write "n is a 0-successor" in second order PA?
 
Yes, but there is no need because second-order PA is already categorical (has only one model up to isomorphism).
 
then how does one typically write that?
 
It may be instructive to see it: ∀X ( 0∈X ∧ ∀k ( k∈X ⇒ k+1∈X ) ⇒ n∈X ).
It says basically that every inductive set includes n.
Note that the set of elements generated from 0 by successors is inductive.
 
but doesn't every inductive set also include the unaccessible number?
 
10:16 AM
No.
Some do, and some don't.
 
hmm...
@user21820 but we can't write this in PA right?
 
It's a second-order formula, and yes we can't write this in first-order PA.
 
but do we have to use second-order PA to write that?
 
There are many reasons for this. The simplest reason is that second-order PA is categorical but first-order theories never have exactly one infinite model.
 
how do you denote the inaccessible number?
 
10:20 AM
In any model of arithmetic, the elements that interpret terms of the form 0+1+...+1 are called standard naturals, and other elements are called non-standard naturals.
 
I mean, I want to use a letter to refer to it lol
 
If you have a non-standard natural in some structure over arithmetic, you can just refer to it by any name you wish. The only thing is that you cannot uniquely pick out a single non-standard natural.
 
wait what?
I'll just call it $\kappa$ for now.
And I'll assume you just meant that $\kappa$ and $\kappa+1$ are kind of the same
Now my question: what the hell would $2^\kappa$ look like?
(and it's defined because of some you-can-encode-sequence-in-first-order-PA thing)
 
Yes it's defined. And yes it's weird. Just think of non-standard models as weird structures that have the same first-order properties as the standard naturals.
Nothing else much you can say.
 
This is very weird
is $^\kappa2$ also defined?
 
10:24 AM
Of course, you have some facts like 2^n ≥ n+1 for every natural n, which PA can prove by induction.
"x^y" is definable over PA, where x,y are arbitrary variables.
 
I've heard that a non-standard model can have order type $\Bbb N + \Bbb Z \times \Bbb Q$, amirite?
 
The initial part is going to look like N, and then there is some element k that is more than all the standard ones, and then you have k*k.
k*k is in the middle of a copy of Z.
There is a copy to the left around k*(k−1).
And a copy to the right around k*(k+1).
And many more copies on both sides.
 
Look
I can't write "standard natural" in first order PA
and second order PA is boring
so what should I do at all?
 
Lol.
 
@user21820 and where is $2^\kappa$?
@user21820 I'm serious
 
10:31 AM
@LeakyNun I don't understand what you're looking for. Non-standard models are not interesting precisely because we don't believe they make any sense to the real world. If you do, then you face a lot of issues, such as the uncomputability that I mentioned, and also the fact that it won't satisfy second-order induction.
 
I mean, if it's $\Bbb N + \Bbb Z \times \Bbb Q$, then where is $2^\kappa$?
@user21820 oops, I meant second order PA is boring because we know all about it and there's only one model up to isomorphism
oh, and I find it astonishing that algebraically closed fields are complete and consistent...
 
@LeakyNun This comes at a cost; you can't pick out the natural numbers using a first-order formula over field arithmetic.
 
@user21820 right
inconsistent theorem :)
 
@LeakyNun I have to think about this; I never really thought about non-standard models; by the way where did you see this mentioned? I don't immediately see why we have Q copies of Z.
 
@user21820 oh I think it's because floor(pk/q) is a thing
 
10:35 AM
@LeakyNun You are right; that's interesting I didn't realize it.
 
oh, I found the answer to my question "how does one talk about the standard naturals"
it turns out that to build a model with an inaccessible number $c$, you add countably infinitely many axioms to PA:
0 < c; S0 < c; SS0 < c; etc.
 
Yes that is the standard compactness method of constructing a non-standard model, which relies on the completeness theorem that I mentioned earlier.
 
oh, lol
is it provable in this model that there exists a k such that n|k for every standard natural n?
 
@LeakyNun So what is happening is that floor(k*r) is in the middle of some copy of Z for each positive rational r, and so we have N followed by Q copies of Z, and then some more stuff! What we need to show is that any countable non-standard model has N followed by a dense linear order without endpoints of copies of Z, using the same trick, and so we get the result we want.
Where exactly 2^κ is can't be described well.
@LeakyNun Not using those extra sentences you had above.
 
@user21820 so it's independent?
 
10:40 AM
But you just use 1|c, 2|c, 3|c, 4|c, ...
 
@user21820 so "$2^\kappa$ is in those copies" is also independent?
@user21820 is the conjunction of these sentences independent from my model above?
basically everything is independent?
 
@LeakyNun I'm not sure. I cannot think of an easy reason that this is false. Perhaps this is true?
I doubt though.
 
