« first day (159 days earlier)      last day (5019 days later) » 

00:16
This is definitely more on-topic here, than on SF, but I'm a little torn as to whether it's worth moving. Thoughts?
0
Q: Security of local Ubuntu development server

Frank VileaI'm developing on my laptop which is constantly connected to the Internet while I'm working. I installed Apache2 with Ubuntu default settings, MySQL and PHP. How safe is it for me to develop when I'm connected to the Internet? Couldn't sb get access to my system somehow?

00:27
@RoryAlsop What just happened to your blog feed? Did the feed get reposted?
00:46
@ScottPack Seems fine for SF - mostly a systadmin/dev question, likely to get good answers there from their standpoint
unless they've got an unusual threat model
 
8 hours later…
08:28
@scottpack - yeah, reorg of posts. Sorry- did I fill your RSS reader? :-)
 
3 hours later…
11:30
@RoryAlsop You did, but that's fine. I saw a couple of posts worth reading.
G'morning @ThomasPornin
Hello
@Ninefingers Well, the only trouble I see with that is it will always yield the same salt for you
so your successive passwords on that system will use the same salt
and so will your passwords on all systems which use this hash-generated salt
allowing for an attacker to run a dictionary on N passwords for less than N times the cost of running the dictionary on one of your passwords
In the common case where an attacker gets a single snapshot of all hashed passwords on a single system, a hash-generated salt will be fine
12:11
ello all
G'morning Gramps
13:01
@ThomasPornin interesting, I hadn't thought about that. Thanks.
13:20
@ThomasPornin For systems on which "root" has a real password, a likely attack would be to make a rainbow table for the root salt so it could be reused
13:47
@nealmcb Yes -- and similarly, some Unix usernames are very common (e.g. "bob"). But @Ninefingers was talking about hashing full name, address and birthday together, which should be quite discriminating
Thus making the production of a rainbow table not very worthwhile
But rainbow tables are just a very thorough way of parallelizing attacks
@ThomasPornin True. But I wonder what values would be filled in for the root account....
@nealmcb Indeed.
@ThomasPornin I wonder how many hashes you'd want to attack in parallel to justify a rainbow table
@nealmcb Actually it is a temporal question
A rainbow table on a function f successfully attacks every f(x) where x was considered during table construction -- and no other.
The cost of building the rainbow table is roughly the cost of computing all those f(x)
(multiplied by something like 1.7 because of chain collisions)
If the attacker has all the hashed passwords he wants to attack as one batch, then it is simpler to just hash his dictionary
The attacker will want to store some data (i.e. build a precomputed table) only if he does not have all the hashed password to attack at that point, but foresees that he will get more of them later on.
So building a rainbow table is "worth the effort" (and the disk space) as soon as it is highly plausible that at least one other password will be attacked at a later date.
14:14
@ThomasPornin Especially as disk space is cheap and a wide range of Rainbow tables exist online available for free (or by earning entry through participating)
@ThomasPornin Thanks! Probably worth an actual question... But since disk isn't free, the trade-off should include a parameter for disk cost and compute cost
@Ninefingers by the way - why even consider a non-random salt, based on the params you mentioned?
14:43
So, I'm getting ready to watch a Sourcefire webinar.
To join the Webinar, please use one of the following supported operating systems:
• Windows® 7, Vista, XP or 2003 Server
• Mac OS® X 10.4.11 (Tiger®) or newer
really?
@ScottPack hahahaha - you said the V word
Say what you will about Adobe Connect. It freaking works on Linux.
Looks like I need to hook up speakers to my Windows box
15:18
@nealmcb Some code I was looking at does it this way and I couldn't think of any reason that was more/less secure than a pile of bytes from /dev/urandom - now I have one. Especially the case for the root user. It is awkward in that changing any of those parameters invalidates the salt anyway, so you then need to re-generate the password, so I intend to replace it.
And in this case it isn't for unix passwords, but it is conceivable a user could be named admin, which is the same problem...
16:07
Do you guys have any tips on tools for testing flash?
Testing as in how?
16:45
Anyone alive in here?
I am
but I have no opinion on the matter of "testing flash"
(whatever this means)
Flash is @Ormis' thing - not mine. I'm having trouble tracking down some info on patches for Apache Tomcat. Might you be able to help there?
nope
(sorry)
@Iszi It was lunchtime, you know...
17:01
sorry, i was a bit distracted
testing as in vulnerability assessment/pen testing
i can was using burp and i'm gonna look at swfintruder after lunch, but if you guys have some other ideas, I would apreciate it :-)
17:28
@ScottPack So, you might be able to help me w/ Apache?
18:14
@Iszi That's a bit of an open question, that.
