The Side Channel

12:00 AM

Literal last chance: Can we for the sake of a hypothetical argument, assume that your scheme is perfectly secure? Regardless of the key size.

Tom

you can just state your argument, no need for rhetorical questions

MickLH

There is absolutely a need for them, but you have violated my "last chance" for you, sorry. I simply do not have the patience to educate you about formal logic and arguments built from axioms... just so I can educate you about mathematical proofs and security reductions... just so I can show you why that idea didn't work when I studied it very, very deeply last year.

Take your paper to a crypto conference, please :')

My ego begs you, because it's not bruised at all, just laughing.

Tom

seems like you have a bit of a formality inferiority complex

MickLH

Please, I beg you to go to a crypto conference with it lol

Or take it to absolutely anyone qualified in the field, at all period

PLEASE I beg you, asap.

Tom

I might meet more people like you who won't formalize what they need for themselves

MickLH

12:03 AM

I not only formalized it precisely, but also proved the security / key size trade off for an idealized version of your scheme.

If you could explain how what I did does not match that, then we can talk.

Tom

you're just reaching to try to get me to slip on your formality banana peels -- look, a mario joke!

I told you that your argument relies on there being less data than is used in the hashes

MickLH

No sir, I've never taken this stuff at uni. Just so you know how deeply wrong you are about every assumption you've made here.

Tom

you know that, and that's what's driven you crazy

I didn't assume that

I just said I think you have a formality inferiority complex

MickLH

Dunning–Kruger effect

The Dunning–Kruger effect is a cognitive bias in which low-ability individuals suffer from illusory superiority, mistakenly assessing their ability as much higher than it really is. Psychologists David Dunning and Justin Kruger attributed this bias to a metacognitive incapacity, on the part of those with low ability, to recognize their ineptitude and evaluate their competence accurately. Their research also suggests corollaries: high-ability individuals may underestimate their relative competence and may erroneously assume that tasks which are easy for them are also easy for others. Dunning and...

Please read, this exactly describes your situation with security proofs.

Tom

and that seems even more plausible now you've told me you haven't studied this at a university

MickLH

12:05 AM

Explain to me how a security proof works.

Tom

look up: appeal to authority

MickLH

@Tom Explain to me how a security proof works.

Tom

you know I don't need to do that

MickLH

I am 100% sure you do not know.

Tom

it's just your last attempt to have some cred

MickLH

12:06 AM

If you expect me to believe that you're possibly competent, then explain to me how a security proof works.

Just a basic overview

Tom

and then do I have to explain how a simple logical argument works, and then what next

is this at all necessary: answer is no

MickLH

You're only making me more confident in your incompetence.

I am being a vastly kind person to continue trying to help you in the face of your deep disrespect.

Tom

LOL. no, you have like a power-trip thing going on

MickLH

So how does a security proof work?

Tom

and your friends are going to read this chat and be like, wow he was owned like crazy

MickLH

12:08 AM

Ok lets be specific, how does YOUR security proof work?

Tom

friends, just read the whole chat

MickLH

No man, I'm sorry to tell you that everyone here will laugh at you.

Tom

you can keep trying to layer the insults to try to hide how your argument was wrong

MickLH

I am reaching the end of my rope, you have to explain why your security proof means anything if you expect anyone to take it seriously.

Can you please put your ego aside man, seriously damn.

Tom

no, you lost your rope a while ago

when your argument failed

MickLH

12:09 AM

@Tom Why does your security proof mean anything?

You still have not given any justification for your claims, and have resorted to ad-hominem several times now.

Tom

you can keep using the words 'security proof' and hope to bury your failed argument

MickLH

Why would anyone ever trust your scheme?

Tom

no, your bloom filter argument failed, and now you're trying to bury it

MickLH

My bloom filter argument is 100% factually correct.

Why would anyone ever trust your scheme?

