gonzo

@Coinifold I agree. What is most salient is that "countless generations pass the torch", or, to use a term currently [often for good reason] in disrepute, "tradition." And, clearly, as a criterion, a temporal "end of inquiry" is inaccessible. And thank you for both your edit and youe response. As an aside, I posed the question after rereading (decades later, at the behest of a young relative), the last few chapters of Robert Persig's Zen and the art of motorcycle maintenance. Whose take on how the greek sophists have been given a bad rep remains an enigma to me. Hence the query.

and sophistry-- [according to Plato/Aristotle] the bad faith/disingenuous use of rhetoric to persuade another of the "truth" of a proposition known to be untrue [or whose truth value is unknown], be characterized when the criteria for "truth" (for whether a proposition is true or false) is "consensus" (agreement within a conversational community of "experts" in a domain), rather than [isomorphic word-world] "correspondence"?

@Conifold the arguably answerable question, which I deleted in response to Causative's comment was: How should the difference between rhetoric -- the art of effective or persuasive speaking or writing [to, at its best, according to Plato/Aristotle, in good faith/ingenuously persuade another of the "truth" of a "true" proposition],

@Causative Gotcha. So under these conditions/constraints is there a distinction to be made between "rhetoric" and sophistry'?

@Causative are we now talking Pierce

@Causative.. OK, fair enough. Answer this Q, then use your answer to answer my previous query.

Hey Ted. What's up. Would you rather talk here?

Gotcha @Ted Wrigley. Adios amigo.

Yes. My point is that to toss cultural metanarratives (fundements, essentially Wittgenstenian hinges) haphazardly "under the bus" because (we know to be a fact (true)) that truth/realism is chimera and knowledge and rationality are exclusively functions of power (to unify Lyotardian and Faucauldian narratives) only to replace them with the situated objective knowledge (essentially subjective knowledge), ie post postpositive realism, is sheer hubris. And is likely to destroy the advances in principles for human flourishing we have made over the past several centuries.

You are evading my query. Do you believe that what Foucault and Derrida were up to was revisionist aesthetics? No. What they were up to, if we are to use this domain for characterization, is (broadly brushed) reducing all epistemology and epistemic considerations to aesthetics/sociology (ie emotivism). And folk like Rorty wed poststructuralism/postmodernism and postpositivism, disregarding D. Davidson's caveat that "truth," while primitive and undefinable, need be contended with as the proper goal of inquiry bc not likely to lead us astray by charismatic rhetoricians.

Your flag is well taken, Ted. Here's a more polite version: C'mon, Ted, gimme a break. Is what you are saying that, for instance, Lyotard's The PostModern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Foucault's Language Counter-memory, Parctice, and Derridean deconstruction are so limited as to address only aesthetic concerns? Yawn. Period.

So, again, do the referenced books limit themselves to the analysis and criticizing of representational, figurative, "realistic", works of art (ie painting, sculpture, poetry, prose, music, etc.)?

@Ted Wrigley While I understand everything you say about gender identity, I am compelled to interrogate the issue further [maybe I also have a bit of a skeptical contrarian streak], rather than simply accept [on faith?] the assumptions you so cogently articulate. As I said toward the end of our former discussion on another topic. We appear to stand in one another’s blind spot. Kinda like Harris and Klein do in their discussion.

@Ted Wrigley That you must examine the small parts that make up a whole in order to fully understand the whole. For instance, as you know, biological systems are at their core chemistry, and chemical reactions are reducible to the principles of physics. Genes are composed of DNA, etc., etc.

@Ted Wrigley Thank you for your thoughtful response. You are correct that, for better or worse, I do have a tendency toward a form of reductionism, and maybe a bit of compositionalism. I am inveterately curious, and believe that that understanding the simpler elements of, say, a system [or proposition] is crucial to understanding the system itself

@Ted Wrigley Sorry for the sloppy editing. Most importantly, the first sentence of my last comment was, of course, a question: "Do you believe...?" Not the assertion "you believe that..." These are other boo boos which I will let lie.

@Ted Wrigley continued: "Formerly labeled “body integrity identity disorder” (BIID), the condition was originally considered a psychological or psychiatric disorder, but a brain-centered Zeitgeist and a rapidly growing interest in the neural underpinnings of bodily self-consciousness has shifted the focus toward dysfunctional central nervous system circuits." Its a kind of mind-body duality issue.

In particular you believe that the identification as male or female is rooted upon stereotypical behavioral predispositions, or, say central nervous system circuitry, as outlined in the NIH link I sent you earlier? Neither? Both? BTW, that article’s abstract begins” Xenomelia, the “foreign limb syndrome,” is characterized by the non-acceptance of one or more of one’s own extremities and the resulting desire for elective limb amputation or paralysis.” Cont below.

As I have already, I simply ask what you meant by the TERMs "male" and "female" gender, as opposed to sex, in the assertion. I do not think I need to articulate the question, which I consider to be neither grumpy nor ambiguous, for a third time. But I would be happy to if you wish.

