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Anonymous
4:00 PM
@BalarkaSen Aha! So what exactly is the difference between $\mathbb R/\mathbb Z$ and $[0, 1)$ in terms of topology?
 
They are not homeomorphic. One is compact, one is not, for example.
Amongst many other things.
There is no "THE difference", because there's so many differences.
 
Anonymous
@BalarkaSen I see. My confusion was basically that I was thinking $\mathbb R/\mathbb Z = [0, 1)$
 
@Balarka Do you happen to know whether $R[x,xy,xy^2,...]$ is a non-finitely generated $R$-algebra for a commutative ring $R$? For $R=k$ a field, this is the standard counter-example of a non-f.g. sub-algebra of a f.g. algebra, but I don't see the more general version stated anywhere, yet can't figure out where the proof would fail if $k$ is not a field.
 
"=" is correct if you're thinking set-theoretically. Correct if you're thinking measure-theoretically. Wrong if you're thinking topologically.
 
Anonymous
So could you like explain how to think of $\mathbb R/\mathbb Z$ topologically?
 
4:04 PM
As a circle. I don't know what else to say. It's homeomorphic to $\{z \in \Bbb C : |z| =1\} = S^1$.
 
Anonymous
@BalarkaSen I mean, how do you define $\mathbb R/\mathbb Z$ in topology? I don't really know much about toplogy.
 
Go read Munkres.
Quotient topology
 
Anonymous
I was looking for a brief explanation but anyway thanks
 
@Thorgott At a first glance, this feels it should be true for any $R$, no?
 
I think so too
but it's only stated for $k$ a field everywhere I look
so I'm second-guessing super hard
but I can't find any step in the argument that fails for $R$ not a field either
 
4:08 PM
If it was finitely generated, localizing at (0) would also give you finitely generated as an algebra over R_(0) = Frac R, not?
Assume R is a domain
 
sure
 
But R[x, xy, xy^2, ...]_(0) = R_(0)[x, xy, xy^2, ...] = (Frac R)[x, xy, xy^2, ...]
 
localizing is exact
 
So you get the result from that of fields
 
yeah, that's plausible
but even non-domains shouldn't be an issue, I feel
1 hour ago, by Thorgott
Consider a field $k$ and the $k$-algebra $k[x,xy,xy^2,...]\subset k[x,y]$. If this were finitely generated (as $k$-algebra, now and in the forthcoming) by elements $f_1,...,f_n$, then it would also be finitely generated by the monomial terms appearing in $f_1,...,f_n$, because any polynomial expression in $f_1,...,f_n$ is a polynomial expression in their monomial terms. So assume it is generated by some $xy^{a_1},...,xy^{a_k}$ and pick $n>\max a_i$. Looking at any polynomial expression in $xy^{a_1},...,xy^{a_k}$, we see that any monomial term containing the power $y^n$ necessarily contains
This only uses the representation of polynomials as linear combination as monomials (afaict) and that holds over any ring
 
4:11 PM
Yeah this honestly looks fine.
 
@S.D. Short version is: you have the canonical map $\varphi : \Bbb R \to \Bbb R/\Bbb Z$. Open sets $U$ in $\Bbb R/\Bbb Z$ are by definition exactly those for which $\varphi^{-1}(U)$ is open in $\Bbb R$. The reason this differs from the subspace topology on $[0,1)$ is that $[0,\epsilon)$ is open in the subspace topology, but not in this quotient topology, as its preimage under the canonical map would be a bunch of half-open $\epsilon$-intervals based at the integers.
 
thanks man
felt like I was going insane
 
Another way to express this is to say that any open set in $\Bbb R/\Bbb Z$ which contains $0$ must contain some numbers near $1$ as well (if you're thinking of $[0,1)$ as your representative set)---this is the sense in which $\Bbb R/\Bbb Z$ is a circle.
 
Yeah, the only difference between an interval and a circle is that, on an interval, when you keep going in one direction, you'll just end up somewhere else, whereas, on a circle, when you keep going in one direction, you end up back where you started
and that difference is precisely encoded in the way the numbers "near $1$" behave topologically
 
Yep.
This is how the quotient topology on a quotient set $X/\sim$ is always defined, by the way---it is exactly the finest topology possible on $X/\sim$ such that the canonical map $X \to X/\sim$ is a continuous map.
 
4:17 PM
R/Z is not a circle... its an infinite wedge of circles. /s
 
Question: We talked about soft and hard analysis before. What about a similar classification in algebra?
What is soft algebra? Anything which is functorial, homological algebra-esq?
 