@user21820 I have no idea.
Should I ask it on main?
 
@LeakyNun If you do, post the link here. I'm curious to know the answer. I guess it's false. =)
 
@user21820 I'm not sure if infinite conjunction is a thing though
 
10:52 AM
There's no need for infinite conjunction.
 
hmm?
 
Just ask whether in every non-standard model of PA there exists an element that is divisible by every standard natural.
 
I'm trying to phrase my question of the form "let $P$ be the proposition ..."
but I can't write $P$
 
We're talking about the model from the outside, and can ask the question from the outside.
 
:c
does "non-standard" mean "containing an inaccessible number"?
Are they equivalent?
 
11:05 AM
@LeakyNun Yes.
 
@user21820 oh, thanks
 
We don't say "inaccessible" because it's non-standard terminology.
=P
 
oh, ok
0
Q: Existence of inaccessible natural number divisible by every standard natural number under PA

Kenny LauLet $P$ be the proposition that there exists a non-zero number that is divisible by every standard natural number. Denote by $PA+\kappa$ a non-standard model. Is $P$ provable from $PA+\kappa$? Is $\neg P$ provable from $PA+\kappa$? Are $PA+\kappa$ and $P$ consistent? Are $PA+\kappa$ and $\neg ...

26 mins ago, by Leaky Nun
@user21820 so "$2^\kappa$ is in those copies" is also independent?
how about this?
 
Your question does not make sense.
 
must there be standard naturals $p,q,r$ such that $2^\kappa = \left\lfloor \dfrac{p\kappa}q \right\rfloor + r$?
 
11:09 AM
I meant that the question you just posted does not make sense.
"PA+κ" already makes no sense.
And even if it refers to a theory, asking whether it proves P makes no sense if P is not a first-order sentence over arithmetic.
 
how should I phrase it?
 
Don't say "provable". P is either true or false about a model, not provable...
And (3) and (4) don't correspond to the question I stated above for you.
 
is it better now?
 
Yes it's now correct.
 
thanks
 
11:12 AM
So let's wait for an answer.
 
5 mins ago, by Leaky Nun
must there be standard naturals $p,q,r$ such that $2^\kappa = \left\lfloor \dfrac{p\kappa}q \right\rfloor + r$?
 
@LeakyNun No, because 2^κ > κ·n for any standard natural n.
 
wat
alright
 
That's why I said it's beyond those copies of Z that I could easily refer to.
It's just somewhere out there far away.
 
oh and what do you study?
 
11:18 AM
Officially, CS, but as you might guess I like logic too.
I see you got an answer. Yes it's so obvious in hindsight.....
Because PA can define any recursive function.
 
yep, in hindsight.
I was thinking that you can't multiply infinitely many numbers together
 
Well you can't.
 
hmm
 
But you see, when you define fact(n) over PA, you would be able to prove by induction that ∀n,k ( k < n ⇒ k | fact(n) ).
 
right
non-standard models are weird.
do you do ZF as well?
 
11:21 AM
I know some stuff about ZFC, but not anywhere near a set theorist.
 
I didn't say C :3
 
ZFC includes ZF. =)
 
hmm
 
As a matter of fact, I dislike ZFC's impredicativity. While I believe it is syntactically consistent, I don't believe it is very meaningful.
 
what do you mean?
 
11:25 AM
Impredicativity is a vague term but basically refers to defining something based on the properties of a collection that includes that something.
If that collection is somehow already previously well-defined, then this is fine.
 
you mean something like R/Q?
 
No that's fine because we can construct R quite predicatively.
Russell's paradox is an example in naive set theory.
 
then what do you mean?
 
"Let R = { x : x∉x }." is an impredicative definition because it defines an object R whose properties depend on the actual membership in all sets including R itself.
 
but this isn't ZFC...
 
11:28 AM
This is an example of impredicativity.
ZFC blocks it by restricting to definable subsets of previously constructed sets.
 
so you dislike this?
 
But that definition still can quantify over all sets (including the one to be constructed).
 
hmm?
I don't get it
 
For example { x : ∃y ( P(x,y) ) } is a valid definition in ZFC for any 2-parameter sentence P.
The problem is that the "∃y" ranges over all sets including the one to be constructed.
 
oh
schema of replacement
 
11:33 AM
I could add a "!" there if I want to avoid AC.
It is conceivable that allowing such constructions can lead to contradiction because the thing to be constructed may somehow diagonalize against itself.
 
but i thought it is consistent
 
By the incompleteness theorems, you can never be sure that it is. You can only be sure that it isn't, if you find an explicit contradiction.
I don't believe ZFC actually proves a contradiction, for syntactic reasons rather than semantic reasons.
 
alright
wait that isn't replacement right
you need to specify a set for replacement
 
Oh yes, sorry. Forget about replacement, just take S = { x : x∈2^N ∧ ∃y ( P(x,y) ) }.
The thing is that if 2^N was some absolute entity, then this is well-defined because we are just using a formula to pick out some of them and collect them in a set.
But 2^N is not absolute at all, as Lowenheim Skolem should tell you. After all, 2^N, or the powerset of N, is more or less syntactically defined, namely the collection of all sets whose members are in N.
 
