About a day ago I asked another question, about both your posts addressed to me about illusionism, which became a hot network question five hours ago: philosophy.stackexchange.com/q/99905/58715
@Dcleve On reflection, I now suppose that the dualism you are referring to is the one revealed by a theory of mind: some things have minds, and others do not. As toddlers have at least a rudimentary theory of mind (I agree that there is good evidence for that), then in some sense you could say they are dualists.
This is not, however, the dualism that physicalists, panpsychists etc. reject. Every dichotomy has a dualism in the sense you appear to be using it in the argument here, and dichotomies are ubiquitous (every distinction creates one). In the philosophy of mind, however, ‘dualism’ refers specifically to the premise that the mental does not arise from physical processes, so there must be something else in addition.
If this is what you mean, your argument here is premised on an unsupportable equivocation over the term 'dualism.'
The Symposium
The Symposium