That makes some sense. Maybe you could delineate by saying soft algebra is that which primarily operates at the categorical level, hard algebra primarily "below" that level
 
I don't really like soft/hard as terminology due to the connotation, but I think, for starters, you could distinguish between categorical and explicit things
 
Yeah that's what I meant.
@Thorgott Agree yeah
 
like, whether you just think about maps between objects or these objects in their own right (as sets, with elements)
 
4:22 PM
right
 
say, homological algebra vs. local analysis of groups
 
Sylow's is hard, iso thms are soft
something like that
 
Good examples!
 
ye, agree
 
Sylow proofs are indeed explicit bashing
 
4:23 PM
but I don't think this is a holistic perspective yet
need the AG people to tell what algebra actually is about
 
Lmao
 
the thing is that a lot of universal properties come in both forms
 
sometimes you want to think of them purely in terms of the universal property, other times in terms of their explicit construction
 
"Algebra is nothing more than geometry in words; geometry is nothing more than algebra in pictures"
 
4:25 PM
what does Burnside's theorem say geometrically?
 
Ask Sophie Germain
I dunno
 
the pq-theorem or Burnside's lemma? :P
 
she didn't know Burnside's theorem
former
 
Burnside's lemma lets you count number of cows from the number of their feet
 
I'm not sure if it's geometric, but Burnside's lemma is very explicitly combinatorial
I can't tell you a super intuitive interpretation of Burnside's theorem
 
4:26 PM
An intuitive one, probably not
But there's probably some sort of collection of finite geometries you can cook up where Burnside's theorem says something
 
yeah I dunno the pq theorem
 
I mean, what does it mean for a group to be solvable geometrically
 
That I wouldn't be able to tell you, but a GGT person might
 
is solvability important in GGT?
 
solvable finite groups don't mean anything in GGT because finite groups don't mean anything
but look up Gromov's theorem on groups of polynomial growth
 
4:28 PM
well shoot
 
I can tell you why solvable groups are meaningful things to consider, but I'm not sure if there's a super satisfying intuitive view
 
I just wanted to share a funny Germain quote because of your AG comment :<
 
Geometrically solvable means that the group's balls don't grow too fast
 
@Alessandro How fast
I don't know this
virtual nilpotency is the same as balls growing polynomially
 
Ah no wait I was thinking about nilpotent
I always mix them up
 
4:32 PM
yeah
solvable hyperbolic groups should just be virtually cyclic
 
I mean, I guess I can say that the complexity of isomorphism types of finite groups of a given order depends on the prime factorization of that order and also that solvable groups are, in a sense, made up of abelian groups, so Burnside's theorem says that groups not too complex in some sense are kinda nice in another sense, but this is massive handwaving and not meaningful to anyone who doesn't already understand it.
Also, the complexity depends, roughly, not only on the number of prime factors, but also their exponents, which can still get arbitrarily high for the fixed prime pair in Burns
 
@BalarkaSen Solvable groups are amenable right?
 
I guess a morally right way is to think of Burnside's theorem in terms of the reverse Hall theorem, but mathematically that's completely backwards, because you use the former to prove the latter
 
Because they are build through extensions from abelian groups, which are amenable, and extensions of amenable groups also are
 
yeah because it's an extension of abelian things
Nice
 
4:35 PM
Right, so I agree that hyperbolic+solvable should just be virtually Z
 
Magic proof
 
wow imagine thinking about groups that aren't finite
 
this post was made by Wildberger gang
 
Let H be a load of hogwash
 
So what is a solvable group with exponential growth
Aka what is a solvable group which is not virtually nilpotent
 
4:41 PM
@Fargle It didn't seem like it was Germain to this conversation
 
@MikeMiller I was looking for that pun, but couldn't find it. Well done
 
hello, if $X$ is compactly embedded in $Y$, is it compactly embedded in $X\cup Y$ ?
 