From the beginning of this exchange, my intention has is to interrogate a claim that you made in the last paragraph of your posted answer. As a philosopher, not as a politician or sociologist. Simply think of me as a pesky neither stupid nor brilliant student in one of your classes that has raised his hand during a lecture and asked you to explain what you mean by a particular phrase or word.

With all due respect @Ted Wrigley, my interest is neither to "normalize" anything, nor to make a normative - "what is right or wrong" - claim about anything. I needlessly added the last two paragraphs to my last comment merely to import pragmatic relevance to a merely philosophical inquiry.

@Ted Wrigley I do not know whether the algorithm laets you know I responded if I fail to preface the response with an @TW. Just wanted to let you know that I did respond. Do have a look at the links I sent you along with my previous "hand waving," though, methinks you will find them interesting.

The problem is that "sex," "gender" and "gender role" have become hopelessly conflated by agenda driven ideologues. And the ambiguity generated by such conflation, though manageable for academic rhetoricians such as yourself, has often resulted s in bad policy decisions, and perpetuation of unproductive gender/sex stereotypes.

Rather than normalizing “sex confirmation” hormonal and surgical interventions; allowing transsexual “women” to compete in [biological] women’s sports, cohabit with [biological] women in prisons, and invade countless other domains which have traditionally been sanctuaries for [biological] women?

So when dissonance is experienced by an increasing number of individuals, should our [educational?] focus not be modifying the cultural norms (gender, gender roles, etc): That is, stressing that predispositions to, say, to crying, sentimentality, playing with dolls, etc. does not necessarily mean that you are [feel/relate to the world as] female.

The referenced “feeling” or “relating to the world as” a gender [male/female] denotes that one’s behavioral predispositions are consonant with the behavioral dispositions deemed appropriate by ones society and culture to femaleness/maleness (concepts mediated by socially constructed gender roles).

Problem is that I am not concerned with the relationship between gonads and feeling male, or uteri and feeling female. Rather, I am asking for an elucidation of the content of the concepts male/female, notions which are loaded with normative elements absent in primitive concepts like red or green (or even, for instance, feeling thirst/hungry – which “means” I want water/food).

Had you answered my original query with the first paragraph of your last comment, this discussion would have played out differently. I appreciate the wavelength:color::plumbing [uterus/gonads]:gender reference, what you are saying is that one’s cones/rods [neurophysiological states’] responses to exposure to electromagnetic wavelengths fail to explain the quales red, green, etc. So why ask about wavelengths when your focus is qualia?

No need to get huffy. If I [thought I] knew the answer to the question, I would answer it. The last paragraph of your answer makes an extremely bold unsupported claim about how one "relates' to the world, and one's "plumbing." I ask you to elucidate the claim and you equivocate. I caution you about making bold claims and send you precisely the type of information that may be helpful in untangling the relevant issues [the "philosophical tangle" you referenced in your comment] and you insult me. Yes, quite clear.

If the question "is such a philosophical tangle it can't be productively answered without further investigation" then don't make glib statements implying that you know something that you in fact presuppose. And this stuff is not as benign as many would have us believe. Have a look at this: theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/07/… and this ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3634160, and Rebecca Tuvel's In Defense of Transracialism, which appeared in Hypatia a couple of years ago to substantial controversy.

I have absolutely no idea of what your comment means. You say that " I'm...less concerned with how one characterizes an experience than with how the interpersonal conflicts those experiences generate are resolved." Huh? The "resolution" of which you speak presupposes/requires [at least] intersubjectively meaningful and relevant conceptual characterization and discourse. Do you simply refuse to eludicte wht you mean by 'Some people relate to the world as male, some people relate to the world as female." What's the diff?

You may know that there is a "difference", but how one describes, characterizes that difference, and why, need be explored. for instance, I like to play with barbis rather than gi joes, or I like to sew/knit rather than tune carburators, etc. Problem is that the criteria we use to opine that we "relate" as a woman or man, male or female, lets "the world" off the hook. they should cease their pernicious stereotyping [causing unnecessary confusion], not force us, it's "residents," to tow the line. Have a look here: philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/39414/….

Can you elucidate what you mean by: 'Some people relate to the world as male, some people relate to the world as female." ? That is, what does it mean to "relate to the world" as either male or female, or some[non-binary]thing else? And how does one come to know/opine what/which one is relating to the world as? By reference to [socially constructed?] gender roles?

If what you are interested in is what constitutional “just compensation” is (which I doubt), it is the fair market value of the land taken. The concept essentially means the price the real estate would bring after fair and reasonable negotiations between a seller willing but not forced to sell and a buyer willing but not forced to buy. And this amount is established with expert witness testimony.

