Actually, both. What really exists are the irreducible/material inhibitions and excitations, and what induces those inhibitions and excitations. Albeit, with the added caveat, on a meta-analytic level, what gets instantiated by those inputs and outputs (i.e., mental state) is not directly reducible to either. Basically, a mental state X is what causes X, and in turn what is "caused" by X.

"For (an avowedly simplistic) example, a functionalist theory might characterize pain as a state that tends to be caused by bodily injury, to produce the belief that something is wrong with the body and the desire to be out of that state, to produce anxiety, and, in the absence of any stronger, conflicting desires, to cause wincing or moaning." (SEP: Functionalism)

But functionalism still seems to imply that consciousness is something "special". Otherwise, why the counterarguments listed here work: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/…

For example, with the China brain, experiment, they say "Some functionalists believe China would have qualia but that due to the size it is impossible to imagine China being conscious. Indeed, it may be the case that we are constrained by our theory of mind and will never be able to understand what Chinese-nation consciousness is like."

But what does "China being conscious" mean. Does it just mean if you look at the outputs the china brain produces, it looks intelligent or self-aware?

So functionalism does say that there's something more than brain states?

Yes, in so far as it is not directly reducible to brain states.

"Something more," doesn't mean some un-embodied mind.

Then what's the name for the theory that rejects the existence of everything except physical brain states (no qualia, mental states, subjective experience, or anything else magical)?

Just particles, and we call some groups of particles "conscious" if they behave intelligently or are self-aware

Identity theory.

As for particle themselves being conscious than that is panpsychism.

But didn't you say that type-identity theory denies the fact that humans have nothing that a deterministic computer program can't have?

What?

"Type-Identity wouldn't agree that a computer chip can instantiate brain states."

I will write it one more time:

What exactly are the aliens missing, that we have?

Neurons

Carbon-based Biological neurons.

But why can't we call the aliens conscious just because they lack neurons?

Why would they have it?

Well to me "consciousness" is just "intelligent, self-aware behavior'.

Then that is behaviorism.

If you're talking about something "special" like "qualia/subjective experience/etc", then I'd say neither humans nor aliens have it

What you are presenting now is called the behaviorism of logical positivists. X is conscious iff X behaves as if its conscious.

Yes, because I just don't see what more there is than physical things. That was my original question. I just don't understand what the philosophical zombie is missing compared to a regular human

Qualia.

It's missing Qualia.

But what exactly is this qualia

If I write a computer program that acts exactly like a human, will it have qualia?

Can I say that its qualia are the lines of code it runs when it receives certain inputs?

Depends on the theory of mind.

Identity theorists wouldn't call the computer conscious. Same for the behaviorist (to an extent, but it can work).

Would identity theorists call humans conscious?

Yes.

I'm not really understanding what qualia is

Qualia is how an entity experiences existence.

The subjective feeling of being alive, feeling, tasting.

And why would an identity theorist say that a computer doesn't have it then?

Its tasting is just lines of code running, rather than neurons firing

It seems like qualia is this sort of "magical thing" that some theories claim to be separate from physics, and other theories claim to be caused by physics. But all of these theories assume that this "magical thing" exists, with no justification, or a precise definition.

As far as our experience is concerned it is magical.

"Magical" since it hasn't been explained.

And what about strong reductionism and eliminative materialism? They seem to reject its existance: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/…

They reject is based on mere hope.

Plus reductionism doesn't reject it.

Only eliminative materialism does. Also, wikipedia is not entirely accurate at times

Alright, i gtg. Any ways, if you want to read this stuff I can name you the pertinent theories: Behaviorism, type Identity theory, functionalism, panpsychism. Have fun!

Ok, thanks!

You can also get an intro to philosophy of mind book.

That should be sufficient as a survey.

Are there any books you recommend?

I think I just found my answer here: philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/6979/…

"However, philosophers such as Daniel Dennett and Susan Blackmore have taken the claim one step further, arguing that everybody is always a p-zombie. How exactly do they pull this off? Well, they simply deny that consciousness exists at all!

They say that what we think is special as consciousness is really just a consequence of the much less significant access consciousness, i.e. all the stuff our brains do much the same way as any computer (e.g. storing and retrieving information, responding to stimuli, etc.). Thus it's just a trick of the mind to think that we have something more than "lifeless" machines do. We feel like we have "hard" consciousness as a result of all the things our minds do, but this is not the case."

Well, not really my answer, but at least two people who believe the same thing as me. My question is really why "this is an incredibly counter-intuitive view for most and very hard to swallow"