The question then becomes, 'Do we have control over what we choose?', and as far as I can tell, there is no evidence to suggest we do.

@Futilitarian Choosing IS control. Choosing means having control over, deciding what will be chosen.

@Futilitarian we seldom want contradictory stuff (have muscles, avoid effort; salad or chips; enjoy the rain or enjoy home, etc.), choosing is an act of control; the fact that choices are so simple to control does not mean they are not under control.

@RodolfoAP. We often want contradictory things. The rest of your statement is true, but there are excellent reasons to think we have no - or extremely limited - control over our decisions. Literature on determinism and free will provides persuasive evidence of this. You may also be interested in this post. A flawed but brief and readable intro into aspects of this discussion is Harris's 'Free Will'.

@Futilitarian You are exceeding the context of the OP. In such case, you can just create an answer: "no, according to determinism, you have no control at all not only of what you want, but of any of your acts, so you should just wait for the outcome".

@Rodolfo. I'm sorry if you feel that way Rodolfo. I was simply trying to respond to your comment. As far as I can tell, everything I said was relevant to the question under discussion, and to your remarks, whilst insufficient to qualify as an adequate answer. The statement you provide as an example of how I might have answered does not, to my mind, qualify as adequate.

@Futilitarian Sorry, I didn't meant to be rude. I was just pointing the fact that your approach exceeds the context of the discussion, and if we adopt such wider perspective (i.e. assuming determinism), the discussion is useless and the answer would be straightforward: we have no control of our desires and actions.

@RodolfoAP. No offence taken. Your intent makes sense. However, an answer to "Can you choose the things you want?" referencing determinism isn't useless, as many considering the OP's question will assume choice implies freedom. An OP suffering an existential crisis and unhappiness because of thoughts they can't control may find relief from deterministic principles. They may also prove challenging/disturbing, but that's no reason to neglect them. People have a right to knowledge. "We have no control of our desires and actions", whilst straightforward, lacks explanatory power.

@Causative. I find it difficult to conceive of choosing to want to throw a ball. Doesn't the want (the desire) preface the choice? I feel like throwing the ball, so I throw the ball. If I didn't feel like throwing the ball, I would not do so. Even if I was coerced into throwing the ball, there still exists a preliminary desire to throw it. Even if throwing the ball is a means to another end, I still experience the desire first, don't I? What am I missing here? Is there a reference you could point me to? Thanks.

@Futilitarian You didn't necessarily throw the ball just because you felt like it. Imagine instead of throwing a ball, it's filling in an oval on a multiple choice test. First you had to decide which oval to fill in (from an initial desire of wanting to pass the test), and this decision caused you to want to fill the oval in, and this second desire guided your motor control until the oval was filled in.

@Causative. It seems like your example describes either a choice following a desire, or a lifetime regress of desires/choices/actions. If I fill in such a circle, yes, this is driven by a desire subsequent to the choice to participate in the test, but if we take that angle, we enter the deterministic regress (by no means invalid). However if we isolate a specific choice, isn't it driven by a desire specific to it? I choose to do the test, but I don't choose to want to fill in the circle. I simply want to fill in the circle. Then I choose to do it/to not do it. Or are we on the same page here?

@Futilitarian, just a remark. Much of the disagreement may stem from different understanding of "choice". Your's, for example limits "choice" to an action, and desire to you is, I presume, a state. I don't think a desire or a want can be a state. It is an occurence, revealing every new minute. It cannot last or linger in any other form than a memory of desire, which is different from desire. In that sense, the desire per se is indistinguishable from a (spontaneous) choice. Next, this urge is hardly distiguishable from instigation for action.

@ttnphns. Thanks. I appreciate the effort. But I don't equate choice with action at all. I clearly distinguish my desire to do something from the choice to do it and the act of doing it. I desire to throw the ball. I decide to throw the ball. I throw the ball. When does a person ever decide to want to throw a ball unless the 'decision' is a previous decision, such as a decision to play catch? Can you provide an example?

@Futilitarian The situation is that initially, the person does not want to throw the ball. Initially they want something else, such as to win the baseball game they're playing. Then they make the choice to throw the ball. But this choice in the moment is not really a choice to throw it, because the throwing is not accomplished immediately. Instead, the immediate effect of the choice is to make the person want to throw it, which they did not previously want. This desire to throw it then guides their actions until the ball is thrown.

@Causative. Thanks Causative, but how does the fact that an action is not immediately accomplished in any way render a choice not a choice? I am conscious of wanting to throw a ball before I throw it. I agree that the desire to throw the ball likely persists whilst the choice is made, and during the action of throwing, but unless it's a highly-trained, very quick, 'automatic' response, I am conscious only of choosing to act upon a desire, not of choosing to desire to act. If I don't want to throw a ball, why would I possibly decide to do so?

@Futilitarian You said, "If I don't want to throw a ball, why would I possibly decide to do so?" >In this scenario you don't want to throw the ball until after you've decided to do so. The decision was made because you wanted to win the baseball game and you decided throwing the ball would help with that. You said, "unless it's a highly-trained, very quick, 'automatic' response, I am conscious only of choosing to act upon a desire." >What I'm saying is, though you may not think of the choice as choosing to want something, the immediate effect of the choice is to want it.

@causative. Yes. I agreed with you in previous comments that if you go back to a prior decision, such as the baseball game, a desire comes after a choice. No issue there at all. However, if I desire to play guitar, I then choose to play guitar, I then play the guitar. The choice to play may indeed stimulate a further desire to play - to continue to play - but this does not contradict the fact that a desire to play was the preliminary event. Are we on the same page yet?

@causative. This has gone on long enough in the comments section. I am sincerely interested in any material you can provide which better explains your position. Intuitively (what's intuition? : ) ), I feel that you have good reason for your claim, but also that it is not being adequately communicated (at least to my level of comprehension). Cheers.

@Futilitarian, The basketball game is a general project and your throw is a particular, subordinate action. Though your connection with the throw appear instrumental choice (do and how to do), you must dimly understand that you want the throw. Why so? Your throw is the obvious signal to you that you want the whole game, as you are playing. During the playing, you know of your desire to participate in the game through the throws and other actions. But is there another, the primary and general desire to play the basketball, as you are playing?

(cont.) Yes, it is also present. But it is out of your reflection. You don't say to yourself "I want it" and don't ask "Do I want it?" (Such a question would be dangerous, for it may suddenly provoke to doubt and to lose interest in the game.). You have to rely on your actions, and not on yourself, to pursuade you that you are still interested. Therefore you must realize, peripherally, that you want the ball throwing action you have chosen to perform the next second.

@ttnphns. Thanks ttnphns. You don't seem to be contradicting my claim that, "The choice to play may indeed stimulate a further desire to play - to continue to play - but this does not contradict the fact that a desire to play was the preliminary event". Am I right? Also...do you have any references I can look at?