@ Conifold Better: conservative progressivism

@Conifold A kind of progressive conservatism. Is your model based exclusively on Pierce (who I agree anticipated much of what Wittgenstein later proposed)? I see a bit of Dewey's thesis in "Reconstruction in Philosophy" as well. Nevertheless, I continue to see a kind of unabridged gap in the reasoning akin to the metaphorical pulling yourself up by your own bootstraps, and which is essentially the genesis of the disagreement between Sam Harris and Jordan Peterson about the notion/nature of [moral] "truth."

@Conifold Again, by "what we do," do you simply mean what we [individually and collectively] happen to find ourselves doing, how we happen to find ourselves [re]acting? Akin to Wittgenstein's "agreement in action" which underlies the phenomenon of language and our forms of life? Then find ways of describing, guided by our biological and emotional drives, that “doing” teleologically (in terms of the purpose it serves rather than causally- say in the way of myth, and/or Darwinism), in such a way that refinement can be described as improvement of “what we do.”

Simply put, as Hume pointed out, reason will not tell you where to go, but only the best way to get to wherever you want/desire to be. And pragmatism's only handmaid.

@Conifold In a 2017 comment of yours to the question: "What is the argument from tolerance for cultural relativism? Why does it fail?" You say that “Tolerance has to be made into an absolute value over and above cultural differences” Does this mean that you are NOT an absolutist in your abhorrence of absolutism? Maybe in order to avoid the slippery slope of pluralism/cultural relativism/multiculturalism? I realize that I am conflating cultural/moral and conceptual/epistemic and relativism/pluralism. But as Putnam discussed, the boundaries here are fragile and porous.

@Conifold By "there at work [while] not spelled out" are you talking mysticism, form of life, or making some kind of transcendental deduction? Pierce's abduction, for instance, starts with [an] observation/s then tries to come up with the simplest most likely/best available explanation for IT (the observation or phenomenon observed). The act oh hypothesizing has a [grammatical] object. A means has an end. What you seem to be talking about is something quite different. BTW I always had trouble with Dewey's means/ends discussion too.)

Despite the fact that they may tend to perniciously exacerbate the instability of our only remaining compass, consequentialist utilitarianism. And does not the absolute criteria-less acceptance-i.e. anything goes- of pluralism/diversity tend toward nihilism?

@Conifold And consequentialist utilitarianism, never particularly reliable as a way to constitute such desiderata, becomes increasingly unstable as the notions of pluralism and the inclusion of diversity tout court become free floating ends in themselves: essentially non-truth apt “hinge” concepts, not to be questioned. And, like all hinges, they serve to reintroduce a dose of absolutism into the culture...

@Conifold, again, agreed. Truth is not fixed, eternal, absolute, and unchangeable. The issue with pragmatism, however, is that in order for something (an idea, policy, tool, etc.) to "work", to be useful or successful in its practical application, etc., there must exist, goal or purpose, an end, a desiderata. Something pragmatism has has a hard time coping with, notwithstanding Dewey’s attempt to resolve the issue with his argument that the means by which a policy supposedly achieves its end necessarily calls into question the value of the end. Simply broadening the dilemma.

As always, @Conifold, your analysis is literally impeccable. However, you have surely have noted over the years of commenting upon the many queries that I've posted in this "vein," that my concern is not pedantic, but how the cultural ethos, folk epistemology, the ideal of democracy itself, is to accommodate the evolution/conclusions of late 20th C academic epistemology. Have another look at that brilliant article you recommended to me surveying various justifications of the "slippery slope" notion. What happens if radical skepticism becomes the norm outside of academia?

An excellent point. But that there are "no equally acceptable accounts which are pragmatically incompatible." is an empirical question. And pragmatism begs the question "works for what," or toward what end?

Okay, gotcha. Quine is indispensable. Rorty must be perused, but may may have gone a little overboard (which he almost copped to in responding to Ramburg's critique), but do consider adding Donald Davidson and Hillary Putnum to your list. Also, check out Conifold's many posts here. The guy is very knowledgeable, a true philosopher, and brilliant. Carry on.

I have come close to getting Lakoff's book several times over the years, but never got around to it. Have a look at chapter two: Persons Without Minds, of Richard Rorty's 1979 opus Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature here: circulosemiotico.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/…. Contrast this with the ideas expressed here: philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/31516/…

Also, you refer to "a framework of being foundational to scientific methods." How would you describe that framework. Finally, How will AGI simulate embodiment, enabling it to "create processes of inference and categorization through an interplay with the environment." Or are you proposing, for instance, that only a fleet of cloud computing "robots" moving through actual environments (something like a fleet of driverless cars, each learning from both the environment it frequents and the environments frequented by its cohorts) will be found to actually be capable of instantiating AGI?

Thank you for this answer. Please describe the category mistake here: "[AGI] will eliminate the realist-anti-realist debate showing that the same category mistake that applies to mind-body dichotomy, software-hardware dichotomy, etc. is at work with realist and anti-realism."

Thank you. Me too. Not too much interest here. And the politics stack is full of philosophical neophytes and raving lunatics.