Tom

yeah, factually correct for the wrong inputs

MickLH

12:11 AM

1 hour ago, by MickLH

By setting the false positive rate equal to $2^{-s}$ and using a (standard) approximation, you can find that with an optimal choice of $k$ and arbitrary choices of $n$ and $s$, you have determined $m$ as approximately $m=\frac{n s}{\log(2)}$

Tom

I'm gonna leave you to this, because I don't want to give you the opportunity to bury the real argument any more

MickLH

Who's burying anything? You're running away and not answering :')

I just re-posted the core of my bloom filter argument

Debunk it

Or prove your security directly another way

Anything at all, I'm reaching out far to help you here

Tom

it was debunked about an hour ago, before you buried it

MickLH

Then link to where you de-bunked it :')

Tom

you're making my point

anyone who is serious can read the paper here: docdroid.net/WZcw7uq/simple-hash-signature-scheme.pdf.html

MickLH

12:13 AM

$m$ is the number of bits in an optimal bloom filter, $s$ is the security parameter, and $n$ is the number of private hashes

My above argument shows that not only can your scheme not achieve the required security in the given size, but also no scheme based on bloom filters at all can.

You can debunk that directly, or you can ignore it. I was nice enough to put my ego aside and say lets ignore that.

But you still have to prove the security if you want to claim it's secure

Tom

wow you should share that result in a paper somewhere. your argument was debunked... and now it's too obvious that's what's made you go nuts

MickLH

And if you want to claim it's as secure as SHA3, then you have to reduce some security definition of SHA3 to your scheme.

Tom

you need to read the paper

there was never the statement that it is as secure as SHA3

MickLH

Ok I read over it again

Tom

that's quick!

MickLH

12:19 AM

It's short

Tom

needs thought though

MickLH

First thing is first. All egos aside. Period. One infraction and I disappear without warning.

Tom

all egos and it's a deal

I'm not hanging around much longer either, so let's move with this

MickLH

Give me a moment, there's so many problems it's hard to pick where to start and if I pick the wrong one your ego will explode again -_-

Tom

I thought you said you were leaving your ego aside

MickLH

12:23 AM

That statement was not motivated by ego on my part

Tom

it was subconsciously: you tried to suggest I was the one with the ego exploding

MickLH

I genuinely am concerned that if I start at a random point, you'll quickly try to justify such a point and then somehow imply that it must be secure if you can justify a certain anecdote

Tom

well the reason I'll reply relatively quickly is because I've been working on the project for long enough to give quick replies

MickLH

But that's not the problem

It's the way you'll assume that if you can defend one point, the whole thing must be secure

And then become attached to your feeling of security, and put too much faith into the defense that may have worked for you but I will not accept anything less than mathematical rigor

I consider this an "explosion" because it's a system that increases its own rate

(and destroys all intelligent thought within a radius)

Tom

it's just not logical that your bloom filter argument can work: there are hashes being created with index counter data in each one, and so there's plenty of data being hashed into the filters; when you first stated it you seemed to be saying that there was only 256-bit information going into the filters, and that's not true

no, I can imagine there's a flaw somewhere in it, it's not the first time I've designed something complex

MickLH

12:27 AM

Well look, just in that sentence alone there are two points glued together in an invalid way

And it's completely based on a proposition that is false, I never used the fact that there is only 256 bits of random seed information

I've given you the benefit of the implicit random oracle assumption and everything

Tom

and have you included the counter/index data?

MickLH

Ok you missed what my small point there was... It's irrelevant.

I'm not saying anything about 256 bits going in

Every public key system can have the private key compressed to 256 bits securely by storing only the seed for the PRNG used to generate the private key

Please stop attributing that to invalid argument to me. I absolutely never even implied such argument and it's clearly wrong anyways.

A "strawman" argument... as you falsely accused me of earlier

Tom

so is that theorem you stated earlier about the bloomfilters including the data from the index/counter?

MickLH

Now please bear with me, and be aware of your own tendency to misconstrue my point as a strawman argument and then make the anecdotal fallacy upon (handwavingly) disproving the strawman.

Tom

I'm listening very carefully

MickLH

12:32 AM

This is just one small detail, but an example of how the premise isn't formulated rigorously

Tom

but also noting that you aren't answering the question about if the argument includes data from the counter/index data

MickLH

Because that question is worthless and irrelevant

"Yes"

It factors in all possibilities in the universe, even theoretical

That's what "optimal" means, move on.

The inclusion/exclusion argument implicitly assumes that the only way to forge a signature is by using keys that have already been seen.

But then you do not go on to prove that it is the only way to forge

What if I forge some other way?

Not using purely known values, and not using brute force exactly either.

What if I find a more efficient hybrid search algorithm? Prove I can't.

