Jun 17, 2021 13:01
@DanChristensen - Does it not remain the case that when we disallow sets from containing themselves R's paradox cannot arise? Then a paradox arises for the set-of-all sets, but it is a different one. No?
Jun 17, 2021 13:01
@DavidC.Ullrich - I suspect you've just given me a useful answer but I can't tell because I can't read the symbols. If you're saying that (regardless of whether sets are allowed to contain themselves) the set of all sets is a paradoxical idea, then I get this. It seems a more important issue than R's paradox. (To me my 'simple point' above still seems to stand).
Jun 17, 2021 13:01
@EricWofsey - I'm asking what problems remain when we state sets cannot contain themselves. The answer seems to be none.
Jun 17, 2021 13:01
@David - Nevertheless, if sets cannot contain themselves then R's paradox does not arise. This was my simple point.
Jun 17, 2021 13:01
Thanks Dan. It seems that when we say sets cannot contain themselves all the problems go away. I wonder how mathematicians are able to imagine sets that contain themselves when a set is defined as a container distinct from its contents. I can make no sense of the idea, and this is what intrigues me. Why does anyone assume a set can contain itself? Is there ever a need for this assumption?
 
May 3, 2020 18:24
i think think the point about Aristotle would clarify the entire issue significantly, which was sort of my point. All good. Thanks for reality-check.
May 3, 2020 18:24
@Conifold - Thanks. We'd better stop here. if you're saying that the Liar is not a dialectical contradiction then we're not disagreeing in a serious way. I was looking for a proposition (or pair) that is a paradox or contradiction in Aristotle's dialectic, but nobody seems able to find one. Even Priest never cites one. The issue seems to have no significance in metaphysics, or not until someone proves Aristotle's system is flawed. Thanks for your comments. .
May 3, 2020 18:24
@Conffold Yes, but first we have to prove his logic is faulty. I can see no fault with it. The case for its faultiness has not been made. Making up illegitimate propositions is not a way to prove anything and is what I'd call a straw-man argument. You're accusing Aristotle of allowing contradictions, but his rules prevent them when they are followed. So, contradictions arise when we break the rules of the dialectic. This is the reason for having the rules. The problem seems to arise from a very basic misundersting of logic and I cannot see what's wrong with this view. . . .
May 3, 2020 18:24
@Conifold Right. So we formulate a proposition that breaks Aristotle's rules for dialectical propositions and use this to prove that Aristotle's dialectical logic is faulty. And this is supposed to be good philosophy? .
May 3, 2020 18:24
@Conifold - If the Liar is a legitimate dialectical proposition having a truth-value. then it has a contrary stating "This sentence is true". So how do we decide between them? Is this sentence true or false? It seems obvious the Liar does not meet the conditions for a dialectical proposition.
May 3, 2020 18:24
@NoahSchweber - I see what you're saying and in a way I agree. But this reduces the paradox to a trivial artefact of language. I;d be okay with "By the time it is finished this sentence will have twelve words". (We can't chat much here but I'll ask a follow-up question when this one is exhausted). .
May 3, 2020 18:24
@Conifold and Ameet - I wonder why I cannot understand this issue. For the life of me I cannot see a paradox. Could you give an example of a genuine antinomy? I'd be quite happy if you can, I have no horse in the race. Not strings of logical symbols but natural language if possible. In the case of "(This sentence is false) is false" my objection still seems to stand.
May 3, 2020 18:24
@Mauro - Pardon me. It's the Principle of Bi-Valence. By the way, I added a link in the question to an article that gives my view.
May 3, 2020 18:24
@tkruse - Exactly!
May 3, 2020 18:24
@Mauro - Are you saying that the Liar contradicts the PBV? This may be so, but where is the paradox? I see no need for a solution.
 
