> In 1968 Boeing modified the flight control system (stability augmentation system, as I recall) for half the B-52 fleet. Each crew was briefed and given classroom training, but despite the effort, it was still possible to be assigned later to fly an airplane without notice which had the new system installed, and some confusion to be experienced. One of the aircrew reports you quoted echoed, 50 years later, the same complaint.

The fault, in my opinion, lies with the airlines involved and their associated training. Flight positions are coveted, nobody in one wants to rock the boat and adm…

> You may be aware of the concept of articulation work … the know-how that humans bring to operating technology, including work arounds. Pilots routinely take for granted that their performance must include learning about design flaws and training to work around them.

[JF note: Yes indeed. A huge part of training, for various certificates and ratings, and for regular proficiency checks, is devoted to “What if this goes wrong?” scenarios. What if the engine fails right after takeoff? What if you have to land when all the plane’s electricity, which powers its instruments, has gone out? What …

> As I’m sure you know from the documents that Boeing has shared with the FAA, MCAS is “supposed” to function only during manual flight phases, with a clean configuration and autopilot off. And it’s clear that many pilots are now aware of this as well—viz: the pilot in the first ASRS report you cited, who stated, “I mentioned I would engage autopilot sooner than usual (I generally hand fly to at least above 10,000 ft.) to remove the possible MCAS threat.” Clearly this pilot was aware that engaging AP should, allegedly at least, disable MCAS.