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Q: Why didn't Hitler invade Middle East for resources first before invading Soviet Union?

ArgyllWhy didn't Hitler invade Middle East for resources instead of Soviet Union? Or at least invade Middle East first to secure the resources needed for sustained military operation? I understand Hitler had long yearned for a showndown with the Bolshevism. But considering the raw material dependency ...

You mean invade the soft underbelly?
You think Hitler could get himself mired in the mountainous terrain of central Turkey and Stalin sits by and watches? Not on your life!
I knew a guy who lived through the war. He said when Hitler found out that the USSR had just finished a single tank factory with the same output as all of Germany, he knew waiting wasn't an option. I've always wondered if this was true.
@axsvl77: The idea that because Soviet was getting better and better and therefore Germany should strike at the earliest possible is just naive to me. Yes Soviet would get better in every aspect. So would Germany. It is more about finding the opportunity to grow at least as rapidly as your opponent until you are reasonably ready for a showdown. The difficulties experienced by German Heer in Barbarossa showed they were not ready.
@PieterGeerkens: What would Stalin do? Invade Germany? Good idea. That would be worth discussing. Would a potential Soviet military attack be sufficient to prevent any possible German expansion into Middle East? Where would the attack go? And was an attack imminent at the time given the domestic situation of USSR? Is there anything else Stalin could do? Trade blockade would violate the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. (Not that the paperwork matters. But breaking the pact by trade blockade would be highly probable to trigger military retaliation which is just as good as invasion or perhaps worse.
You lose initiative by not start the invasion yourself.)
@Argyll I agree with you that to "strike at the earliest possible moment is just naive". As a logical extension of this thought, the whole of WWII (and the following cold war) was naive and imbecilic. Not to mention a waste of human lives and manpower.
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Southern Russia really isn't that far from Northern Iran
@Argyll The USSR was watching Germany like a hawk, the reverse was also true. Stalin noticed Germany increasing production of winter gear in early '41 and increased border defenses in response. Hitler saw that as the USSR gearing up for an invasion of Germany and rushed to counter that by invading the USSR before he was fully ready. At least that's what I read in a biography of Stalin and several other books about the period.
@PieterGeerkens You think Hitler could get himself mired in the mountainous terrain of central Turkey and Stalin sits by and watches? I think an equal if not bigger threat was Britain assisting Turkey. Britain assisted Greece, and look how bloody that was, especially Crete. With Britain's sea power, they could supply and aid Turkey indefinitely as long as convoys kept coming from America and Canada. There's a question about why Germany didn't invade Turkey and I posted a hefty answer to it: history.stackexchange.com/questions/16806/…
Look for info about the logistical limits of Libyan ports. How many tons of supplies could be delivered, versus how much supplies Rommel needed, this was Rommel worst constraint. Air transport is even more limited, you need planes, airfields, and control of air space, it is no magic teleportation. Rommel results were already too good. To expect him to conquer Egypt was too much.
@Argyll The Red Army was getting better as Germany waited, and I see no reason to think that a 1942 attack would have been particularly successful. Many more tank divisions would have T-34s and KVs instead of the extremely unreliable older tanks. The Mechanized Corps had been newly formed, and only a few tank divisions had adequate training, which would have been done in late 1941. I think forty reasonably well-equipped and reasonably well-trained tank divisions would have made a German invasion much harder.
@David Thornley: The alternative at hand is not to wait and do nothing until 1942. Aside, Germany had little visibility over Soviet tank production and their progress on mechanized divisions. (e.g. That famous recorded conversation between Hitler & Mannerheim. Hilter was hyperbolic as usual though.) There was no indication such was a factor in the Nazi decision making -- unless you have sources indicating otherwise?
@Luiz: I don't think there was any bottle-necking effect by the Libyan ports. The problem historically was that the ports were under blockade. Sofa General's answer is centered around control of Mediterranean basin. Check out his comments?
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I read somewhere precise numbers about the possible tonnage which could be delivered, that showed that even with no blockade and perfect conditions, Rommel still would not get enough supplies. I do not remember the source (otherwise I would write an answer), it is just a suggestion about what info to research. Remember that amateurs talk strategy, professionals talk logistics.
Interesting. That is a piece of info I'll definitely keep an eye out for.
Take a look at a topo map of the area you are suggesting the Wehrmacht would have used and you will see that is very difficult terrain to move armies across. Additionally the rail network in Turkey was very primitive compared to other parts of Europe.
@Argyll I am surprised at the mildness of the view on the USSR here. In Eastern Europe it is common knowledge that the USSR was building its military potential like mad and their annexation of neighbouring countries right before WW2 was part of increasing their empire before major expansionist war they wanted. I will look at the sources and probably make my own answer, but it was quite clear that the USSR was just a year or less from attacking Germany itself, so all Nazis could do was to make a preemptory strike.
@ed.hank: This point was brought up and discussed in the comment sections in a few answers below
@Gnudiff: I don't find it so clear that the USSR was just a year or less from attacking Germany. That was what Hitler may have liked to claim and boast. But even then, outside of Hitler's conversation with Mannerheim, I am not sure how widely the Nazi party propagated that pre-emptive strike theory beyond selected few casual conversations. So both perspectives-- preparation by USSR to attack AND perception within Nazi Germany of imminent attack -- are not simple ideas to be glossed over. I'll eagerly look forward to your findings.

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