Does anyone know where one can download the Carmichael-numbers upto $10^{21}$ ? There are "only" about $20$ million ones , so this does not need much space.
@冥王Hades Honestly, when I am coming down with a cold, the very first symptom that I notice is that I get dumber. I get really bad at basic arithmetic, for example. My teaching gets quite loopy.
When someone uses a derivative rule, e.g. the product rule, the quotient rule, etc., they are assuming the point of differentiability is an interior point of the domain, right? In other words, these rules don't hold at boundary points of the domain, right?
I know there is the concept of left-hand and right-hand derivatives, but are there corresponding rules for these derivatives?
@XanderHenderson Well, I think it does. First of all, $g'(x)$ and $f'(x)$ would change to $g'(x^+)$ and $f'(x^+)$ respectively, where $h(x^+)$ is the right-hand derivative of $h$ at $x$. I'm unsure how $f(x)$ and $g(x)$ would change. In the proof, we are using the continuity of $f$ at $x$ to evaluate $\lim_{h \rightarrow 0}f(x+h)$, however, now $x$ is a boundary point, so I'm unsure if "right-hand continuity" implies "right-hand differentiability".
I guess $g(x)$ would stay the same, since it doesn't depend on $h$.
@sunny Continuity does not imply differentiability (though the converse holds). However, left- (right-)differentiability should imply left- (right-)continuity, no?
I guess we would get $f(x^+)$ instead of $f(x)$, where $f(x^+)$ is the right-hand limit of $f$ at $x$. So to summarize, instead of $f(x)g'(x) + g(x)f'(x)$ we would have $f(x^+)g'(x^+) + g(x)f'(x^+)$, which looks considerably different.
Seems like this result is of little use. For instance, if we'd be interested in finding extreme values, then we'd just check the derivative at the interior points, and then evaluate the function at the boundary points to compare with the critical points.
In that context, computing the derivative at a boundary point seems like it gives little information.
In that context, computing the derivative at a boundary point seems like it gives little information.
@sunny: While differentiability of a function $f$ at $x$ can be defined whenever $x$ is in the domain of $f$ and $x$ is a limit point of the domain of $f$, I don't think this is a particularly useful notion. The most important theorems of calculus, such as the mean value theorem, require $f$ to be differentiable on an open interval $(a,b)$. (Note that each point of this interval is an interior point.)
@sunny: If you define the derivative for functions $f:\mathbb Q\to\mathbb R$, for instance, then a function could have derivative zero everywhere without being constant!
I don't want to claim that differentiability in the looser sense is a useless notion, but its properties are much more pathological.
@sunny: Let $f(x)$ equal $0$ whenever $x^2<2$ and equal $1$ whenever $x^2>2$. Then, you can check that $f$ has derivative zero on its domain.
@sunny: For functions $f:\mathbb R\to\mathbb R$, you can use the mean value theorem to show that if the derivative is zero everywhere then $f$ is constant. However, there is no corresponding "mean value theorem" for functions $f:\mathbb Q\to\mathbb R$.
@sunny: Going even deeper, this is because the central theorems of calculus require the completness of the real numbers. Without completeness, things go completely wild...
See this thread for more details. I have posted an answer before, but the other answers are actually probably more comprehensive
@sunny: Sorry, the domain of $f$ in my above comment is intended to be $\mathbb Q$, if that was not clear.
@sunny: Also of interest is this thread about "gaps" or "holes" in the rational number systems. Intuitively speaking, $\mathbb Q$ has "holes" at points like $\sqrt2$, and $\mathbb R$ "fills" those holes
@sunny: My favourite mathematics book is Michael Spivak's Calculus. I have never read a book with better exposition. It begins by stating the axioms of the real numbers, but initially it omits the "completeness" axiom. Then, when he is about to prove his first "big" theorem about $\mathbb R$, he shows why completeness is the missing piece in the jigsaw, and explains how the theorem cannot be proven without first postulating the completeness of the real numbers.
At the end of the book, he constructs the real numbers from $\mathbb Q$, thus showing that there is a number system (more precisely, a field) that satisfies the axioms that $\mathbb R$ is postulated to have.
@Joe I also have a copy of the book. I can not pass any judgement on the book yet, since I have read too little of it. However, one comment I have is that in the definition of continuity, he defines it as $\lim_{x\to c}f(x)=f(c)$. However, this only holds for limit points of the domain of $f$. This is just one example where I wish he had been more careful or worded it differently. For example, in Rudin's PMA this is a separate theorem.