GIVE EXAMPLE
Where are the GROUP THEORISTS
Where are they NOW
Solvable with no nilpotent guy of finite index
Pure algebra
Give
Is lamplighter solvable?
Of course it is
LAMPLIGHTERS
@Alessandro Dude it's good to be at the top of group theory
Only pure geometry
 
what about the trivial group tho
 
Pobody's gerfectly neometric
 
4:47 PM
oh wait, the trivial group is nilpotent
ok, then no finite group will do
 
G <- finite group
crumples G
throws it in the dustbin
That's what GGT does to finite groups
Every finite group is geometrically a point in GGT
 
yeah, out of spite
 
No literally
 
GGT is TOO WEAK to handle finite groups
 
Every finite group is quasi isometric to trivial group
Because finite group theory is trivial
 
4:50 PM
does this make quotienting by finite subgroups basically useless in GGT?
 
tell me your favorite proof of feit-thompson
 
@Fargle yeah
it doesn't change the quasi-isometry type
$G \times (Monster group)$ is quasi isometric to $G$
 
gotcha
 
and that product can be any extension of groups or whatever
 
I mean the monster group is just made-up nonsense anyway
I don't believe in monsters
$D_3$, on the other hand, that's a real physical thing. I have that set of six troublemakers in a little box in my basement
 
4:55 PM
lmao
user image
4
 
LMAO
 
5:24 PM
finite groups are all indistinguishable from the ggt point of view
 
5:52 PM
When is Frac(R) a f.g. R-algebra? Certainly not when R is factorial and has infinitely many primes, but not sure about other cases.
 
Anonymous
Is there any measure in which all subsets of the reals are measurable?
 
No, this is Borel's theorem
Well, assuming you want [a, b] to have measure b - a
Which you probably want
 
do you have a reference for that Balarka
I remember you mentioned that a while ago, but I couldn't find it
 
Let me look
 
Anonymous
@BalarkaSen Interesting, I see
 
Anonymous
5:56 PM
Like Thorgott says I'd like a reference too
 
Anonymous
The Wikipedia page doesn't say much
 
Anonymous
By the way, I wonder why measure theorists don't use a definition (axioms) of measure that allows all subsets of R to be measurable
 
it does
$\mathcal{P}(\mathbb{R})$ is a perfectly fine $\sigma$-algebra
there just aren't any good enough measures on it
 
Anonymous
@Thorgott By good enough you mean such that [a, b] has measure b - a?
 
I mean such that [0,1] has measure 1 and translation-invariant, i.e. Lebesgue measure
cause that's what anyone who is being reasonable wants
asking for something a bit less restrictive will quickly lead to questions that are independent of ZFC, curiously
 
Anonymous
6:01 PM
@Thorgott Well, then let me rephrase my question as: why don't measure theorists use a definition (axioms) of measure that allows all subsets of R to be measurable with "good enough" measures? :)
 
I don't understand your question
 
Anonymous
Or is such a definition not possible?
 
the definitions allow this
it's just that such a measure does not exist
which is, of course, Vitali's theorem
 
@BalarkaSen most aesthetic thing I've read today
 
Anonymous
Eh, I was talking more about changing the definition of "measure" so that such a measure exists for all subsets of $\mathbb R$. I mean it would be useful to have a notion of length for all subsets of $\mathbb R$.
 
6:04 PM
Hi
 
here's something related to the problem mathoverflow.net/questions/103583/…
that doesn't make sense @S.D.
you can't just define things into existence
 
@S.D. the "reasonable" definition for measure precludes this.
 
that said, there exists a notion weaker than that of a measure, which applies to all subsets of the space, a so-called outer measure
 
You can weaken it, sure. But that doesn't mean what you get in the end is representative of what you want.
 
Anonymous
I guess I just want a reasonable notion of length for say the Vitali set, such that the length of any interval [a, b] is b-a.
 
Anonymous
6:07 PM
@anakhro I see, interesting
 
the Lebesgue outer measure is the closest thing to that
 
Anonymous
Ah, the Wikipedia page on outer measures seems good
 
Anonymous
> In the mathematical field of measure theory, an outer measure or exterior measure is a function defined on all subsets of a given set with values in the extended real numbers satisfying some additional technical conditions.
 
Result 8. See footnote as well
Manju hasn't given a reference but I can ask him sometime
Or maybe you can figure it out somehow. How hard can it be?
Gotta get dinner, seeya
 
very hard, I assume
I think this is closely tied to some difficult set theory
cya
I found this in Bogachev: "1.12.40. Theorem. If a finite countably additive measure μ is defined
on all subsets of the set X of cardinality ℵ1 and vanishes on all singletons,
then it is identically zero."
due to Ulam
so this takes care of it if we assume CH
"A cardinal κ is called real measurable
if there exist a space of cardinality κ and a probability measure ν defined
on the family of all its subsets and vanishing on all singletons."
so the set-theoretic phrasing of this question is whether the continuum is a measurable cardinal
"1.12.44. Theorem. The supposition that measurable cardinals do not
exist is consistent with the ZFC. In addition, if either of the following assertions
is consistent with the ZFC, then so are all of them:
(i) two-valued measurable cardinals exist;
(ii) real measurable cardinals exist;
(iii) the cardinal c is real measurable;
(iv) Lebesgue measure can be extended to a measure on the σ-algebra of
all subsets in [0, 1]."
the fact that this is a theorem stated this way seems to imply that the measurability of c is open, no?
 