May 2, 2020 09:36
It was your reference to 'anti-philosophy' that set me off. I may have misunderstood what you meant. Seems to me Nagarjuna is very much pro-philosophy.
May 2, 2020 09:33
I'm now rather unclear as to what exactly we disagree about. I thought you were reading Nagarjuna as rejecting philosophy but it seems not. Perhaps we differ on whether he endorses non-dualism. Is that it?
May 2, 2020 09:31
@Kanchog - Could you put a @ sign in your posts as otherwise I don't get notified.
Apr 30, 2020 14:44
I would argue that Nagarjuna is the most useful philospher in human history and find it tragic that he is so often read in the way Priest does, as proving philosophy is hopeless. I don't take any notice. All positive theories are absurd, and this leaves non-dualism as the only reasonable fundamental theory. But please go on arguing. This is all about conducting reality-checks on my views. .
Apr 30, 2020 14:38
So what I meant by 'misunderstanding' is not Nihilism but the idea the the universe and thus also N's philosophy is paradoxical. I see no reason to believe this. His metaphysical scheme is the only one that works, as he proves, and it works precisely becasue it caannot be reduced to absurdity.
Apr 30, 2020 14:35
From his association with Graham Priest I guess Garfield agrees that Buddhist philosophy is paradoxical, thus that Reality is paradoxicical, and I'm imaging this is your view. I assume that Nagarjuna (and the Buddha) is endorsing a reasonable universe and a non-dual metaphysic. It seem to my my view is more sympatheic, and I'm not sure how anyone could prove otherwise. More importantly, I'm not sure why anyone would want to do so.
Apr 30, 2020 14:31
@Konchog - Thanks for a great post. Not easy on this system. Lots to say. First. I don't like Garfiled's book and believe it confuses a simple issue - but I have read it. I can;pt respnd to all your pints but will pick one issue. Non-dualism is the rejection of all extreme metaphysical views. There are then two remaining. Nondualism and a paradoxical universe.
Apr 30, 2020 13:05
Your view is common but in my view it one of the most damaging misunderstandings. I didn't cite myself as an authority. I pointed to where I make a proper argument. I have a number of essays out there saying the same thing and have never received an objection. I believe the case I make is solid and inarguable. if you find an objection, however, I would be genuinely interested to hear it. .
Apr 30, 2020 13:05
No need for a slanging match I hope. Here's my justification at length. bernardokastrup.com/2017/05/…
Apr 30, 2020 13:05
Oh yes, definitely only a boat. But Nagarjuna endorses a neutral or nondual metaphysical scheme, This is not anti-philosophy. It's the rejection of all extreme theories for being false. I'd call it the only plausible philosophy. It's truth (and N;s argument) would exlain why nobody has ever found another plausible philosophy. I feel there is much unnecessary confusion on this issue but can't say much here. . .
Apr 30, 2020 13:05
I wonder why you call it 'anti-philosophy'. It seems excellent philosophy to me. I would also question your reification of mind. The usual teaching is that stripped of thoughts there is no such thing as mind. Not so much arguing, just raising potential issues. .
 
Mar 23, 2020 08:21
I see 'post-truth' thinking as stemming directly from the failure of philosophy.in our society and its lack of epistemic grounding. This would be one of the reasons I get so shirty on philosophy forums, that the low quality and parochialism of university philosophy has such a terrible effect on society.
 
Mar 19, 2020 14:52
A religious person accepts everything as God's Will (or, if not theistic, as if it is God's Will) and this would include the current pandemic. Don't forget that this pandemic is doing a lot of good. They would not expect a trust in God to protect them from a virus. They would expect their trust to help them cope with catching it.
 
Mar 3, 2020 06:44
I have no idea what it means to say Israel has a right to exist. It appears to be an empty statement.
 