Tom

we have talked about this already: the message they provide must be hashed using SHA3-256, and the output is infeasible to predict, so that constrains effectively to brute force

MickLH

That's the "brute force" I was referring to, and actually that's also wrong, but I'm being loose for you

I'm saying what if I can avoid the difficulty of brute force by using known values, yet not need all values known by doing some type of search algorithm faster than brute force

Tom

I'm also being loose, because I can't see a reason not to be loose at this stage

MickLH

12:37 AM

(When I say that's also wrong, I mean that you didn't prove that the specific way you use SHA3 is as hard to brute force as just an SHA3 hash alone.)

Well you'll have to trust me that there is a reason to be rigorous.

This is exactly the stage where you need to be rigorous.

Side question, don't assume I'm like you, this is not an insult. Are you in high school?

Tom

no way past high school

MickLH

Just wondering if maybe you're just getting into the field or something is all

Tom

you can't avoid having to have a message that hashes to the signature you're proposing

MickLH

You don't have to tell me, I fully understand your intuitions...

For all intents and purposes, I trust you on it

I'm asking you how you've proven it.

It's just like algebra, just manipulate your mathematical facts until they take the form of what you want to show

Tom

part of the definition of a cryptographic function is that it's infeasible to choose an input to get a desired output without already knowing the mapping

MickLH

12:42 AM

We already covered that, and we're assuming that SHA3 is a perfect random oracle.

But even if SHA3 itself is perfect, that doesn't prove anything about the specific way you use it

Just saying "the message is hashed so it can't be forged" also doesn't prove anything

Tom

no, you asked why someone can't use anything other than brute force, and I'm saying that they would have to manipulate the message to get a working (in the sense of gaining verification) hash output

MickLH

"manipulate the message"

define.

I could easily change every bit of the hash randomly, that's a manipulation

Tom

they would have to change the message?

you would have to change the message

you can't affect the hash

directly

MickLH

I can easily change the message, I don't care what message I sign

As long as I sign a message, I forged.

Existential forgery counts as broken

and I'm still going WAY easy on you to be nice

Tom

I thought you were leaving your ego aside

MickLH

12:46 AM

Again, this is not from ego, you want me to bust out my ego so you know what that looks like?

Tom

yes, you can try to sign a message you change, but any deliberate change to the message will cause unpredictable output from the hash function

not really, I want you to just focus on the problem

as you suggested earlier

MickLH

Trust me, I am

I am frustrated that you aren't

But I don't blame you for not knowing

I do, however, blame you for resisting when it got uncomfortable

Tom

you just asked me some questions, I answered, and you just jumped off the problem again

MickLH

sigh I'm still waiting for an answer

Tom

and you're bringing back this power play stuff

MickLH

12:48 AM

I explained why that's not an answer, let me ask in different words.

Tom

I said: you can change the message, you will get unpredictable output, so you must use brute force changing the message

MickLH

You didn't prove that last part, see.

What if instead of brute forcing the message completely, I just brute force a much smaller space of "Messages that are more easily broken using some known values"

Lets say a hidden pattern emerges in the layout of the filters, and 1 in a billion is easier to deal with

Tom

it's implied from the fact you can't control the output: you won't be able to try the hashes you want, ever, so your hypothetical about doing anything other than a brute force is impossible

MickLH

So I only need to brute force 30 bits and now I can use an efficient attack.

Tom

(that was an answer from above)

MickLH

12:51 AM

Prove that there's no such weak points in the rest of the verification system after SHA3

Even if the message and the signature data are both hashed securely... I might find a message where there are significantly many valid signatures, because of maybe one of the statistical independence assumptions being invalid

(One very well might be in that complicated system of bloom filters!)

Tom

right, well now we're on to the probability arguments. because once you've gone through the SHA3 we're dealing with for practical purposes a random distribution of inputs from whatever changes you make

MickLH

That's the random oracle assumption btw

Tom

sure, that's fine

MickLH

You really really need to say RO instead of SHA3 otherwise nobody in the field will take you seriously, only hobbyists.

Ignore that advice if you want lol

Tom

ok, just assume I say random oracle

and if you give me the OK after going through the rest of the scheme with that assumption, I'll even add it to the paper

but I think we both know that's what's assumed anyway

MickLH

12:54 AM

Earlier I said we can't use "you know what I mean"

That is the point I am still trying to drill in

"you know what I mean" leaves room for everything to quietly be wrong

Tom

I'm 100% aware of formal arguments, no need to drill

I'm also aware that I need to get the idea to people, and then they can complain, but know totally that's what was assumed

because if I focused on formalizing 100% then the paper would take too long to publish and get feedback

MickLH

I'm not asking for 100% formalized at all though

I'm asking for a bare skeleton of a formal argument at the very least

You're leaving it up to magic why I can't just do something else, outside of brute forcing the hash function

Tom

to me SHA3-256 implies random oracle

MickLH

We. Covered. That.