6:50 PM
What's the question @Thorgott
 
if we know whether c is measurable
 
It isn't
But it can consistently be real-valued measurable iirc
 
I mean real-valued measurable by measurable, I think
existence of probability measure on the entire powerset that vanishes on singletons
 
is the image of a regular submanifold under a diffeomorphism a regular submanifold?
 
Ok so, $\mathfrak c$ isn't measurable because measurable cardinals are inaccessible. It can be real-valued measurable, but that has the consistency strength of a measurable cardinal (as the theorem you're citing says), which is strictly higher than the consistency strength of ZFC
 
6:56 PM
So is result 8 stated in these notes math.iisc.ernet.in/~manju/PT/Lectures-part1.pdf wrong or am I missing something?
 
We don't ask $\mu((a,b))=b-a$ if $\mu$ is to witness the real valued measurability of $\mathfrak c$
Ah but wait, we can construct such a measure if $\mathfrak c$ is real valued measurable
Yeah I think result 8 needs a translation invariant or something similar thrown in
But I might be missing something, those things are too tricky
 
oh, duh, you're right
that's an additional requirement
so the non-existence of such a measure is actually not a claim about the measurability of c
this is all perfectly consistent
 
@Thorgott Right but (iv) here says that result 8 is wrong as stated, doesn't it?
 
also true
theorem 1.12.44. is pretty surprising
so I guess there is something missing after all in result 8 after all
 
I'm not sure, I've seen it with translation invariance before, but then the proof is not hard like the footnote suggests, because you can do the usual Vitali set argument
 
7:06 PM
yeah, that's clear
if result 8 is true as stated, it would definitely be hard
 
but since I'm willing to believe Bogachev, this would imply that measurable cardinals don't exist, which should be open?
or is it actually undecidable
 
Hm I'm not sure where the mistake is. But 1.12.44 and result 8 can't both be true unless I'm being stupid, and I think Bogachev is a reliable source
@Thorgott It's independent of ZFC
Actually the situation is a little subtler than that
 
independence would mean that both it and its negation are consistent with ZFC, no?
 
Yes but that's not quite true
 
7:09 PM
but then we would have result 8 by theorem 1.12.44
 
Let me explain, CH is independent of ZFC meaning that ZFC proves Con(ZFC) implies Con(ZFC+CH) and it also proves Con(ZFC) implies Con(ZFC+~CH)
So ZFC+CH or ZFC+~CH have the same consistency strength of ZFC, if one of those theories is consistent so are the others
But ZFC+there is a measurable cardinal has higher consistency strength, if ZFC is consistent it cannot prove Con(ZFC) implies Con(ZFC+a measurable cardinal)
So we believe that a measurable cardinal is not inconsistent with ZFC, but that cannot actually be proved in ZFC itself (unless ZFC is inconsistent of course)
 
so it's undecidable in ZFC?
 
We believe that, but it cannot be proved in ZFC
 
can we prove that it cannot be proven within ZFC or is that a claim true in a stronger system?
 
ZFC proves that ZFC does not prove Con(ZFC) implies Con(ZFC+a measurable)
Man I hope I'm not messing this up, it always confuses me
The thing is that if you have an inaccessible cardinal you can use it to build a model of ZFC, and then Gödel bites you
 
7:19 PM
ok, I think that makes sense
so that and theorem 1.12.44. means that ZFC proves that ZFC does not prove result 8, no?
 
yes, if theorem 1.12.44 is true, then result 8 isn't (unless having a measurable cardinal is inconsistent with ZFC, which would be HUGE lol)
 
it would definitely be huge, but a priori not impossible if I understand this correctly, right?
Bogachev cites 1.12.44. from Jech's Set Theory btw, so that's most certainly true
 
yes, it is possible that a measurable cardinal is inconsistent with ZFC, but measurable is very weak in the large cardinal hierarchy
 
@AlessandroCodenotti what do you think about this large cardinal?
 