Feb 12, 2020 09:53
Pleas feel free to make objections. I'm always doing Reality-checks for my views.
Feb 12, 2020 09:52
The issue is crucial in metaphysics because it obviates the need for dialethism, paraconsistent logic and the idea there are true contradictions. It means that metaphysics can be done with just ordinary dialectic logic. This works, so there is no evidence that Reality uses a different logic. This makes sense if we believe that the creation of the psycho-physcical world is a process of Mind, and explains the 'unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics'.
Feb 12, 2020 09:48
I was suggesting that there can be no undecidable contradiction in the dialectic because a contradiction could only occur between illegitimate propositions. Aristotle's rule for contradictory pairs (RCP) stipulates one must be true an the other false. In this case any undecidible contradiction is a violation of the RCP and the LNC and LEM would not apply. .
Feb 12, 2020 09:48
@Dcleve - I suspect some of these issues arise because we're restricted to short comments. Your objections are fair but I think they can be dissolved.
Feb 9, 2020 11:53
@Dcleve - I'm happy to chat about this but am not sure where the discussion has got to. My proposal is that there are no true contradictions, and that the rules of Aristotle's logic ensure there can never be one. This is because it is a precondition for the dialectic that propositions are either true or false. Where this rule is not met the dialectic cannot function. This issue is utterly crucial in metaphysics.
Feb 4, 2020 12:42
I've lost the plot slightly here. My point has been that the rules for Aristotle's system do not allow exceptions to the LNC. This is because a dialectical proposition obeys it a priori. It is part of the definition of 'dialectical proposition', as defined by Aristotle. For this reason I cannot imagine how a true contradiction could exist and would deny the possibility. This point is not grasped by dialethists but it is logic 101.
Feb 3, 2020 11:57
@Dcleve - Re: your earlier question. I don't know what it would mean to say the LNC is necessary. I'm suggesting there are no exceptions to it. For Aristotle's system it is known to hold a priori because the LNC must hold for a legitimate dialectical proposition. This is stipulated.
Feb 2, 2020 13:19
@AdamSharpe - I believe bivalence is a red-herring and not a factor in dialectal logic but we cannot discuss this issue here. For me it's A's rule for contradictory pairs that seems utterly crucial and this is ignored by the dialethists and paradoxicalists. . . . . .
Feb 2, 2020 13:19
@AdamSharpe - The entire problem goes away if we examine Aristotle's rule for contradictory pairs. This ensures that undecidable questions and paradoxes are impossible for legitimate dialectical propositions. Aristotle was no fool and covered all the eventualities. It's a simple issue almost universally misunderstood, leading to utter confusion in metaphysics. . . . .
Feb 2, 2020 13:19
@AdamSharpe - Nice to meet a fellow sceptic. .
Feb 2, 2020 13:19
@JamesWeiss - I share your view of folks who abandon the LNC. It is an error to think that in modern times it has been shown to refuted by any evidence. There is no evidence, but there are a lot of people who misunderstand the rules and end up thinking there is evidence. The dialethists would be an obvious example, as would those physicists who interpret QM as requiring a new logic. . . . . .
 
Dec 14, 2019 12:40
Looks like a good question to me, but perhaps better asked on a recording forum. Any good mixer will know the physics and psycho-acoustics. If you know the speed of sound all else follows. Try listening to a percussive sound while altering the pre-delay time and hear how it shifts backward and forwards in the mix. .
 
Dec 11, 2019 16:08
I would suggest that the problem is a hazy definition of freewill. Clearly we have freewill of a sort, but of what sort?
 
Nov 20, 2019 09:13
@christo183 - Conditioning of that sort (driving) is useful and might be viewed as a positive skill. It is this conditioning we are paying for when we take driving lessons. It would all depend on whether the tail is wagging the dog or vice versa.
Nov 20, 2019 09:13
If you use the idea of conditioning (rather than habit) then you're speaking of a well-understood phenomenon. Gurdjieff calls most human beings robots since their behaviour is conditioned and not free, and this would be the standard view of behaviour for his Sufism and mysticism in general. Freedom would consist in freeing oneself from conditioning, which means freeing oneself from the conditioned self. .
 
Nov 19, 2019 00:57
I don't think we can approach music in this way. A number is always the same number with the same value, but a note or rest will have a different value depending on its context. Even where two successive notes are identical they are different, since one is a repetition and one is not. . .
 
Oct 24, 2019 02:40
Thanks. This seems to be a fairly typical view of Mahayana so is useful. Whether it is a correct view is not really the point here, it seems to summarise a common view and explains quite a lot. . .
 

 Ontology and its Questions

A continuing discussion
Oct 7, 2019 07:03
The answers you want are found in the essays I linked. Thanks for the chat
Oct 7, 2019 06:59
@user157860 - Yes, I think you're right. Best to stop here. i see no chance of moving forward.
Oct 6, 2019 08:48
I'm not here to argue or convince you. I'll answer questions if it's helpful to do so.
Oct 6, 2019 08:45
@user157860 - I don;t know why you;re arguing with me rather than trying to understand,. experience acquired in meditation is what I'm talking about. Advaita means 'not two' and so it should be obvious that it denies the I and other distinction.