@sunny: This is one drawback of Spivak's book, but I don't think it is major. Spivak only defines continuity and differentiability at interior points, but he is not explicit about it. Your objection is correct. However, I will note that again, the most important theorems of calculus assume that $f$ is continuous on an interval (open or closed). So we are only considering continuity at points when $x$ is an interior point of the domain.
(Ok, to say that $f$ is continuous on $[a,b]$ means that $f$ is continuous on $(a,b)$, and $f$ is right continuous at $a$, and left continuous at $b$. So technically, it is not just interior points we care about.)
But we are certainly not usually interested in continuity for functions $\mathbb Q\to\mathbb Q$, except when we want to demonstrate just how pathological notion it is!
@sunny: I think it is sensible to consider "right-hand" continuity at $x$, provided that $f$ is defined on an interval $[x,x+\delta)$ for some $\delta>0$. But to define it any more generally is not so useful.
@user85795: I have never read Hardy's textbook, but I have heard good things about it. Personally, I would delay the construction of the real numbers to the end of an analysis introduction, since we are much more interested in their axiomatic properties rather than any specific set-theoretic construction of them. But it is a matter of taste, of course.
@user85795: Also, I think it is absurd to posit that a real number really is a Dedekind cut, but I suppose this is a philosophical view rather than a mathematical view. I think it is better to think of real numbers as just a primitive notion (they are just numbers!), similar to how we think of sets as being primitive. The set-theoretic construction of the real numbers, which demonstrates more or less that the axioms of $\mathbb R$ do not lead to a contradiction...
give me the luxury of being able to hold this view.
@user85795: Much appreciated! Anyway, there is lot of literature on philosophical psoition – known as Structuralism – which essentially holds that it is misguided to ask what something like $\mathbb R$ is. Instead, we should ask what properties characterise it up to isomorphism.
This was posted on MSE originally.
Please note that my only training in programming of any kind is in the context of mathematics, specifically group theory. Thus, please use minimal technical language.
The Problem:
I'm trying to get GAP on my Android phone.
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“All of us want to be completely alive, to live one hundred percent in the present moment. What prevents us? More urgently, how can we bring about such a state of mind? The great American psychologist [William James] gives us a clue in a quotation I found in a most unexpected place, Vogue magazine. This is a direct quotation: ‘The faculty of voluntarily bringing back a wandering attention, over and over again, is the very root of judgment, character, and will. An education which should include this faculty would be the education par excellence.’
Anyway what I think it's wrong to ask what properties characterize $\mathbb{R}$ up to isomorphism. Instead we should ask what we can also think of as $\mathbb{R}$. But this is deeper than just isomorphism. Category theory restricts us to think in only one category at a time, but we can think of $\mathbb{R}$ as existig in various multiple categories at the same time
The general idea of structuralism, I think I agree with though
I wouldn't say it's misguided to say what $\mathbb{R}$ is though, instead, those properties define in part what it is for us
The reason why we call something a table is because it's something resembling a table, can be used as a table. What it is, is defined by the properties that we attach to it
I don't think I said anything deep however. It seems though as the story writes itself with this one
@Jakobian: If you only specify what they are up to isomorphism, then aren't you agreeing with me that we should be care about their properties rather than any specific model?
@Jakobian: If you want to think of $\mathbb R$ fluidly, where it denotes any complete ordered field, then surely you can't make a definite claim about what $\mathbb R$ is, beyond: it is a complete ordered field. And if that is the case, then you have specified its strucutral properties, and what it is up to isomorphism, but not what it is in the set-theoretic sense
@Jakobian: Well, I'd say the informal view is: the real numbers are just numbers, and they have the properties of a complete ordered field. And that informal description definitely doesn't specify what $\mathbb R$ is beyond saying what it is up to isomorphism. So I think even the informal view doesn't say anything about what $\mathbb R$ is as a set beyond saying it is a collection of numbers. If you want to think of numbers as being unique, then I suppose that does specify $\mathbb R$ exactly
But you're thinking of $\mathbb{R}$ as a complete ordered field. What if I wanted to think of it as a topological space? I wouldn't think of it as a distinct object
$\mathbb{R}$ is not just a complete ordered field, and if we were to define it this way, it wouldn't exhaust what it is at all
@Jakobian: In my view, depending on what operations $\mathbb R$ is equipped with, it definitely has different properties, and so it should be thought of as different. For instance, as a group, $\mathbb R$ is isomorphic to $\mathbb C$, but not as a field. So I think even in everyday practice it is best to distinguish the different cases
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