thank you for that description which quite unlike my understanding of phenomenal. Can you provide sourcing for that? Clearly my understanding is similar to your last paragraph, that drifted apart from the others where you say, "it has certain non-material properties," and "you can't observe the characteristics of a noumenal object; you need some other source of knowledge such as religious inspiration." Those statements suggest phenomenon require an observer and material properties, where as noumena don't. My understanding is more consistent with en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phenomenon

My description is essentially the same as Wikipedia (at least in the philosophy section). It's just that the Wikipedia entry uses some ambiguous phrases like "phenomena has come to mean things which are experienced by the senses". The word "things" here refers to a kind of things, not to individual things. English tends to be ambiguous about this if you aren't careful. I believe if you reread the article with my explanation in mind, you will see that it can be easily read to agree with my description.

"whether an object is phenomenon or noumenon is determined by what kind of things it is, and not by human knowledge." That's a personal bias of yours. Modern philosophy of science holds central to its practice that knowledge is the "essence" of defining what a thing is. The argument you put forth is a stale, absolutist theological argument called natural kinds (SEP). You should probably also brush up on scientific undetermination so you don't continue to pass off failures of Scholasticism.

"The Epistemology of Natural Kinds" is literally a subsection in the entry showing how intertwined epistemology and the determination of things have become.

@JD, as usual you are insulting and downvoting me because of your personal animosity and not because you have any expertise in the topic. Here are the things you get wrong in your enthusiasm for attacking me: since I was only explaining the terms and not taking a position, it makes no sense to accuse me of bias. No, modern philosophy of science does not hold knowledge is the 'essence' of defining what a thing is. In fact, that sounds distinctly Aristotelian. Modern philosophy mostly views definitions as purely linguistic and not requiring or providing knowledge.

@JD, as to your diatribe about natural kinds: (1) I wasn't giving an argument, but an explanation. (2) my explanation doesn't appeal to natural kinds, and (3) the concept of natural kinds is not theological or "stale", it is still widely used in science and philosophy. Finally, nothing in my answer had anything to do with underdetermination. I'm sorry that our disagreements have made you so upset, but your efforts to retaliate against me with uneducated, snotty responses to my answers does not contribute anything of value to this site.

It's amazing how you ignore the primary issue and instead engage in strawman attacks claiming I claimed your answer had anything to do with natural kinds. Your erroneous claims about the divorcability of epistemology and ontology was my primary focus, and my counterclaims were just to ensure your misinformation doesn't persuade anyone that is the case. Just like when you claimed 'consent' isn't a topic for philosophical discourse despite it being a central ontological concern in action theory and ethics, you again make bizarre philosophical claims and then move the goal posts.

And apparently, you are unfamiliar with the operational definition, which is a central technique in the social sciences where accrued knowledge thrpugh procedure is de facto existence. G factor exists on the basis of the fact a test produces empirical knowledge. But it is clever that you try to paint me as hateful when I argue against your questionable claims.

The difference between us is that when I downvote, I provide a rationale, and you just repeat the lie that I hate you in loaded language. You are good at professing victimization. Lots of practice being "oppressed" by those who disagree with you?

@JD, you: "engage in strawman attacks claiming I claimed your answer had anything to do with natural kinds" also you: "The argument you put forth is a stale, absolutist theological argument called natural kinds (SEP)." Also "Your erroneous claims about the divorcability of epistemology and ontology was my primary focus" yet those words never appeared in your comment, nor did I make such claims.

@JD: but sure, you aren't holding grudges from previous conversations. You: "Just like when you claimed 'consent' isn't a topic for philosophical discourse". Oops. Also you: "you just repeat the lie that I hate you". There was no repetitions. All I did before was note that you went around looking for my answers--some weeks old--to insult my answers and downvote them. None of your criticism showed any knowledge of the topic beyond a quick Wiki read to try to find something to criticize.

I apologize for the scuffling between you and @JD, but I remain eager to understand better. So let me approach this from another direction. Epistemically, what is the difference between what someone sees in the forest and what they deduce happened, or induce what they are going to do about it. If it's not a phenomena/noumena thing, what are the epistemological equivalents?

@Christopher You needn't apologize for anything. I disagree vehemently and have exercised my right to do do. That's the purpose of this forum. As for your question, it's on the head...

We can perceive existence or we can conceptualize it. When there's a difference, we have the phenomenological/noumenological existence. So you see a mirage of water in the desert, there is the phenomenon, but reaching it it disappears which is inconsistent with water, so it's existence requires epistemic interpretation as opposed to the visual intuition you first experienced. The knowledge of optics is then adduced to explain the visual intuition. Thus, the appearance of water and the existence of the mirage satisfy the dichotomy of phenomenon/noumenon...

This is why ontology can't be divorced from epistemology...

In fact, the existence of a subatomic particle whose existence is defined by a wave function is an example where there is no direct perceptual intuition for its existence, but rather the mathematical knowledge is literally the definition of its being... hence without the epistemic tools of mathematics, it cannot be said to exist, and why under the Copenhagen interpretation, the particle is both a wave and a particle depending on the scientific apparatus to make manifest...

Its existence. What Kant argues is essentially that much of what we claim exists differs between what we perceive and intuit, and what we reason about its being, but since reason has limits and perceptionn is imperfect and shaped by our intuitions we can't really know the object itself, das Ding an sich in German.

Phenomenologists take that idea and run with it with ideas like bracketing perceptions of being themselves are suspended to strip away assumptions through epistemic discourse.

This is why in a discussion about the dichotomy between phenomenon and noumenon it's a logical contradiction and an utter misapprehension to claim ontology is separated from epistemology. But you're free to believe what you want.

Caveat emptor. Cheap ad hominem in the form of claims of persecution is a tactic of the uninformed. Good luck.

@Christopher, I've added to the end of my answer to try to address this question.