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6:29 PM
That moment…
 
 
2 hours later…
8:10 PM
Well... after working really hard, I've mostly salvaged my proposal!
but not without some damage to the efficiency... the security proof demands a prime field, which sucks because a binary field would make every operation a lot cheaper
but it's not just an artifact of the proof strategy, I've even constructed a working attack in the binary field case, so those benefits were simply too good to be true
The prime case was the original design anyways, now the only remaining sketchy assumption is about the distribution of prime factors of random numbers of the form $p - 2^\lambda n$ where $n$ is uniform and $p$ is prime.
 
@MickLH $0<n<p$?
 
Yes
In fact you could even assume $n^3 < p$
 
@MickLH Is $\lambda$ a fixed constant?
 
Yes, typical security parameter
 
so something like 128, 192, 256?
 
8:19 PM
Yep exactly those 3 in my experiments
 
and I guess $p$ has to be in the 2048-bit range?
 
Probably, maybe it can be as low as $4\lambda$ though
 
@MickLH ask on Math.SE whether they have any ideas?
 
If a non-negligible fraction of those $p-2^\lambda n$ values admit a set of prime factors for which we can find a subset product that is in $[2^{3\lambda}, 2^{3\lambda+1}]$, then I'll be very happy
@SEJPM I guess I'll have to... it's awkward to me even trying to formulate exactly the question I'm after
 
@MickLH that may already help you solving your problem
 
8:27 PM
@SEJPM Do you know of any work that characterizes the effect of the dimension of an LWE problem with exponentially large modulus?
 
@MickLH I've no idea about LWE-related research
 
damn. I'm scared that I've interpreted a reduction incorrectly, because only needing one dimension seems too good to be true
Either way I'm very excited, even if the density of the special numbers turns out to be too small, there is still room for a large paranoid choice of dimension while still improving on key size of any other PQ scheme I can find
 
9:24 PM
0
Q: Factors of integers of the form $p-2^\lambda r$.

MickLHHere $p$ is an odd prime, $r$ is uniform on $[0, 2^\lambda]$, and $\lambda$ is a constant. We define distribution $\mathcal{D}$ by: $$x \xleftarrow{\$} p-2^\lambda r$$ Assume $p \approx 2^{4\lambda}$, $\lambda \in \{128, 256\}$, and $0 \leq n \leq \log_2 \lambda$. Do a non-negligible fraction of...

I posted it... sigh
 
9:36 PM
(though, even if the answer turns out to be "No." it only costs $2\lambda$ bits into the public key to mitigate the weakness it would induce.)
The only real issue is that Keygen takes 15 minutes for 128-bit security level, and takes about 35 minutes for 256-bit security level.
 
@MickLH keygen or parameter generation?
 
Key generation :'(
Even fancy parameter generation only takes seconds
 
@MickLH you may want to replace the $r$ with an $n$?
 
thanks, updated, been away from reals so long I totally didn't think of that :P
Open question: Is it worthwhile to cut the size of the public key in half, at the expense of a really slow Keygen?
(the keygen time can come down to milliseconds, if we just store more data in the public key)
 

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