(just peaking by before I head off)
 
11:47 AM
@SimplyBeautifulArt: Peeking you mean? =)
 
welcome
 
Come by more often! Haha.. see you around!
 
No, peaking, as in reaching the top obviously
 
@SimplyBeautifulArt Now you're making me confused.
 
@user21820 who is that not well-defined?
 
11:48 AM
@user21820 that's the plan! :D
@LeakyNun how*?
 
LS shows that if ZF is consistent then ZF has a countable model, and in that model 2^N has only countably many members.
 
ugh, how.
@user21820 but 2^N cannot be countable in ZFC
 
@LeakyNun That model doesn't have the bijection to see that 2^N is countable, so there's no contradiction.
 
*sighs* when someone asks a question and it would certainly help to know what definitions they are using
 
@user21820 but Cantor's theorem doesn't require choice right
 
11:51 AM
@LeakyNun It doesn't. I think you've never heard of Skolem's paradox?
 
I haven't
there's little i know, more that I don't know, and even more that I don't know that I don't know
2
 
Assuming that ZF is consistent, we can (via the same proof as the completeness theorem) construct a Henkin model M, which is countable. Then note that any set in M must have countably many members, because each member is itself a set in M.
M still satisfies Cantor's theorem that 2^N is uncountable.
You must always remember where you are, whether inside the model or outside. Inside there is no bijection from N to 2^N, due to Cantor's theorem. Outside there is.
 
I see no problem with that
you just can't define every set inside
wait, outside there is???
 
Of course outside there is; we constructed M via the Henkin construction and it produces a countable model!
That's why it's called Skolem's paradox, because people take some time to get their head around it.
 
so why is there no bijection inside?
because a bijection is a function is a relation is a set...
 
11:56 AM
Yea, M has not many of those bijections.
So inside M we cannot see that 2^N has 1-to-1 correspondence with N.
 
my mind is exploding from the inside
is there any concrete example?
 
The Henkin construction is non-constructive.
But not very non-constructive.
 
not very constructive either? :P
 
You just need to make countably many decisions, each of which is based on whether some countable set of sentences is consistent or not.
 
my mind is imploding upon itself
 
12:00 PM
So if you believe that the halting problem is well-defined, you should believe that each step of Henkin's construction is well-defined.
 
I'm not believing in any of that shit :P
 
@LeakyNun Why not? Do you believe that there is some program and some input for which the question of whether it halts on that input has no truth value?
 
@user21820 I'm just kidding.
aka shitposting
@user21820 well, the halting program...
I think there's an animation on that
 
@LeakyNun Couldn't tell whether you're joking, because it's indeed one of the first philosophical commitments needed to climb higher up the meta-system strength.
9
A: Are sets and symbols the building blocks of mathematics?

user21820The things you actually write on the paper or some other medium are not definable as any kind of mathematical objects. Mathematical structures can at most be used to model (or approximate) the real world structures. For example we might say that we can have strings of symbols of arbitrary length,...

 
12:03 PM
Huh, I didn't know Martin still asks questions
 
@SimplyBeautifulArt There are a couple of Martins on Math SE...
 
Our Martin, the one who's in CRUDE
 
Haha..
You remind me of a children's book I read called Martin's Mice.
 
well, I'm off
Catch everyone later
 
@SimplyBeautifulArt See you! =)
@SteveChamaillard: Hello and welcome! Do you have anything you would like to talk about regarding (mathematical) logic?
 
12:13 PM
oh no, an enemy from CR :P
 
Lol.
@LeakyNun: By the way, what's your specialization in mathematics?
 
@user21820 I haven't started :P
it's two weeks from now
 
@LeakyNun Oh okay. And yet you already know so much.
 
@user21820 I like to learn about mathematics
 
I knew practically nothing of what I told you today before I started university.
 
12:17 PM
24 mins ago, by Leaky Nun
there's little i know, more that I don't know, and even more that I don't know that I don't know
@user21820 I see
 
I agree with that saying. If you are interested in logic, you may want to take a look at the posts linked from my profile, including the introduction one that links to a few online references.
 
thanks
 
@LeakyNun: I've to go now. See you next time!
 
@user21820 see you
 
 
7 hours later…
7:30 PM
@user21820 how doesn't the diagonalization argument fail from the outside?
 

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