7:42 PM
thank you Leaky
 
Still my favorite large cardinal
Stolen from a quora answer
 
@Thorgott you're welcome
 
Howdy, @Leaky, @Thor, demonic @Aless
 
hi
 
7:58 PM
hey Ted
 
rehi
 
howdy, a @Balarka ... what is this with Burnside dividing by 4 for you?
 
yeah its something dumb
 
@Balarka dunno if you backread, but result 8 from the notes you cite is most likely stated incorrectly
 
I'd be surprised if it is incorrect
Manjunath is usually a trustworthy source for these kind of things
 
8:12 PM
it would imply that the existence of real-measurable cardinals is inconsistent with ZFC
 
ok lol
shoot him an email and ask
 
(which isn't a contradiction, if I understood Alessandro's explanation correctly, but it's believed to be untrue)
 
I very much doubt Manjunath is wrong on these sort of things; he's a big probabilist. You can ask though
 
$\mathbb{R}^d$ valued functions $f$ in $L_n(\mathbb{R}^n)$ whose distributional partial derivatives of order $1$ belong to $L_n(\mathbb{R}^n)$. Furthermore, the Lorentz norm $\lvert \lvert \triangledown f \rvert \rvert_{L_{n,1}}$ is finite.
Is anyone aware of any classification of functions that satisfy this?
Or at least some of it
 
What is $L_n$
$L^n$?
 
8:17 PM
Ye
I hope anyway, otherwise I've misunderstood the paper in a big way
 
maybe I should email him
 
Sounds like a Sobolev space to me, Drat.
 
I'll have to check Jech's set theory for a relevant result before to make absolutely sure tho
maybe there's a slight loophole
 
Seems like this has something to do with Ulam
 
Yeah this is called $L^{n,2}$
 
8:21 PM
Did you check the original Ulam reference
 
in your notation
I'd call it $L^n_2$
 
which Ulam reference?
 
That's referring to the first two properties right? I assume that the Lorentz norm property isn't part of that
 
the $\aleph_1$ result seems irrelevant as long as we don't assume CH
 
@Drathora What would you call the Lorentz norm?
 
8:22 PM
what is the N_1 result man
does CH imply result 8?
 
"A function $f \in L^n$ whose distributional partial derivatives belong to $L^n$" is called something in $L^n_1$
The $L^n_1$ norm is $\|f\|_{L^n_1} = \|f\|_{L^n} + \|\nabla f\|_{L^n}$
 
CH implies result 8
 
Oh, Lorentz norms are complicated
I don't know this stuff. Sorry for saying nonsense
 
@Thorgott Oh, so done
What's the big deal
 
there is no measure defined on the entire powerset of a set of cardinality $\aleph_1$ that vanishes on all singletons
 
8:25 PM
Yeah I'm struggling to decipher this Lorentz norm business.
 
except the trivial one
 
I'm sure every sane person assumes CH
 
do they??
 
In any case, CH is consistent with ZFC (as in non-CH) so I don't understand "most likely result 8 is incorrect"
seems like you're doing a set theory prank to me
of course man he's a probabilist. he doesn't give a shit about CH
lol
 
I said incorrectly stated
 
8:29 PM
Yeah but that makes you sound like an annoying pedant
But more seriously I think he'll appreciate it if you tell him this result depends on CH.
You should email
 
cause my understanding was that it implies a set-theoretic claim that is not known, but believed to be false
I think my understanding may be flawed though
here's a question
if we had such a measure satisfying \mu[a,b]=b-a for all the intervals, then it would necessarily agree with the Lebesgue measure on all Borel-measurable sets, but does it have to agree with the Lebesgue measure on all Lebesgue-measurable sets?
 
Honestly don't know
 
I think not without some regularity assumptions
 
This stuff is too technical for me
 
cause I'm not sure if theorem 1.12.44. from Bogachev (which is the crux here) is about the Lebesgue measure on the Borel- or the Lebesgue-algebra, but I'd assume it's the latter
in which case the implications I mentioned actually don't exist
 
8:32 PM
@BalarkaSen [stars this meme] reject modernity. embrace tradition
 
ahh I'm getting a headache from trying to decipher set theory statements
 
Never been much of a masochist
wouldn't know
 
I don't wanna figure out what a $\kappa$-complete nonprincipal ultrafilter is
 
good
 
So wait how would such a measure measure the set of irrationals in [a,b]?
 