You keep refusing to explain why you can't break the scheme, even assuming the hash is a true random number

Tom

oh, so you've given that. I thought you were still debating it

MickLH

1:00 AM

No. I said literally first thing a long time ago I gave you that

I've always given you that

I've given you every single thing I reasonably can

Tom

I was wondering why it seemed like an issue

MickLH

and even every stretch I could make

Because your intuition is fooling you

Everyone's does.

Tom

no

MickLH

Reductions simply feel backwards

Tom

I've actually said the next step too

MickLH

1:01 AM

Do NOT say "no" without explaining why sir.

I am ready to believe your "no"

Just explain what a reductionist argument is

Tom

so you now are forced to provide 8 private hashes that hash to something that can get a positive response from the CORRECT bloom filter for the public hash that should come -- remember we are deciding the index by modulo

MickLH

(sure, and I'll ignore how in your paper you said "closest unused" one)

But you still have not explained what a reduction is.

If you don't have the respect to discuss a "reductionist argument" with me, which I am insisting is the next and most important step of your proposal, then we are done here!

Tom

it's not going to reduce

MickLH

That's a huge and ominous statement to make off the bat

Tom

well it's you that wants it to reduce

MickLH

1:05 AM

Pause

Reduce what to what?

Tom

I'm assuming you want it to reduce to the security of SHA3

and we've done this already also

MickLH

No

Tom

it is not the same problem

cannot be reduced to it

MickLH

Triple wrong now

Let me know if you open your mind one day and want to learn something

Tom

you can simply tell me what you want to share

you've said you want me to explain what a reduction is

I'm saying it's irrelevant

MickLH

1:07 AM

I've learned not to trust you with that, because you throw it back in my face arrogantly.

See, you already assume it's irrelevant

Yet you do not even understand the purpose of using it.

Dunning–Kruger effect

The Dunning–Kruger effect is a cognitive bias in which low-ability individuals suffer from illusory superiority, mistakenly assessing their ability as much higher than it really is. Psychologists David Dunning and Justin Kruger attributed this bias to a metacognitive incapacity, on the part of those with low ability, to recognize their ineptitude and evaluate their competence accurately. Their research also suggests corollaries: high-ability individuals may underestimate their relative competence and may erroneously assume that tasks which are easy for them are also easy for others. Dunning and...

Tom

no, that's your ego again

MickLH

Not at all, but here's my ego since you bring it up: When I said I didn't take classes at uni, it's because I spoke at them ;)

Tom

I'm using straightforward logic. you can choose your methods. there's no reason to use anything other than what's implied by the paper

MickLH

Hold on, more of my ego: You don't pay me and I doubt you could ;)

Tom

awesome

damn your ego is spilling over

MickLH

1:09 AM

Nah I got dayzzzz to go

Tom

I'm sure if I wanted to pay you I could lol!

MickLH

Lol, how much?

Tom

anyway that's not a logical argument

millions

MickLH

If it's 9 figures or less it's a joke to me

hahaha yeah... you couldn't pay me

Tom

I wouldn't pay you

MickLH

1:10 AM

most cheapskates wouldn't ;)

well at least, not until they waste a million trying to avoid me and then have a fire under their ass and need it done right overnight

Tom

I'd have to get a logical argument from you without resorting to unnecessary formalities

MickLH

We tried that, you blocked it and kept bringing up ego

So we're on about ego now?

Tom

no, you keep bringing in ego

MickLH

Me saying you are low-skilled is not of ego.

Period!

It's simply factual.

Tom

so show your cards, what's your great claim to fame?

mario-style dubstep?

which I like btw

MickLH

1:12 AM

And me saying your low skill impairs your ability to judge your own skill is again, not ego but factual

It's not an insult, it's advice

No human is immune

It's something to deeply consider in any new field for the first few years

Tom

right.... are you going to answer a serious question or try to act tough

MickLH

I do mostly research and management

Tom

I don't know many such people who earn millions

MickLH

Nothing special, I just know how to tackle a project and figure it out. I also had the drive to start my own companies

Tom

right so you're not the uber success I was hoping

MickLH

1:14 AM

Oh, I am, but I won't rub it in your face too much

Tom

please do

MickLH

jk you couldn't imagine my life

Oh jeez

Tom

I'm sure it will wipe off easily

I'm sure I can

MickLH

How often does a woman from another country you'd like to visit shower you in gifts and beg you to stay with her for a while?

