@GorchestopherH The point of that would be to have an unofficial result on election night, that is almost certainly identical to the final result.

@gerrit Exactly, there would be no point. That's what I'm trying to say. Printing a receipt doesn't give you any extra security. The receipts are simpler to compromise than the electronic tallies.

@GorchestopherH But I just told you what the point is. Many people want to know the result on election night and not have to wait hours or days for the result. And the fact that there is a paper trail makes tampering with the software pointless.

The voting computers that we got rid of in The Netherlands had no paper trail and closed-source software. There was no way of telling there weren't any lines of code along the line of "if vote = social democrats and random() < 0.1: vote = conservatives"

Or the other way around.

With a paper trail, you get the advantages of the voting machines (quick results), and the advantages of paper votes (verifiability).

@gerrit People think paper trails are bullet proof because that's the historic practice. All I'm saying is that it's easier to stuff a box with false receipts than it is to replace hardware in a locked machine cabinet.

@GorchestopherH With voting machines and a paper trail, one would have to fraud both. What's easier depends on who you are. For an authority, slightly altering firmware requires less manpower than adding hundreds of thousands of false ballots.

@gerrit I suppose, but if you simply fraud the one that people are using as the "golden" accurate truth you essentially win. Don't trivialize firmware modification. Like a said, stuffing a ballot box requires being within 3 feet of the box for 3 seconds. Modifying firmware requires picking a lock, removing circuitry, and adding new circuitry. This isn't Mission Impossible, you can't just drive up in a van and start furiously typing and expect to compromise firmware.

Of course, the real reason people need special security measures is because "technology is confusing" and "technology gets viruses", both these statements reduce a populations trust in the democratic process, and that trust is central to democracy in general.

@GorchestopherH I suppose the difference is, who is doing the fraud. Modifying firmware is not trivial for criminals, but electoral authorities in countries with limited transparency are likely capable of doing this.

@gerrit Underhanded electoral authorities with limited transparency can do whatever they want with whatever system they feel like compromising.

True.

@Bobson are you entirely sure people can handle the snark level regarding debate that a typical SFF movie viewing chats naturally attract? :)

@GorchestopherH I hate to quote Stalin Tammany Hall boss William Marcy Tweed, but who counts the votes is far more important than who votes

@DVK-in-exile Lets find out :)

@GorchestopherH - The other thing you're missing is that with an ideal VVPT, A) the voter never actually has access to the physical ballot box (the machine handles it after displaying the receipt), and/or B) the only way to add fake paper ballots is to get the machine to print them - faking a machine-printed receipt is much harder than faking a regular paper ballot.

@Bobson Honestly, it doesn't matter.

@GorchestopherH Oh? I think that that's the key point.

Like gerrit said. Many people want to know the result on election night and not have to wait hours or days for the result. And the fact that there is a paper trail makes tampering with the software pointless.

Electronic reporting for quick results. Easy-to-read and standardized machine-generated paper backup, verified to be correct by the voter, as the final "official" result that can be referred back to in case of any questions.

If either one is significantly different from the other, then you have clear evidence of shenanigans.

@Bobson I get it. America will always defer to the infallible, uncompromising, box of paper.

@GorchestopherH Do you have a better solution?

@gerrit is in the Netherlands and specifically went to the paper trail.