8:39 PM
@CalvinKhor LMFAO
 
What are you saying is $\mu (X)$ where $X$ is the intersection of the irrationals and [a,b]
 
the set of irrationals has full measure
 
Alright good
 
Full Measure Analyst: Borelhood
sorry
 
@Thorgott just a nonprincipal ultrafilter closed under intersections of cardinality $\kappa$ rather than finite ones
 
8:44 PM
@Alessnadro just a LKJJHJGFHLFJKHLKJFHLKJFH
thats how i read your sentence
 
the connection with measures is that if you have an ultrafilter $U$ on $X$ you get a finitely additive two valued measure by saying that stuff if $U$ has measure $1$ and stuff outside has measure $0$
 
Ah
No that makes sense
 
And if you have such a measure the set of sets of measure $1$ is an ultrafilter
So what do you get if you have an actual two valued measure rather than a finitely additive one? An ultrafilter closed under countable intersections
For a measurable cardinal we usually ask that $\kappa$ has a $\kappa$-additive measure, but that makes no difference, ZFC proves that if there is a cardinal with an $\omega$-complete nonprincipal ultrafilter, then there is also a cardinal $\kappa$ with a $\kappa$-complete nonprincipal ultrafilter
 
@BalarkaSen lol that caught me off-guard
so it seems that Jech talks about two-valued-measurability but Bogachev talks about real-valued-measurability
I'm big confuse
 
Jech talks about real-valued measurable cardinal in a later chapter
Chapter 22
 
9:08 PM
urgh, I can't figure any of this out
I'll just ask for a reference for result 8 and if there is one, the result is true and if there is none, it isn't
 
CH implies result 8 man you just said it
Assume CH
Goddamn
 
why would I
 
why would you not
 
cause I don't like assuming significant axioms out of nowhere
 
I don't like you
rekt
 
9:12 PM
but do you like the fact that residue fields of finitely generated Z-algebras are necessarily finite?
 
There's actually some strong forcing axioms that imply not CH that set theorists like a lot
 
see, that's what I'm talking about
I'm all about those forcing axioms
 
@Thorgott sure man. You have a finite type morphism $X \to \text{Spec}\, \Bbb Z$ of schemes, and you're saying a geometric point lifts to finitely many goemetric points along this.
Pure geometry
 
nice
 
9:42 PM
Let $U$ be an open subset of $M$. Consider the inclusion map $i$.Then, $di_p$ is the identity on $T_pM$ for $p\in U$.
right?
 
no, it's a map $T_pU\rightarrow T_pM$, so it can't be the identity
 
$T_pU=T_pM$
tangent space is defined on germs
hence if $U$ is open in $M$ then $T_pU=T_pM$ for $p\in U$.
 
Yes, orientablesurface, you're right.
Restricting the range, it's the identity map $U\to U$.
 
well, not literally equal, but if you make that identification, then yes
 
9:47 PM
Yes, literally equal.
 
What do you mean? yes, literally equal
$C_p^{\infty}U=C_p^{\infty}M$
 
Thorgott shut up
 
If we're in $\Bbb R^n$, are we going to debate whether the tangent space at any point is "literally" $\Bbb R^n$? I am not.
votes for a Balarka
 
I'm not saying it's a problematic identification, I'm just saying they're not the same set
 
I say you're wrong. We're done.
 
9:51 PM
I am not
 
If $f: V\subseteq M \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is smooth, then $[(f,V)]=[(f,V\cap U)]$, no?
 
Yes you are
 
yes, but you're looking at equivalence classes for equivalence relations defined on different sets
so the sets of equivalence classes aren't the same, even though they're in canonical bijection
 
I have no use for this sort of pedantry. Go away and do your algebra.
 
I'm not completely sure what you mean by the first sentence, @Thorgott
elements in $C_p^{\infty}N$ are defined by $(f,U)\sim (g,V) \iff f\equiv g $ on a neighborhood $p\in W\subseteq V\cap U$
 
9:58 PM
$C_p^{\infty}(U)$ is the set of equivalence classes of smooth functions defined on a neighborhood of $p$ in $U$ by the equivalence relation you give, whereas $C_p^{\infty}(M)$ is the set of equivalence classes of smooth functions defined on a neighborhood of $p$ in $M$ by the equivalence relation you give. There are more (in the sense of proper set containment) neighborhoods of $p$ in $M$ than there are neighborhoods of $p$ in $U$ and therefore also more smooth functions defined on neighborhoods of the former type than smooth functions defined on neighborhoods of the latter type. So you are
(all assuming $U$ is a proper subset of $M$, of course, otherwise they are literally equal and trivially so)
 

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