user333310
4:45 AM
I came here for the memes

2:54 PM
There was a mildly interesting RSA decryption challenge there. It was clearly off-topic, failed migration to security.s.e, and (rightly) got deleted. Here is a copy:
A message that has been encrypted twice with RSA, with the following keys:
Public key #1
n = 24016279469503302311768363568486449460171750320351449411053109064904102702186605‌​107662009320942295421144872090146373296123251966130145432041792751439876360474093‌​585612002400165121650447690296909966552951831431726123370359155905316115223804791‌​521947206341327545023938257688891564488348042571100942123588832599
e = 11
Public key #2
n = (same)
e = 19790125945807415789658145157375071027246291152591354370026201735017896966524113‌​139937447258966451429481110907853851830992620307669610880090286370444761219125493‌​131857702493160092401045045642774942777030593168550028854084081011541093705747800‌​29908357870187035294088105105999982886731850954738596033927830763
Ciphertext
c = 19077240875014404240513831497347701592496448798525581251271555405125029031254112763878818905801024929555186756783763228867690958988427269235733424681439935493781830895580741081706308780868332000845463226253464982424465795348256005266884842524968814407751760246714244563807678549191109606785376890867915099095

my guess on that one would be that the private key which belongs to the public key e'=e1*e2 ($e'=e_1\cdot e_2$) is susceptible to wiener's attack

3:36 PM
My guess was that e2 was intended to make d2 small, we could use Wiener, factor n, then solve. It turns out that both methods work and SEJPM's saves having to factor n.

4:20 PM
@EdwardR.Murrow memes you say? aww, now I need @e-sushi to teach me how to inline images in chat

4:35 PM
ah there we go

2 hours later…
user333310
6:22 PM
Tasteful abdominals and crypto chatter. I'll invite j edgar hoover

9:23 PM