@JD I am not trying to interpret law. It is not a question of the philosophy of law or methodology of law. It is a metaphysical/ontological/ethical question I am trying( the question focuses on what the definition is) to define value and secondly I am examining whether value is objective or subjective. As I see a moral realist would see that there is a market value while moral anti-realists would deny there being a market value at all. A value is an ethical proposition after all.

@JD The realist would accept an objective/ intersubjective value while an anti-realist would deny it.

@JD Would using a morally realistic value be really a full compensation? The civilian would never agree by his free-will so long as the compensation is less that the indiferrence price. So the expropriation leaves them worse off.

@GeorgeNtoulos You must separate some ideas. First, value in the broad sense is studied by axiology, not ethics. In terms of economics, value is determined by the economic system. In a free-market economy, by the interesection of supply and demand curves...

Secondly, in the US, when the government expropriates land, it generally offers above-market value to avoid litigation. This means that generally speaking, technically someone who has land taken often is better off financially, than if they had put it on the market. Of course, financial value is not the only form of value, so that conversation gets sticky.

Your attempt to pin down a definitive, single metaphysical definition of financial value will fail, because value is context dependent. It is a product of agency and the conceptual framework employed...

Now, as for realism and anti-realism, I would say that a strict realist would recognize that agents are real, but that their conceptual schemes are an illusion, in the tradition of Dennett's eliminative materialism. The basis for this thinking is to deny a the existence of the abstract ontology.

In this case, value itself, being a product of abstraction, would also be an illusion and not exist in the technical sense. Of course, one allows for an abstract ontology, as championed by anti-realists, then value exists, and it is physical reality that becomes suspect, and so an anti-realist would likely deny value is objective.

Someone who occupies the middle ground would recognize the strengths of using and combining both a physical and abstract ontology (think naive realism, and would take some position similar to mine. Value can be subjective, objective, and intersubjective depending on how the conversation is framed.

Now, if you want to decide what 'value' means, I'd encourage you to abandon the law of the excluded middle and embrace a more dialetheistic position. A value is objective and it is not objective. A value is subjective and not subjective. A value is intersubjective and not intersubjective...

It will depend on the context of the text which property or properties should be attributed to 'value', rather than the rigid and simplistic position that value must be described by one or the other or the other. That would be the fallacy of false dilemma.

You are not struggling with the nature of 'value'. You are struggling with how to cope with 'antinomy'.

@GeorgeNtoulos I should have used value theory instead of axiology above. Bad habit of mine.

@JD Isn't the value( I don't have a clear definition but loosely it measures, it is the magnitude of the desire to have something. If something has twice the value of something else you are willing to sacrifice the later twice to get the former) an ethical proposition? The greater something's value the better(more true) having that thing is.