@ThoriumBR well, I guess it's just statistics: 97% of all the companies they have checked (about 400 companies)
Cited: "The research was run using ImmuniWeb's free online Domain Security Test, which combines proprietary OSINT technology enhanced with Machine Learning, to discover and classify Dark Web exposure". Not sure how accurate that could be, I'd feel like investigating further but I don't have time now
I would never trust such an automated testing tool. There's no standard to validate against (unlike, say, TLS for ssllabs.com) so the number of false positive and false negatives should be huge.
I'm calling B.S. and your typical FUD. The fact that seeing the dark web results requires signing up for a "Free Demo" is very suspicious. They probably have a "crawler" for TOR or other sites not normally publicly visible, and this is the equivalent of a crappy google search on the results. AKA in some onion site somewhere someone mentioned or linked to security.stackexchange.com, and they just call that an "exposure"
I signed up. "Thank you, we will get back to you within a business day. Expect an email from us and a quick phone call." I hope they do not try to call me, I used a fake phone number. I might try later using a burner phone number.
do you have a firewall? is the connection wired or wireless? is the firmware updated, or is still with the same one that shipped and was built last century?
So... The registration to immuniweb "free demo" is to have a phone meeting of 45 minutes with a sales representative. It does not sounds that "free" anymore.
His LinkedIn profile looks fishy. He lives in San Fransisco, California, but works in Geneva, Switzerland. His profile is almost empty, and that's very strange for someone with his position. The name of his university is very generic too.
My body is like an old Skoda built in '99 that feels shit to drive, looks ugly as fuck, moves like shit, makes weird noises it shouldn't be making and people wonder a.) why the fuck this piece of shit is still working, and b.) why anyone on earth would want to have that.
My mind is like a machine-learning algorithm gone wrong, because it was simultaneously overfitted and underfitted, and now when letting it loose on real-world tasks it is stuck in an endless loop marking e-mails as read without ever reading them.
Gosh, how I hate resumes. I bet I could put "security expert" in my resume, and then include a picture of me in front of my computer, with passwords written in a sticky note on my monitor. And somebody would hire me
@reed lol. At least I actually have a degree in Security and Risk Analysis with a focus on Information and Cyber Security, and the networking certs to back it up xD
stick me in an avatar that's equipped for combat. I have some... things... that need to be done. (20mm gatling cannon, rocket launcher, maybe dual-mounted 50-cals, and some missile launchers? A rail gun would be nice too but we don't have those... yet...)
TIL: You can block people from installing a bittorrent client by not giving them Administrator rights, but that does not stop the bundled adware from installing into the AppData folder.
if your deskop is part of a domain, sure, not having admin rights limits the amount of damage you can cause... but on a local desktop there are so many ways to doing harm that admin most of the time isn't much needed...
That doesn't make sense to me, but I'm also not a windows person. Why does being an admin on your local machine and being part of a domain mean you can cause more trouble?
a local admin can read all memory of the computer, and access any passwords on it. if a domain admin logged on that computer in a short time, that password hash could be compromised. several attacks can leverage that hash and end up creating a domain admin account for the attacker. and a domain admin can execute ANY command on ANY computer in the domain with SYSTEM privileges...
there are a couple constraints, so it does not mean "local admin = instant domain admin", but usually a domain admin compromise starts with a local admin running mimikatz and exploiting misconfigured settings on AD...
think of this scenario: attacker gets local admin, deletes an app critical file so the user will ask for support help, support logs in using privileged account (not domain admin) to fix issue, attacker gets the password of that guy, uses that credentials to hop around, running mimikatz and grabbing more hashes, until he lands on the computer of a domain admin. having the domain admin, he can push a scheduled task domain-wide to execute anything he wants...
@ThoriumBR It still seems strange to me. I think it is of the connection between "local admin" and "network admin who can admin all computers". Probably because I've always just had a "standalone" computer and especially avoid windows like the plague. I've never even seen AD.