Honestly

Tom

lol I don't waste time with gifts

MickLH

1:16 AM

hahaha ok man ;)

Tom

I have my own toys

MickLH

Have fun with your life

Tom

no, you're just getting started right?

elaborate

I've got my face wipe ready

MickLH

Tom I don't have time to argue with high schoolers, sorry.

Tom

this is like poker

you've got a bad hand, I can tell

MickLH

1:17 AM

I used all my time I was gonna give to the internet today, plus almost 20 minutes

If you have anything objective you'd like to ask, go ahead

Tom

aww... so rich you don't have the freedom to chat online

here's something objective: what's your net worth

MickLH

Well you know, doing what you love takes time

Tom

hmm, sounds like you don't have so much money

sounds like you might be a contractor in san francisco

MickLH

Hold on, I'm being a nice guy and finding out for you :P

Tom

looking forward to it

check with your girlfriend

you don't need to bring up your pension spreadsheet, just give a number from your accounts recently

MickLH

1:22 AM

Hold on, there's actual real life details to deal with when you run a company, I'm curious for myself now so I'd like an accurate answer

Tom

this will be good

not really on top of your business having to do so much calculating

would it be faster if you leave out the thousands (and below) and just give ballpark??

MickLH

About half a billion

And I didn't do any calculating, I just had to get ahold of busy people

Tom

sounds realistic

MickLH

Anyways I'm 30 minutes past my cutoff and it's setting an improper example to masturbate ego when I should be working

Peace!

Tom

sure. I mean would be nice to have some evidence with such a claim

but we'll leave it at that

and if anyone wants to look at this paper about a new hash-based signature scheme, please do: docdroid.net/WZcw7uq/simple-hash-signature-scheme.pdf.html

@MickLH would have been nice if you could have added something instead of obstructing all the time :(

@MickLH I didn't know such rich people spent so much time using javascript... only 4 years ago? stackoverflow.com/questions/20201042/… LOL!

SEJPM

3:10 PM

@Tom for post-drama-clarification: security proofs want to do:
hard(A) AND hard(B) AND ... AND hard(Letter) -> secure(sytem)
But because it's hard to show this directly, we use contraposition and show
NOT secure(system) -> NOT hard(A) OR NOT hard(B) OR ... OR NOT hard(Letter)

Contraposition

In logic, contraposition is an inference that says that a conditional statement is logically equivalent to its contrapositive. The contrapositive of the statement has its antecedent and consequent inverted and flipped: the contrapositive of P → Q {\displaystyle P\rightarrow Q} is thus ¬ Q → ¬ P {\displaystyle \neg Q\rightarrow \neg P} . For instance, the proposition "All bats are mammals" can be restated as the conditional "If something is a bat, then it is a mammal...

@MickLH I suggest if you want to avoid frustration in the future:
If you decide a situation can't be salvaged / isn't worth your time, don't just threaten to leave, actually do it and "cut your losses" ie accept the way things are as you have already assessed them not being able to turn out well

Tom

@SEJPM thanks for keeping it factual, but I think I need to explain why I'm not providing a formal proof of security in this 'paper'. I'm not a professional cryptographer -- obviously -- but I've studied algorithms and logic at a reasonably high level. the 'paper' is to share an idea, and requires people to apply a bit of logic themselves to fill in the obvious lack of formal proofs. this might seem like I'm trying to be lazy....

but actually it's because writing up formal proofs isn't something I do regularly

ArtOfCode

Better advice: if a situation has resolved itself, don't kick it back up.

2

Tom

and perhaps what's missing is that it's not mutually exclusive: you can valuably suggest a creative approach that could ultimately be proved formally, but not provide the formal proof

this seems obvious to me, because in mathematics conjectures often came before proofs. and sure, it could be wrong, but that doesn't prevent it being valuable for discussion

Ella Rose

4:26 PM

@Tom You might consider checking out the algorithmic tag/package for LaTeX and including some psuedo code of your algorithm in your paper. I read it, but I had a hard time understanding exactly what it was doing; Mathematical notation is not my preferred notation, given a choice; English/code are easier. Even so, I could not really understand exactly what your proposal was. Something about hash based signatures and bloom filters, but more detail is really needed if it is to be implemented.

your paper mentioned an implementation; You might consider linking to it in your paper, though you might want to stamp a disclaimer that says something like "not prepared for use in the real world yet"

Oh, right, and please don't think that Mick is representative of our community - most people are actually nice and helpful, if a bit too busy to read the complete proposals that are semi-regularly suggested here

Tom

@EllaRose that's a really good couple of suggestions, I'll look into that now. and no problem about the community, life has interesting/challenging social dynamics!

