Might-have-been are irrelevant here. That past was water long ago under the bridge. The question deals with the situation from fall 1944 through war's end. You also neglect that the Allies were committed to unconditional surrender only, so what is the basis of your argument that Japan's negotiating position was weakened by the kamikaze use?

@PieterGeerkens The past is our purview, and interpreting it without context leads to poor conclusions. This is not a might-have-been, this is examining the causes; how did Japan find itself in this mess and was it inevitable? Even in the narrow tactical view, kamikaze could not win the war nor even a battle. It was a poor strategy in a situation caused by other poor strategies. The issue of Japanese surrender cannot be oversimplified to "because unconditional surrender". The situation was complex, as linked to, and at any time the Emperor could order it which is what happened.

@PieterGeerkens But if we take the "because unconditional surrender" position this leads to a paradox. If the Japanese thought negotiation was impossible, what did they hope to achieve by prolonging the war? If they stop the invasion they face blockade, bombardment, starvation (something acceptable to Japanese high command, not so acceptable to the people), and revolt. The threat of invasion was useful to keep the government in power. The only purpose would be to retain power and they could only do that by negotiating a peace before revolt.

All of that is true - but it's not what your answer above states. Perhaps you haven't quite written what you intended to write.

@Schwern: But given the US position, they could not negotiate much of anything. They could surrender now, or hope for some miracle - which, after all, is where the term kamikazi comes from.

@jamesqf There's an assumption that unconditional surrender gave Japan no choice. They had a choice: surrender and hope for the best. It turned out pretty well, better than Germany. They could have attempted negotiations in earnest after Saipan and ousting Tojo, and before losing their fleet at Leyte and the Potsdam Declaration; they knew they couldn't win. Maybe they could have gotten some guarantees; that's what negotiations are for. The longer they waited, the weaker they'd get. They left it until May 1945 when they had little to bargain with. Like I said, it's a big topic.

I have to disagree with your claim that A6M production impacted the A7M and Ki-84. Those newer designs were only initiated well after the war was underway and by the time they were production-ready, the Japanese materiel situation precluded manufacturing them in any appreciable numbers (not to mention the lack of pilots). This was, as with the entirety of Japan's downfall, a failure of planning - all their projections were for a short decisive war in which they'd knock the USA out of the Pacific quickly, there was no provision made for any other scenario. Likewise, once Japan had... (cont'd)

(cont'd) ... failed to push the USA out, they also failed to re-plan and re-prioritize things that would allow them to fight better - for example, fast-tracking the A7M and Ki-84 designs. Japanese (misplaced) belief in their superiority and infallibility was what doomed them - arguably their war was lost before it began.

A stat from en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kamikaze#Effects you might want to include: "14 percent of Kamikazes survived to score a hit on a ship; nearly 8.5 percent of all ships hit by Kamikazes sank" - 8.5% of 14% means that a mere 1.2% of ships attacked by kamikazes were sunk - hardly a good return on that expenditure of men and materiel.

Maybe the question was not well formed enough, but this answer assumes one specific question out of the possibilities. If the question is "was it an effective strategy compared with conventional air attacks?" then the answer would be yes. This answer instead answers "was it an effective strategy to win the war or at least to delay the defeat?"

This answer could be improved by touching on the historical doctrines that partially facilitated resorting to Tokubetsu Kougeki Tai tactics in general (not just kamikaze) instead of surrendering. Japanese military culture had a very much ‘death or glory’ mentality at the time, and the various Tokubetsu Kougeki Tai programs were a rather direct extension of that mentality from a personal scale to an organizational scale.

@Schwern: Re "that's what negotiations are for", the problem is that you need (at least) two parties to negotiate. Would the US have negotiated?

One thing, which is purely speculative: pushing on till August 1945 might have allowed Japan to reap the benefits of the worsening US-USSR split. Would Mac Arthur have "sold" the US on leaving the emperor alone in 1944? By 45 the emphasis was starting to turn to containing Stalin and it became convenient to treat Japan as a possible anti-Communist bulwark. Most of the really nasty Japanese war crimes had already been committed and with Pearl Harbor's treachery US sentiment would have been to seek guilt at the highest levels. Containment against Russia changed that.

-1 Completely wrong answer . They were only strategy left, and did force Allies to change their own strategy.

@jamesqf The Japanese perspective is what matters here, and they certainly thought it was possible. Prior to Potsdam (July 26th, 1945) I'm not aware the US said they wouldn't. Under Admiral Suzuki, the Japanese were trying since May 1945 to open negotiations with the US via the still neutral Soviets. Joke's on them, the Soviets were already planning to invade Manchuria and strung the Japanese along. Even after Potsdam, the Supreme War Council was split between unconditional surrender and trying to resist until they got guarantees.

This looks like a great answer (from a non-expert like me, at least), but there is one thing I don't get about the logistics. Did Japan (a) at some point build more A6M zero that they had pilots for, or (b) at some point lose more pilots than planes (but how exactly is that possible in large numbers?).

@FedericoPoloni The death spiral is like this. Good pilots require hundreds of hours of training. Japan did not have a strong pilot training pipeline set up, as they took loses they had to replace them with pilots with less and less training. They went against an ever better enemy flying ever better planes. Those pilots took increased loses which puts more pressure to make good those loses which means prioritizing existing designs over developing and tooling up to make new ones. Eventually they began flying obsolescent models and trainers.

@FedericoPoloni Kamikaze tactics commit to this death spiral. Barely trained pilots who will never gain experience fly increasingly ineffective aircraft into a growing armada of Allied ships. Meanwhile the facilities which make the aircraft, refine the fuel, and train the pilots are undefended against US heavy bombers.

Thanks, but I don't think this answers my question. How do you lose a pilot without losing their plane? Random wartime casualties while on land? Were they so significant to cause such a big imbalance?

@FedericoPoloni Japan had more aircraft than well trained pilots. I think there's a misunderstanding that militaries have one plane for each pilot. My experience is, in the days before planes cost millions, they had many more planes than pilots. I can't exactly say why: training, maintenance, loses, spare parts, extras in transit, extras for stockpiling, extras for forward storage, old models, poor planning...