@ScottPack Say I have vulnerability A that is present in Apache Tomcat version B. The vulnerability is fixed in version B.1, but this instance of Tomcat is on a vendor-managed appliance - so, we can't just update it ourselves. The vendor says the vulnerability is also patched by applying a hotfix number X. However, the hotfix doesn't fully update the Apache version, and therefore the vulnerability scanner still flags vulnerability A on the system.
Where would I go to look up the hotfix and independently verify the vendor's claims? Google's been of little to no help.
18:58
Can you read the rule in the scanner to see what it's doing to check?
@ScottPack No, but it does provide a "System Response" - which pretty much indicates to me that it's just checking the version number and not verifying hotfixes.
What I need is a place to look up the hotfix and see that the given hotfix ID: 1.) Actually exists, and 2.) Does address the vulnerability, according to release notes.
Everywhere I've looked so far just says "version B.1 fixes this".
19:17
You could always try direct exploit
@ScottPack Yeah... let's not?
Well, since you're talking about independently verifying the effectiveness of a proprietary patch...
I want to say, "Good Luck" in the least assholish way possible :)
That's just it... I don't think it's "proprietary". I'm pretty sure it's supposed to be an Apache patch.
That is, if by "proprietary" you're saying "specific to the supporting vendor".
The vendor-recommended method of verification was: showrev -p | grep [patch#]
Precisely, yes.
This is a pretty common thing in vendor based Linuxes as well. RedHat, for example, doesn't like updating versions of software for support purposes. So they backport security fixes. Thus, the version numbers can be pretty misleading.
So, really, your best options for verification of patching is to either accept their word that the given vulnerability doesn't exist in a given version of their distribution of Apache, or attempt to exploit it.
So, what you're saying is Apache doesn't actually release "hotfixes"?
19:25
Depends on your definition of hotfix :)
They'll version bump
I mean, like Microsoft releases patches every month... Example would be how my computer will probably report "Microsoft Windows Version 5.1" until it gets a full OS upgrade. However, application of update KB250827 means that my computer is more secure than an out-of-the box fresh install of XP SP3.
For example, the current stable version is 2.2.19, released on 2011-05-22. They might apply a patch which would bump the version to 2.2.20
@ScottPack So they version-patch? They don't do separate "hotfixes"?
Pretty much, yeah.
Bleh.
19:31
I don't much care for the Windows style. Whether it really doesn't scale well, or it's just not what I'm used to is up for debate.
Now then, for something like Apache HTTPD, you can find gobs of information about other stuff on Secunia
Sorry, securityfocus
Thanks for the info. Guess the best we can do is take the vendor's word for it at this point.
They list pretty much everything they know of that's affected.
Even if apache is just bundled somewhere inside of it, like Websphere.
More on the problems of java practice vs general open source distribution process: fnords.wordpress.com/2010/09/24/…
a real mess....
Oh, wait... it looks like the patch isn't released by Apache (re-reading e-mail). It's from Oracle/Sun.
Okay, Googling around for a Sun patch with the ID and CVE is turning up more solid results now. Devil's in the details, eh?
19:51
tsk tsk tsk
Thanks again.
Aim to pleasure
20:51
@nealmcb Basically the opensource Unix-like systems are built around C.
The strive on the concept of compiling portable source code for a given, specific architecture.
With library incarnated by "header files" and loadable shared objects.
None of this works well in the Java model.
@ThomasPornin Well, also lots of python and other scripts, and important pockets of C#/mono and even haskell
Java was designed, from start, for binary distribution with on-the-fly downloading.
The "natural" way to distribute Java code (at least for desktop applications) is through Java WebStart
Oops - not sure about haskell - I'm thinking of some other more recent language....
On a related note, the GPL and LGPL tend not to apply well on Java code, there again because the (L)GPL was designed for the C model of compilation and linkage.
@nealmcb Ruby ? OCaml ?
well, boundary ambiguities like linkage issues abound with any share-and-share-alike form of licensing
Maybe Eiffel?
ruby is hard also - divergence on packaging expectations
same with eclipse and other systems that have their own packaging systems
 
1 hour later…
22:12
0
A: Isn't OAuth, OpenID, Facebook Connect, and others crazy from a security standpoint?

nealmcbWithout a specific scenario and threat model in mind it is hard to answer your question. But one clear win is the classic OAuth use case. It turns out users are amazingly willing to give one web site their password for another web site, e.g. their Google password to a social networking site lik...

I'm surprised we haven't had an S&A close discussion for this one yet

« first day (159 days earlier)      last day (5019 days later) »