SEJPM

6:13 PM

mirror.hmc.edu/ctan/graphics/pgf/contrib/tikzpeople/…

^ for your people needs in your next paper

Tom

@SEJPM that's very cool!

Tom

6:57 PM

@EllaRose here's a new copy with pseudo code starting page 2: docdro.id/lWUHV5c

Meta Crypto SE

7:39 PM

0

Q: (When) are reference requests actually on-topic here?

I recently realized that we have some contradictory documentation on our site (and, probably, contradictory beliefs and opinions among users) about the topicality of questions asking for off-site references. In the interests of consistency, and of ensuring that we don't offer contradictory advic...

ArtOfCode

8:27 PM

→ 3 messages moved to Trashcan

it'll get your messages binned. Let's not.

MickLH

thanks

@Tom If this is a real question... because I genuinely enjoy helping people especially with technical issues. This is also why I've insisted on helping you even as the social interaction became uncomfortable.

Tom

@MickLH that's not it. but like the moderator says, best to 'not'

MickLH

@Tom I misunderstood the purpose of your paper before, so sorry about that too. I had simply assumed that you had training or at least experience in the field, and that you wished to produce meaningful contribution. I hope you see there is no ill-intention there.

Not at all, it's complete honesty

Maybe it was rude, and if so sorry? I don't see it. It's sure not sarcastic though

I spent quite a bit of my own time trying to assist, which is a quite nice gesture

Why? It's factual

I had assumed he meant to propose a useful scheme, the only way to make it "nice" would be to remove the actual meaning.

Tom

@MickLH I'm quite sure technically you have no idea what you're talking about

MickLH

That does not matter, and it honestly is a thinly disguised ad-hominem

The fact of the matter is, you proposed a scheme, and I identified problems with it. You've been increasingly resistant to these problems since the point where the technical issues surpassed your actual skill level in the field.

If you want to pretend nothing is wrong, go ahead. Cryptographers will never consider it though.

CodesInChaos

8:42 PM

@MickLH Pointing out the flaws in a scheme is fine. The way you conduct yourself here is not.

SEJPM

Mod Invasion D: :p

MickLH

@QPaysTaxes Well thanks for the advice? I genuinely do not see how this is any less rude.

It sounds far more flippant to me, in fact

But I just said the facts straight without fluff -_-

SEJPM

Welcome @RoryAlsop @Xander @ArtOfCode :p

MickLH

We're completely subjective at this point

ArtOfCode

how about... stop?

MickLH

8:45 PM

The meaning of the sentences is the same, and if "feelings" matter then this is ridiculous to me but I realize my feelings don't matter without a blue diamond.

Well I assumed the drama was resolved to be honest. I gave everyone the benefit of the doubt of acting mature.

The security argument, however, is not resolved.

Yourself?

ArtOfCode

rolls eyes

MickLH

You're being incredibly rude to me here.

It's over then? I'm done with it

ArtOfCode

just stop engaging each other, both of you

MickLH

Now wait

ArtOfCode

if you stop replying, conversations come to a close remarkably quickly

Xander

8:47 PM

@MickLH I'll take you on your word at that.

MickLH

Tell me up front, is everyone actually over it? Or just pretending to be?

I'd much prefer to get back to objective and mathematical discussion about crypto

ArtOfCode

@MickLH let's do that then

Tom

@Xander maybe you'd have some good input as a professional security consultant about the scheme I'm proposing: docdro.id/lWUHV5c

Xander

@Tom I'm getting ready to wrap up and head out on vacation, but will take a look when I get a chance.

Tom

@Xander excellent, thanks!

Xander

8:58 PM

@Tom You'll get good input from the rest of the folks on the site here as well though...Most of them have credentials and experience in this field far better than mine.

Tom

@Xander yeah, I'll keep shopping around for input, the more the better (more eyes see more bugs etc)

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