I wonder why you call it 'anti-philosophy'. It seems excellent philosophy to me. I would also question your reification of mind. The usual teaching is that stripped of thoughts there is no such thing as mind. Not so much arguing, just raising potential issues. .

@PeterJ, in Madhyamaka there cannot be any a priori assertions as there are no objective truths for said assertions to be grounded. Both Nagarjuna and Candrakirti acknowledge the resonance of philosophical language, but in the end it is a boat, a necessary boat, but merely a boat. When you say "usual teaching" I recommend that you qualify your assertion. Gelug/Sakya/Kargu/Nyingma:,The two qualifiers for 'mind' are that 1: it's clear, and 2: it's knowing. what are thoughts?

Oh yes, definitely only a boat. But Nagarjuna endorses a neutral or nondual metaphysical scheme, This is not anti-philosophy. It's the rejection of all extreme theories for being false. I'd call it the only plausible philosophy. It's truth (and N;s argument) would exlain why nobody has ever found another plausible philosophy. I feel there is much unnecessary confusion on this issue but can't say much here. . .

This is not the place to have a discussion. But you must do your best to source your assertions, @PeterJ. Show me where Nagarjuna says "I endorse a neutral or non dual metaphysical scheme". We should agree to disagree before this becomes a slinging match.

No need for a slanging match I hope. Here's my justification at length. bernardokastrup.com/2017/05/…

Your view is common but in my view it one of the most damaging misunderstandings. I didn't cite myself as an authority. I pointed to where I make a proper argument. I have a number of essays out there saying the same thing and have never received an objection. I believe the case I make is solid and inarguable. if you find an objection, however, I would be genuinely interested to hear it. .

Can an essentialist really understand the view of an anti-essentialist? If I live in, and believe there is only "is" or "is not", then how can I begin to understand someone who tells me I am missing the point?

This isn't simple. For instance, Bhāviveka implies (the Tibetans say he argues) that Nagarjuna accepts that the structures of argument (classical logic) exist in a shared communal space: That both essentialists and non-essentialists share a common ground in classical logic.

Candrakīrti thoroughly disputes both Bhāviveka's interpretation of Nagarjuna as well as his (Bhāviveka's) critique of Buddhapalita. Instead, Candrakīrti argues strongly for prasaṅga (reductio) as the sole structure available to the Madhyamika (ie, follower of Nagarjuna).

Nagarjuna, according to Candrakirti's position (and that held by most modern Madyhamikas) would neither call himself a dualist nor a non-dualist, as it doesn't mean anything to him to do so.

I believe that you and I may be seeing things not so differently though. For instance, I would agree with you that Nagarjuna rejects all "extreme metaphysical positions" - but what we are faced with is "what is included in 'extreme'"?

In your essay, you also say "Nagarjuna painstakingly proves that there are no contradictions in Buddhist philosophy." – regardless of our differences, I am sure you must agree that this is a conflation of a large order: He recognises his primary opponents as being Buddhist philosophers. (Read Jay Garfield's translation and commentaries on this - most sources are in Tibetan, but there are some great translations available now).

What he argues is that any system (Buddhist or non-Buddhist) that asserts an objective (or inherent, or essential, or self-standing) 'truth' is false. He uses the language of the opponent to demonstrate prasanga - reductio - of the opponents own position.

So, your primary source for Nagarjuna is Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso, himself an eminent scholar. He follows the views of Mipham - another scholar - who invested a lot of his writing life objecting to Tsongkhapa - yet another eminent scholar.

If you really are interested, you may like to read Jay Garfield's article that discusses some of the distinctions made between Mipham and Tsongkhapa: jaygarfield.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/…

I'm really not able to write as well as Garfield on this matter but, even though he argues for Tsongkhapa, it may give you some insight into the depth of thought that goes into the question.

Honestly, when it comes to the MMK, I recommend that you study all the major scholars, regardless of school.

Anyway, when you say to me that you consider my view to be a most damaging misunderstanding it makes me think that maybe you are concerned that I have ended up in a nihilist position, where nothing is real, and that lies are truths - some sort of extreme of relativism? But I have not, and I do not. Instead, I recognise that causality entails essencelessness, and that essencelessness entails causality. Every action has a consequence, without fail.

@Konchog - Thanks for a great post. Not easy on this system. Lots to say. First. I don't like Garfiled's book and believe it confuses a simple issue - but I have read it. I can;pt respnd to all your pints but will pick one issue. Non-dualism is the rejection of all extreme metaphysical views. There are then two remaining. Nondualism and a paradoxical universe.

From his association with Graham Priest I guess Garfield agrees that Buddhist philosophy is paradoxical, thus that Reality is paradoxicical, and I'm imaging this is your view. I assume that Nagarjuna (and the Buddha) is endorsing a reasonable universe and a non-dual metaphysic. It seem to my my view is more sympatheic, and I'm not sure how anyone could prove otherwise. More importantly, I'm not sure why anyone would want to do so.

So what I meant by 'misunderstanding' is not Nihilism but the idea the the universe and thus also N's philosophy is paradoxical. I see no reason to believe this. His metaphysical scheme is the only one that works, as he proves, and it works precisely becasue it caannot be reduced to absurdity.

I would argue that Nagarjuna is the most useful philospher in human history and find it tragic that he is so often read in the way Priest does, as proving philosophy is hopeless. I don't take any notice. All positive theories are absurd, and this leaves non-dualism as the only reasonable fundamental theory. But please go on arguing. This is all about conducting reality-checks on my views. .

Hi - Peter. No, not paradoxical, not at all. Garfield talks elsewhere about paraconsistent logic, but this particular stance is where he and I differ in respect to Nagarjuna. It comes back down to something I implied right at the beginning: Nagarjuna is not involved in an epistemological journey, but a soteriological one.

I think what annoys philosophers is this point. They want to argue Nagarjuna's point from an epistemological stance, but it's just not interesting to him. In the very first verse, he honours Sakyamuni Buddha, the best of teachers. Not Manjushri. This is telling.

And, moreover, in the second line he states the main thesis of the entire text: That which is a dependent arising is essenceless.

Nagarjuna likewise, does not 'prove philosophy is hopeless', and this is something that I would doubt that Garfield would say (I am not familiar with Priest, as I am a Buddhist before being a philosopher).

I would like to point out that in his translation of the MMK, IIRC, Garfield does not mention paradox once. He doesn't refer to Priest in his extensive acknowledgements - which include many personal friends of mine:- both Tibetan and Western.

If you -really- are interested letting go of your assumptions about me, you can get a really clear idea of my thoughts via the Lhatong chapter of the Lam Rim Chenmo (Translated into the second half of Volume 3, published by Snow Lion). I doubt you have read this closely, as it would have reflected in your understanding of my position.