What I've been doing:
I've been working on creating a HttpOnly cookie to prevent cross-site request forgery (CSRF). I've had trouble creating a HttpOnly Cookie on a POST(login) request. I did find an alternative solution where I can res.send(token) then in my store where my token is sent I can ca...
it's infuriating as a customer when I call my ISP because they got a routing loop (and all packets get back with TTL exceeded in transit) and they ask me to reboot my router, and my computer, or plug my mouse on another USB port...
really, I once had to ask the customer service to transfer my call to engineering, because the script is so dumb it would end nowhere...
I got transferred, told the guy that the routing table on the routers A and B were wrong, he yelled about it to another guy, asked me to call back in 5 minutes if needed... it wasn't needed, as they probably reverted the change and rebooted the routers
took less time than to convince the customer service to transfer me to engineering
Sometimes, when I connect to a WiFi network, usually my own home WiFi, if the connection isn't functioning correctly (has happened a few times, not sure of the cause), I would get a message in my browser telling me to log in through a portal to use the WiFi. My university has a WiFi portal on 172.16.x.x but my home WiFi should be 192.168.x.x so I seems like the cause shouldn't be in that confusion. Of course, when I get the unexpected "log in prompt", it never actually works.
How would we respond to a CA compromise? I've learned of DigiNotar but it's been a while since. I'd imagine most servers and apps would remove the CA asap and that CA may go bankrupt, but what else would/should we do?
The problem is knowing what you need to know, in order to learn what you want to learn. Often knowledge isn't linear, and to really understand something you need some background information, which in turn needs other background information to be understood.
I really have much more questions than I have answers, and sometimes I feel like this loop will never end
@JohnZhau a CA compromise is a compromise of the entire TLS infrastructure. Except by a few minority that set the CA on the DNS records, every single TLS protected site around is affected.
my personal domain have the CA fixed on the DNS zone, and I doubt anyone would gain anything by MitM-ing my own personal domain, but few other domains are setting the CA on the DNS... as any certificate issued by any CA is valid for any domain, one compromised CA means the individual (or group) in possession of a CA certificate can impersonate almost any website...
if they get the certificate from, say, Noob-CA, they can issue a certificate for verisign that is signed by Noob-CA and it would be valid
@MechMK1 I recently realized that I'm like 2 months behind on xkcd and existentialcomics. It's so sad... (mainly the existential comics - I don't find xkcd as entertaining these days)
@ThoriumBR, I looked that up, it looks like it's DNS CAA records, but I don't understand how that can help. From what I understand, a CA must first check if that record exists to see if they are authorized to create a certificate. But if the CA is "compromised", what forces the compromised CA to follow the rules and actually check? My reasoning: compromised CA => avoid checking
@reed Although I'm a bit out of the conversation, I think the idea is that the browser (or more generally, the client) is the one doing the checking. As a result the client is going to check the DNS and can do that regardless of whether or not the CA is compromised
That's why I'm here, to gently steer the discussion away from this boring place called "on-topic" and instead discover the vast hellscape known as "off-topic"
His discussions are great to. I'm assuming he is just giving a factual description of the person at hand:
Hegel did recognize that a large part of society, namely the uneducated poor who had no real hope of advancement, which he called "the rabble", were excluded from political and social influence, and more or less condemned to live and die as poor laborers (Prussia was just transitioning from Feudalism to Capitalism at this time). However, he seemed to not really be too bothered by this.
In addition he somehow seemed to not think this progression of the "consciousness of freedom" would ever apply to women, and he seemed to think that Democracy was less free than a Monarchy (although in his conception the Monarch would have very little real power). He also expounded many theories for why such a consciousness of freedom had failed to arrive in places such as Asia and African, and let's just say, well...that not all of his ideas aged so well.
@ConorMancone, I just found a question and answer here on SE, basically CAA is only meant for CAs, browser should not implement any checks (and they don't). Pity.
@reed what the CAA record does is specifying that you will use that CA for issuing certificates. for example, my personal domain says it will be created by letsencrypt, and only it. If verisign issues a certificate for my site, my domain records says it should be from letsencrypt and the browser should reject the certificate
but as plain dns is plaintext over udp, it's possible to change the response in flight and remove the CAA record from the respone
the typical CA adversary aren't a typical user, but a typical oppressive government...
they usually own the ISP, own the links, own the laws, own the media... but the CA usually is outside
so they create their own CA (state-controlled), issue certificates for gmail, hotmail, facebook, mitm their population and guess how journalist's sources get caught...
A definition of an Insider Threat in enterprises/organizations context is: "A current or former employee or business associate who has access to sensitive information or privileged accounts within the network of an organization, and who misuses this access."
I would like to know if such a threat ...
@ThoriumBR I don't think they are a great fit here anyway. I VTC for "Opinion based" but I think that "Off topic" would be just as applicable. After all, we're not a dictionary.
The idea of using jargon is that people understand what you mean. When you say "Insider Threat", 99.9% of all security folks will know what you mean, even if you don't present a formal definition. — MechMK112 secs ago
Tell me one person who has to deal with the concept of an insider threat, but needs a definition of the word
@ThoriumBR are you sure the browsers are supposed to check the CAA record? According to this answer, CAA is only meant to be checked by CAs: security.stackexchange.com/questions/180903/…
@ThoriumBR, yeah, so basically to me CAA doesn't seem to help much if you want to mitigate the treat of a compromised CA. The Certificate Transparency Logs OTOH seem more appropriate